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Abstract
This thesis investigates some of the key current economic and regulatory chal-
lenges pertaining to grid development. These issues include: investment drivers,
the relationship between investment and static/dynamic efficiency, and integration
of distributed energy resources as alternatives to traditional network reinforcement.
The thesis comprises four essays and uses a range of techniques including theoretical
and empirical analysis in Chapters 2, 3, and 4; as well as conceptual modelling in
Chapter 5. A common feature of the first three chapters is the usage of a dataset
composed of 129 Norwegian distribution companies, observed between 2004 and
2010.
The issue of investment determinants and the responsiveness of companies to
the regulators’ incentives for investment have been investigated in Chapter 2. This
chapter uses a Bayesian Model Averaging technique (BMA) to identify the invest-
ment drivers in regulated firms. The results of the chapter provide an insight into
investment behaviour of network companies under incentive regulation. The identi-
fied investment determinants shed light on the effectiveness of investment incentives
and can be used to improve the process of capital cost treatment under incentive
regulation.
A theoretical framework for the relationship between investment and efficiency,
including the concept of “no impact efficiency”, which is defined as the revenue-
neutral efficiency effect of investment under total cost benchmarking, is introduced in
Chapter 3. The observed efficiency effect of investment and no impact efficiency are
estimated using a Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) technique. The concept of no
impact efficiency is important because it describes the process under which incentive
iii
regulation, with ex-post regulatory treatment of investment, achieves investment
optimality. It also provides a useful benchmark for the sector regulators to examine
the investment efficiency of regulated firms.
Chapter 4 explores the concept of dynamic efficiency under incentive regulation.
In this respect, the notion of “inefficiency persistence” due to presence of quasi-fixed
inputs, under total cost benchmarking, is introduced. The theoretical framework
shows that inefficiency of regulated companies is a combination of period-specific
effects (shocks) and a carry-over component from previous periods due to sluggish
adjustment of capital stocks and/or production capacity. The two components of
inefficiency and the rate of inefficiency transmission between periods are estimated
using a dynamic stochastic frontier model in a Bayesian framework. The results
show that the persistence of inefficiency can seriously affect the companies’ short run
productivity and, consequently, regulated revenues. This can lead to disincentives
for investment and innovation.
An innovative solution to the traditional demand-driven network investment is
investigated in Chapter 5. The feasibility and advantages of adopting a portfolio of
distributed energy resources including distributed generation, storage, demand re-
sponse and energy efficiency as alternatives to grid capacity enhancement, have been
discussed. Also, a market-oriented approach termed “contract for deferral scheme”
(CDS) is introduced in order to integrate these resources under an extended busi-
ness model of distribution companies. The CDS contract protects the developers of
distributed resources from market risks, decreases the financing costs and improves
commercial bankability of investments. Additionally, CDS acts as a proxy for ver-
tical integration and helps distribution companies to improve the efficiency of their
asset utilisation.
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Introduction
Access to a reliable electricity supply is an indispensable part of modern life. Tradi-
tionally, electricity services were provided by public utilities that owned the entire
supply chain from generation to retail (Joskow, 2008). This arrangement of the
power industry, although it might improve reliability as one organisation is respon-
sible for management of the entire sector, suffers from deficiencies owing to lack of
incentives for cost-reducing measures. The monopolistic nature of the industry and
the lack of private ownership caused the cost of services to be higher than optimum.
The inefficiencies in the operation of utilities and the significant scope for cost-
reducing measures were the driving force behind liberalisation of electricity markets
at the end of 1980s (Newbery, 1997). This led to unbundling different elements of
the publicly owned vertically integrated monopolies. In this way, generation and
retail supply, which are potentially competitive, were separated from distribution
and transmission which are proved to be natural monopolies. Thus, the power sector
reform has been accompanied with the introduction of two markets and regulation
of the network segment. The wholesale market was created to allow generators to
compete in order to sell their produced energy. On the retail side, a market was
formed to promote competition for end-user supply.
The liberalisation and privatisation brought along new challenges and opportu-
nities to the power industry1. Form an economic perspective, the introduction of
1The wave of power sector reform was not limited to developed countries as many of developing
2
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competition in generation and retail supply would reduce the cost in these elements
of the supply chain. The competitive pressure in a market with surplus of generation
capacity can reduce electricity prices. There is evidence suggesting that market lib-
eralisation has generally promoted cost efficiency of the sector (Newbery, 1997). At
the grid level, however, the dynamics are different as the networks are natural mo-
nopolies and, therefore, subject to economic regulation (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2001).
The regulation of network companies has always been a challenging task. The regu-
lators around the world have adopted different incentive mechanisms to induce cost
efficiency and mimic the outcome of a competitive market in this segment of the
supply chain.
Reform and regulation of the electricity system is an on-going process, which
aim at its transformation. This involves promotion of a sustainable power system
through large scale integration of renewable resources, deployment of smart tech-
nologies, penetration of electric vehicles and enabling demand side participation.
These, on the other hand, require ample amounts of investment and innovation in
grid infrastructure as the networks need renewal, reinforcement and reconfiguration
to support the transition toward a sustainable power system and, in consequence, a
low carbon economy. The evolution of the operating paradigm in the power industry
makes the distribution networks a crucial element of low carbon economies, which
have a critical role to play in the smart and sustainable electricity sectors of the
future. Therefore, a major current issue is the development of a modern, efficient
and reliable grid that can pave the way towards achieving a sustainable economy.
Overview of the networks in the power sector
Power networks are the crucial component of power systems that transport elec-
and transitional economies also started to implement these reforms. Although, in developing
countries privatisation was received most attention, these countries also aimed at wider reforms
such as market liberalisation and structural changes in terms of unbundling and introduction of new
laws and regulation. However, issues such as lack of relevant institutions, independent regulator,
expertise and quality data impede these countries to fully utilise the benefits of power sector reform.
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tricity from resource-concentrated regions to load centres. Therefore, efficient, safe
and reliable operation of the grid is critical. The grid includes two different networks
for transmission and distribution that are separated based upon their voltage level.
The transmission grid comprises high voltage circuits designed to transfer bulk power
from major power plants to demand areas. The higher the voltage, the larger is the
amount of power transferred though the lines. Hence, the step-up transformers are
used to raise the voltage to the required level. The organisational arrangement of
the transmission system in terms of ownership and control can be different across
the countries. However, in many countries there is often one national company that
owns the physical infrastructure. At the same time, transmission systems are oper-
ated by a Transmission System Operator (TSO) or Independent System Operator
(ISO) (Pollitt, 2012). The management of the transmission grid is done through
control centres known as “dispatch centre”, which balance the supply and demand
and reconfigure the network to tackle planned and unplanned outages for every hour
during the day. In addition to system operation, the ISO usually does the task of
(wholesale) market operation as well.
The distribution grid, on the other hand, transfers power from the transmission
grid to the end user and, ergo, works in low voltage. The step-down transformers
are located at substations to reduce the voltage to a level suitable for distribution.
Unlike the transmission function, the number of distribution companies in a given
country can be high such that each one serves a specific region within the country. In
each area, the distribution network is owned and managed by the regional Distribu-
tion Network Operator (DNO). The DNO is responsible for the efficient operation,
reliability and safety of the network in accordance with the national regulation and
other relevant standards practiced by the industry (Shaw et al., 2010). Distribution
companies are also responsible for quality of electricity supply, based on the terms
and conditions specified in their licence. Almost all the residential and commercial
customers and many of the industrial consumers are connected to the distribution
grid.
Although grid development involves all the elements from transmission to dis-
tribution, the main focus of this research is on the distribution network companies.
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This is mainly because these networks have been experiencing a rapid change in
recent years, as a result of sustainability policies. Distribution grids are originally
designed as passive transporters of electrical energy. However, their operational phi-
losophy is evolving to manage bi-directional power flows and the use of information
and communication technologies in grid operation. Moreover, the penetration of dis-
tributed generation, electrical vehicles and storage facilities create techno-economic
challenges which require grid reinforcement, technological improvement and the in-
troduction of new business models for distribution utilities. Furthermore, distribu-
tion networks are the main points of interaction between the end user and the grid
where many of the new concepts such as demand response, smart metering and con-
sumer empowerment can be implemented. This involves changes in planning and
operation at the distribution level.
The next section discusses the importance of grid and post-liberalisation chal-
lenges of the power sector. These challenges and the need for grid development
are the main motivation of this research. Section 1.2 provides a brief review of the
economic environment of network utilities as regulated natural monopolies. The
objective of the thesis has been stated, in Section 1.3, with a view to the necessity
for grid modernisation in the presence of a regulated environment, which influences
the behaviour of network utilities. The thesis objective, then, has been narrowed
down into four fundamental questions, which are addressed in Chapters 2, 3, 4 and
5 using appropriate methodologies and techniques, as outlined in Section 1.3.
1.1 Thesis motivation
Power sector reform, in the first place, was motivated by efficiency improvements
in electricity supply. However, in the years following privatisation and market lib-
eralisation, a new dimension of energy policy objectives, related to the concept of
sustainability, emerged. This, along with previous policy objectives has originated
an energy trilemma of affordability, reliability and sustainability. The support for
sustainability was motivated by environmental concerns regarding the amount of
fossil fuels consumption and their possible impact on the climate at regional and
1.1. Thesis motivation 6
global levels. Therefore, the international community has endeavoured to reach an
agreement which mandates effective measures, in relation to climate change mitiga-
tion, from all major economies.
These efforts led to the Kyoto protocol in 1997, which sets binding targets for 37
industrialised countries as well as the European Community to reduce greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions. The specified targets require these countries to reduce GHG
emissions by an average of 5% with respect to the 1990 level (8% for EU15 countries)
over the period of 2008-2012 (Capros et al., 2011).
Around 10 years later, in March 2007, in a landmark decision, EU leaders com-
mitted to make Europe a highly energy efficient and low carbon economy by setting
ambitious targets (EC, 2008). These targets, which are known as 20-20-20, aim
at: a) 20% reduction of greenhouse gases with respect to 1990 level, b) increasing
the share of renewable consumption to 20% of the overall EU energy mix and c)
improving EU energy efficiency by 20% (EC, 2007). The 20-20-20 target was later
followed up with longer term commitments at the European level to address the is-
sue of climate change. At the G8 summit in July 2009, European leaders announced
another even more ambitious objective to reduce the greenhouse gases by at least
80% with respect to 1990 level by 2050 (ECF, 2010a).
Although the objective of a low carbon economy embraces all sectors in mod-
ern economies, the electricity sector is at the focal point of any strategy aiming at
mitigating climate change. A significant portion of current CO2 emissions is related
to fossil fuels consumed in power generation. The European Climate Foundation
(ECF) initiated a study to investigate the implications of the 2050 target for Euro-
pean industries and in particular the power sector. The result of this study showed
that transition to a fully reliable and decarbonised electricity sector is a precondition
to achieve 80% economy-wide emission reductions (ECF, 2010b).
Therefore, decarbonising the electricity sector plays a pivotal role in the path
towards a sustainable economy. Achieving this goal entails promotion of large scale
renewable energy resources, including onshore and offshore wind and photovoltaic
cells, enabling effective demand side participation, deployment of smart technologies
and empowering consumers to have more control over their energy consumption.
1.1. Thesis motivation 7
A green power sector, also makes electrifying the transport industry worthwhile.
These, however, require an efficient and modern power grid which is able to support
integration of renewable resources and also provides sufficient level of flexibility,
reliability and resiliency.
The design and technology of the current electricity networks in many countries,
and especially at the European level, date back to around half a century ago. Accord-
ingly, these networks lack the required capacity, flexibility and resiliency to address
the current and future challenges of the power sector. This problem, if unaddressed,
will result in bottlenecks for renewable integration, congestion in the distribution
networks, higher risks of power outages, loss of quality of supply and finally emission
target failure. In what follows, we briefly review some of the most significant post-
liberalisation challenges in the power sector, which affect the future development
of the grid. These challenges include integration of renewable resources, smart grid
deployment, market issues, network security and quality of supply. Some of these
issues such as smart grid deployment, market issues and network security are not
directly addressed in the thesis but they are still relevant to the overall discussion
on grid development and rationalising the thesis objective.
1.1.1 Integration of renewables
A shift to renewable resources has been viewed as an effective measure of energy
conservation and climate change deceleration, which can contribute significantly
to CO2 reduction by 2050 (IEA, 2011). At the European level, many countries
have started to increase the share of renewables in their current energy mix. The
European electricity generation from renewable resources has been doubled from 100
GW in 1995 to 200 GW in 2008 (Ruska and Kiviluoma, 2011). Although around half
of the renewable generation capacity in 2008 was related to hydropower resources,
wind power 25-folded over the aforementioned period and dominated the non-hydro
renewable capacity (Ruska and Kiviluoma, 2011). Furthermore, in 2009, wind power
reached 39% of newly installed generation capacity in the EU (EWEA, 2010). This
made the year 2009 the second year in which wind power installation surpassed
any other generation technology (EWEA, 2010). The fast penetration of renewable
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resources in the EU energy mix necessitates investment both in non-intermittent
generation and grid modernisation.
The required average investment in order to meet 20-20-20 target, with respect
to renewable resources is estimated to be between 61 to 70 billion Euro annually over
the period 2011 to 2020 (Klessmann et al., 2013). The current level of expenditures
and renewable development is different across the member states and therefore re-
quires different levels of effort to achieve the renewable target. For example, in 2005,
the share of renewable resources in gross final energy consumption ranged from 1%
in Luxemburg to 42% in Sweden (Capros et al., 2011).
The rapid growth of renewable energy in recent years has driven the European
network capacity to its limit and consequently has created several technical chal-
lenges which can hinder further penetration of these resources. Also, promising
renewable resources, such as offshore wind, are located far from load centres and
require grid expansion and reinforcement to transfer energy. Perhaps the lack of a
sufficiently modern and developed grid to support renewable integration is among
the most serious obstacles facing penetration of these resources. In practice, the Eu-
ropean renewable targets, geographical restructuring of conventional power plants
and projection of demand rise have already created bottlenecks in some regions as
the network does not meet the N − 1 reliability criteria due to 100-180% overload
condition at times of high wind power (Battaglini et al., 2009).
1.1.2 Smart grid deployment
The increasing concerns with the capability of the current electricity grids to support
a sustainable power system (through integration of renewable resources and the use
of electric vehicles (EVs) as a clean replacement for conventional cars with combus-
tion engine) heightens the interest in the notion of smart power grids. The basic
concept of smart grid is to add monitoring, analysis, control, and digital commu-
nication capabilities to the electrical delivery systems to maximize the throughput
of the system, technically and economically (Poudineh, 2012). The intelligent grid
management, together with effective regulations, reduces the technical challenges
of renewable energy integration and electric vehicles uptake. Overall, the areas of
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smart grid function include grid operation and utilisation optimisation, grid infras-
tructure optimisation, distributed resource integration, new market and end user
services, ICT services on the grid, and active distribution network (Agrell et al.,
2013).
The ability to match changing electricity demand and supply in real-time is
vital for reliable operation of the power system, revenues of utilities, and security of
supply. An increase in the share of intermittent renewables sources, in the generation
mix, raises the stochastic characteristic of power supply. At the same time, the
output of intermittent resources does not necessarily coincide with the demand. The
development of a smart grid environment helps to absorb part of the supply variation
(Clastres, 2011). This will be done through the adoption of smart technologies that
facilitate access to dispatchable demand and supply resources for the purpose of
system balancing.
Likewise, a shift to electrical vehicles (EVs) will increase demand for electricity
which varies with respect to time and location. On the other hand, many of the
existing electricity networks are not designed for the extra load from electric vehicles.
This is because EVs will be a new load on distribution feeders while many of these
circuits are already being operated at their maximum capacity. Thus, parts of the
network on the medium and low voltage levels might be unable to deliver the demand
and this can potentially disrupt grid stability and significantly affect power system
dynamics (Webster, 1999).
It is expected that deployment of a smart grid environment will facilitate pene-
tration of intermittent renewable resources and electric vehicles. Load control in a
smart grid environment is done using demand response, local energy storage, con-
sumption scheduling, real time pricing signals and local demand signals (Agrell et al.,
2013). This means that by consolidating data from different sources (e.g., conven-
tional generators, renewable resources, consumers and network operators and EVs)
demand and supply are matched favourably for network security and sustainability
(Webster, 1999).
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1.1.3 Market issues
Technical challenges are not the only factors that require investment in power net-
works. There are also economic issues related to the electricity markets which call for
grid development. An important precondition, among all other factors, for the well-
functioning of an electricity market is the access of suppliers to the power network
(Newbery, 2002). Presence of sufficient number of competing generation units to
supply power requires an adequate transmission grid. Any network constraint frag-
ments the electricity market and reduces the number of generators which compete to
sell their energy in the submarkets (Newbery, 2002). In summary, the power trans-
mission grid plays the role of facilitator in the electricity market. The configuration
of the transmission network specifies the degree to which suppliers face competition
for a given geographic distribution of demand. The expansion of transmission lines
will increase the number of hours in a year that a supplier faces sufficient com-
petition, which can place a downward pressure on market clearing price (Wolak,
2012).
Previous studies show that network capacity constraints increase the incentives
for strategic behaviour in pursuit of increasing profit. For example, Borenstein et
al.(2000) studied a two-node model of quantity-setting imperfect competition be-
tween two suppliers which are separated through finite transmission capacity and
serve price-responsive demand at both nodes. They showed that, under the con-
dition of limited transmission capacity between nodes, each firm has an incentive
to restrict its output in order to create congestion in the transmission line into its
local market in anticipation of a price increase. Moreover, they demonstrated that
a moderate investment in transmission lines will raise the competitiveness of the
market significantly.
The issues of network access and capacity constraints are crucial for integration
of renewable resources as well. Promotion of competition among renewable tech-
nologies requires access to the distribution grid as they are often connected to low
voltage networks. Along with traditional technical problems related to integration
of these resources, the presence of sufficient network capacity is a necessity for the
successful operation of the market. This is where the concept of smart grid and
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active network management can come to play an important role. Under the current
planning and operation of distribution networks, the capacity to integrate renewable
generation is limited, because this excess capacity often reserved for the purpose of
addressing outages. Consequently, there is not enough capacity available to support
a competitive market for renewable resources. All in all, network adequacy is an
important part of promoting a competitive electricity market.
1.1.4 Network security and quality of supply
Due to the critical role of electricity supply in the well-functioning of the whole
economy, uninterrupted availability of electricity is an indispensable part of energy
policies. Meanwhile, more than 90% of interruption incidences are triggered in the
distribution networks (Hammond and Waldron, 2008). Electricity supply can be
affected by several factors, such as technical failures, accidental threats, natural
disasters, manmade attacks to the network (cyber or physical) and risks related to
the regulatory framework and organisation, including underinvestment and network
pricing. Moreover, with the increase in intermittent renewable generation and de-
mand, without having proportional network development, maintaining the security
of the electricity network is expected to be more challenging than ever.
The issue of network security affects the consumers through quality of supply.
Accordingly, regulators incentivise distribution companies to reduce power outages
using, for example, quality-incorporated regulatory models or specific service quality
targets (Jamasb et al., 2012). The strong interdependencies between the power
industry and other critical infrastructures cause electricity supply perturbations to
propagate to other sectors rapidly. This makes other sectors and consequently the
whole economy dependent on the level of security measures taken in the electricity
sector.
An increase in power system resiliency can potentially avoid or mitigate the
adverse impact and cascading effects of electricity supply interruptions. However,
resiliency enhancement requires system design, planning and adoption of smart tech-
nologies, which currently do not exist in many power grids. Furthermore, along with
technical measures, network security and reliability require economic and regulatory
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measures (Heng et al., 2009) .
In order to withstand reasonable contingency and maintain the integrity of the
system, an efficient network pricing model must be designed such that it reflects the
cost imposed by new generation and load to the network. Also, timely investment
and network reinforcement, along with efficient operation and utilisation of the grid
are other important factors that significantly contribute towards network security.
However, network companies are natural monopolies and their revenues are regu-
lated. Therefore, in the long term, the risk of underinvestment in system resiliency
and security are among the most significant threats to the operation of the grid
(Nepal and Jamasb, 2013).
1.2 Economic regulation of networks
As discussed in the previous section, there is a range of factors such as renewable
integration, market issues, network security, the need for a smart grid environment,
and electric vehicle penetration that motivate development of a modern, reliable and
resilient grid. Development of the grid comprehend various areas, such as investment
in new technologies and grid expansion as well as innovative network solutions, the
latter of which may require changes in the business model of distribution companies.
In addition, the measures to develop the grid need to be consistent with regulatory
framework as the revenues of natural monopolies are set by sector regulator.
A market with natural monopoly features makes the concentration of service pro-
vision in one single company more efficient than in two or more companies. The cost
structure of these companies is such that capital cost dominates and hence, creates
high economies of scale which results in barrier to new entry. The non-competitive
nature of the network business creates several problems. Joskow (2005) argues that
a natural monopoly suffers from various performance deficiencies such as productive
inefficiency, excessive prices, poor quality of service and perhaps unwanted distribu-
tional effects.
Moreover, the lack of competition in this segment of the electricity supply chain
has considerable impacts because network charges account for around one-third of
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the final electricity price (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2008). This highlights the need for an
effective regulatory regime that prevents network utilities from monopoly pricing and
discriminatory access charges and at the same time ensures an efficient production
process for a given level of quantity and quality of service.
1.2.1 A brief summary of regulatory models
As mentioned previously, a characteristic of natural monopoly is that it exhibits a
high economy of scale relative to the size of market. The presence of scale economies
prevents the application of marginal cost pricing because the regulated company
would not be able to recover its capital cost. Therefore, a great deal of discussion in
the regulatory economics literature revolves around investigating the optimal pricing
for regulated monopolies (Joskow, 2005).
Average pricing covers the capital costs of companies but it is not welfare max-
imising. Therefore, the economics literature suggests alternative second-best meth-
ods such as Ramsey pricing, in which the price is set to maximise social welfare sub-
ject to the firm’s break even or balanced budget constraints (Currier, 1986; Joskow,
2005). Ramsey pricing is higher than marginal cost and it is inversely related to
the product’s elasticity of demand. Thus, this relationship allows the supplier for
third-degree price discrimination in the sense that the same product can be sold
with a higher price to those consumers with lower elasticity of demand (Shepherd,
1992; Joskow, 2005).
Another form of price setting for the products of a regulated firm is a two-part
tariff in which consumer pays a fixed cost as well as a variable cost which depends on
the units consumed. From an efficiency perspective the two-part tariff does a better
job compared with second best Ramsey pricing when consumers are identical and
the fixed part is small compared to the net surplus after consumer pays marginal
cost (Joskow, 2005). Under the condition of diverse customers, the regulator can set
a variant of two-part tariff in which consumers can choose from the menu of tariffs
that are different in the fixed and variable parts (Joskow, 2005). The consumers
with lower demand can choose the tariff with lower fixed cost while the high demand
consumers can opt for the tariff with lower variable cost. This reduces the distortion
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in social welfare compared with a fixed two-part tariff.
The optimal pricing models heavily rely on the assumption of a fully informed
regulator which has the same information as the firms do about their cost struc-
ture and consumers demand (Joskow, 2005). However, in reality, the presence of
asymmetric information between the regulator and regulated firms makes the ap-
plication of optimal pricing impracticable. Therefore, alternative regulatory models
have been considered to address the problem of uninformed or imperfectly informed
regulator.
The rate of return or cost of service regulation has been traditionally the main
method of regulating network utilities. It is based on an approach in which the
companies are reimbursed for their costs, based on a “reasonable” rate of return
which is at least equal to the cost of capital (Gilbert and Newbery, 1994). At
the early stage of power sector reforms this regulatory model was more appealing
because of the incentives for investment. However, the main criticism of the rate
of return regulation is that it reimburses the companies for their “costs” rather
than “performance” and therefore it does not promote efficiency in the production
process. Moreover, setting the right level of the regulatory asset base and also
defining reasonable rate of return can be sources of dispute between regulator and
network utilities.
The dissatisfaction with rate of return regulation led to new forms of regula-
tory regimes in which the emphasis was placed on the cost-reducing incentives and
performance-based revenue setting. This regulatory strand is known as “incentive
regulation”. As noted in Jamasb and Pollitt (2001), the emergence of incentive
regulation was not the result of new contributions from economic theory but rather
was the result of the need for practical approaches to induce cost-reducing measures
in pursuit of efficiency gains in natural monopolies.
The most employed models of incentive regulation are price cap, revenue cap,
yardstick regulation, targeted-incentive models, sliding scale, menu of contracts, and
partial cost adjustment (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2007). A common feature among all
these forms is to achieve cost efficiency through penalty and reward schemes2. At
2Apart from the aforementioned incentive regulation models to incentivise cost efficiency and
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the same time, regulators need to ensure that consumers will benefit from efficiency
gains in operating and investment expenditures of these companies.
Asymmetric information between the regulator and regulated company is a key
issue in the regulation of natural monopolies (Jamasb, et al., 2004). Due to the
presence of this problem, efficiency and productivity analysis, based on sector infor-
mation, is an indispensable part of incentive regulation. This is to strike a balance
between firms own information and sector information by comparing them against
their peers. This allows the regulator to extract more information on the cost struc-
ture of network companies. Nevertheless, it complicates the process of revenue and
tariff setting because the choice of a benchmarking technique, estimation procedure
and interpretation of results are not straightforward.
1.3 Thesis objective
There is compelling evidence which suggests that the environmental policies for
promotion of renewable share in the European energy mix will not proceed without
proportional development of technically capable electricity grids. At the same time,
in many countries network companies are regulated on the basis of incentive regu-
lation aided by efficiency and productivity analysis. Thus, given the characteristics
of incentive regulation, it is important to analyse the behaviour of distribution com-
panies in order to understand and identify the possible barriers to the objective of
grid development.
Additionally, the fact that environmental policies will change the configuration of
power sector suggests that distribution companies need to adapt to an environment
with high penetration of distributed energy resources. This requires a shift in the
traditional operating paradigm and also the business model of these companies. This
is because network utilities are often considered as passive transporters of electrical
service quality in electricity networks, there are other forms of regulations in the power sector to
address the issues such as environmental commitments/constraints of generation facilities. For
these, regulator might use a wide range of instruments such as mandatory targets, voluntary
schemes or even taxes.
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energy with their revenues being based on the connection and use of system charges.
However, renewable resources penetration, close to the site of demand, will reduce
the volume of energy transported in the grid and hence, may adversely affect the
companies’ revenue.
Given this background, the objective of this research is to investigate the eco-
nomic, regulatory and policy issues related to grid development and analyse their
impact on the behaviour of distribution companies. These issues include invest-
ment, static and dynamic efficiency, and the development of an innovative business
model to integrate distributed energy resources as alternatives to network reinforce-
ment. The objective of this research can be broken down into more specific research
questions, as follow:
I) How do network companies respond to the regulator’s incentives to maintain
and modernise the grid? What are the determinants of investments under
incentive regulation?
II) Given that incentive regulation aims at improving cost efficiency whereas in-
vestment raises costs, what is the relationship between investment and cost
efficiency under an incentive regulation framework?
III) How does incentive regulation address the long term nature of investment and
innovation? Does incentive regulation, with the current forms of regulatory
treatment of investment, lead to a dynamically efficient behaviour among the
regulated firms?
IV) How can distribution companies adapt to an environment with high penetra-
tion of distributed energy resources? Is there a way to take advantage of the
synergy between increasing penetration of distributed resources, on the one
hand, and the need for network investment on the other hand? What is the
appropriate business model to adopt this innovative solution as an alternative
to traditional network reinforcement?
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1.3.1 Thesis outline
This thesis comprises six chapters. Apart from the Introduction and Conclusions,
the remaining four chapters address the above research questions. Chapters 2, 3 and
4 utilise a panel data set of 129 Norwegian distribution companies observed from
2004 to 2010.
The next chapter deals with the issue of investment determinants under incen-
tive regulation. It reviews the investment and associated incentives in distribution
networks. The review of state-of-the-art literature also informs the choice of the
empirical model which is based on a Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) technique.
The identified investment determinants provide an understanding of investment be-
haviour under incentive regulation.
Chapter 3 investigates the relationship between investment and cost efficiency
under incentive regulation. The issue of investment efficiency and regulatory treat-
ment of investment are explored through a literature survey. A theoretical frame-
work for the relationship between investment and efficiency including the concept of
“no impact efficiency”, as the revenue neutral efficiency effect of investment under
total cost benchmarking, is introduced. The observed efficiency effect of investment
and no impact efficiency are estimated using a Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA)
technique. This chapter also discusses the implications of cost benchmarking for the
investment behaviour of distribution companies.
Chapter 4 addresses the issue of the dynamic aspects of firm behaviour and ex-
plores the concept of dynamic efficiency under incentive regulation. The chapter
reviews the most recent and relevant literature on dynamic efficiency measurement
and tries to bridge the gap by applying theoretical and empirical models to a reg-
ulated industry. In this respect, the notion of inefficiency persistence due to the
presence of quasi-fixed inputs under total cost benchmarking is introduced. The
theoretical framework shows that inefficiency of regulated companies is a combina-
tion of period specific effects (shocks) and a carry-over component which is related
to the sluggish adjustment of capital stock and/or production capacity. The two
components of inefficiency and the rate of inefficiency transmission between periods
are estimated using a dynamic stochastic frontier model in a Bayesian framework.
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An innovative solution to the traditional demand driven network investment
is investigated in Chapter 5. This chapter begins with the necessity of reducing
deficiency in traditional network reinforcement and reviews the previous works on
the impact of distributed resources on investment deferral. The methodological
approach of the chapter is qualitative and based upon critical analysis of literature
and development of a conceptual model. The feasibility and regulatory challenges of
adopting a portfolio of distributed resources including demand response, energy effi-
ciency, storage and distributed generation as alternatives to grid capacity enhance-
ment have been discussed. Also, a new method to integrate these resources under a
three stage market-oriented approach termed “contract for deferral scheme” (CDS)
is introduced. Moreover, as penetration of renewables might lead to the shrinkage
of the revenue base in distribution companies, an extended business model for these
companies has been suggested.
Finally, Chapter 6 presents the concluding remarks of the thesis. It synthesises
the main findings and discussions from the previous chapters, making explicit refer-
ence to the stated research questions, and attempts to draw scientific conclusions,
considering the limitations of this research.
Chapter 2
Determinants of investment under
incentive regulation
Electricity networks are capital intensive and exhibit natural monopoly characteris-
tics and are, therefore, subject to economic regulation. In recent years, the need for
network expansion, integration of renewable energy resources, enabling demand side
participation, and adoption of new technologies such as deployment of smart meters
and smart grids has necessitated significant amount of investments in the grid. This
has placed the issue of network investment at the core of recent energy policies and
regulations in the power sector. The objective is to ensure sufficient investment in
maintaining and modernising the grid and at the same time avoiding inefficiency in
capital expenditures in order to protect the end-users against high electricity prices.
This is because, in some countries, nearly one-third of final electricity prices are
related to distribution and transmission network charges (Pollitt and Bialek, 2008)
and investments lead to higher consumer bills.
The investment behaviour of firms in a competitive market is among the most
studied areas of economics (Jorgenson, 1967). However, the results of competi-
tive market may not be directly applicable to regulated industries such as network
utilities. This is because investments in electricity networks, as regulated natural
monopolies, are not driven by market signals where decisions are based upon the
expected returns being higher than the incurred cost of capital. Instead, investments
in networks companies respond to the regulatory framework and institutional con-
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straints (Vogelsang, 2002; Crew and Kleindorfer, 1996). Therefore, regulators adopt
various incentive mechanisms to ensure that there is no systematic underinvestment
which jeopardises the reliability of grid.
The challenge of regulation is to provide effective incentives for delivery of right
quality of services while reassuring investors of the profitability of economically
justified investments (Newbery, 2004). The advantages of an effective regulatory
framework include lower network costs, quality of service improvement, support of
competitive wholesale and retail electricity markets and encouraging investments to
address the changes in supply and demand for electricity services (Joskow, 2008).
As a consequence, identifying the main drivers of investments can help regulators
to understand the responsiveness of firms to regulatory incentives and hence, more
effectively tackle the issue of investments under incentive regulation.
Despite the importance of investments in regulated industries, the empirical liter-
ature on the issue is rather finite. The current studies, except the work by Kinnunen
(2006) which investigated the investment drivers in Finish electricity networks, do
not analyse investment response to regulatory incentives. Instead the empirical
research papers mainly aim to model the effect of certain regulatory features on in-
vestment. For example, some studies have attempted to explore the effect of public
versus private ownership or unbundling of network utilities on investment (see, e.g.,
Gugler et al., 2013; Nardi, 2012 ). Another strand of literature has attempted to
conduct cross country analysis in order to explore the effect of different regulatory
regimes on investment (see, e.g., Cambini, and Rondi, 2010; Gugler et al., 2013 ).
Also, some studies analyse investment indirectly as the cost of quality of supply
improvement (see, e.g., Coelli et al., 2013; Jamasb et al., 2012).
Therefore, little effort has been made to identify and analyse the determinants
of investments in electricity networks under incentive regulation. This chapter in-
vestigates the key factors that drive the amount and direction of the investments in
electricity distribution networks using a case study of the Norwegian network utili-
ties.The next section discusses network investment and associated incentives under
regulation. Section 2.2 presents the empirical analysis. It briefly reviews the power
sector reform and regulatory framework in Norway and then describes the method-
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ology and data used in empirical analysis. The empirical method is based on a
Bayesian Model Averaging technique. The results and discussion of major findings
are presented in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 is conclusions.
2.1 Investment in electricity distribution networks
Electricity distribution companies are responsible to deliver energy to the end users
and hence, they are required to have a reliable and available network at all times.
These obligations are usually stated in the countries’ regulation and standard of
practice for the power sector. In the UK, for example, under the Electricity Act of
1989 which later modified by Utilities Act in 2000, distribution companies are obliged
to support and facilitate a market-oriented electricity sector through developing and
maintaining an economically and technically efficient distribution system (Shaw et
al., 2010). The companies are also required to comply with additional standards such
as those related to the environment, security of supply, safety and customer service.
These challenges necessitate an investment plan that helps network companies to
achieve their performance targets and at the same time ensure all statutory and
legal responsibilities are met.
There are several technical and non-technical factors that can potentially drive
investment in distribution network companies. The number of connected consumers
and distribution of load, in a specific region, can change and hence require network
reinforcement (Blokhuis et al., 2011). In these cases, distribution companies iden-
tify development of new residential or commercial sites, within their network area,
and forecast future demand by taking into account the general macroeconomic and
market conditions. Thus, a non-trivial part of investment of distribution companies
is related to demand for new connections.
At the same time, the load profile of the existing customers can change and, over
time, lead to lower or higher demand for electricity. For example, consumers may
use more energy efficient equipment or appliances and therefore, cause the demand
for electricity to decline. Similarly, consumers can use larger appliances and cause
the demand for electricity to rise. Under the conditions that the load growth pushes
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the grid capacity to its limit, distribution companies need to carry out general
reinforcement to enhance network capacity (Poudineh and Jamasb, 2014a).
The need for connection of supply side resources such as distributed generation
is also another investment driver of distribution companies. Distributed genera-
tions mainly comprise renewable resources and combined heat and power (CHP)
plants which are connected to distribution network and can bring the network to its
operational limit (Vovos and Bialek, 2007).
Network companies are also responsible for quality of service and reliability of
electricity supply at distribution level (Giannakis et al., 2005). This means the
companies need to reduce progressively the frequency and duration of electricity
supply interruptions as well as the number of affected consumers. The networks
often experience technical faults which, in the worst case, can lead to power cuts.
Thus, appropriate investment measures needs to be taken in order to rectify these
faults which may damage consumers’ appliances. In this respect distribution com-
panies need to carry out frequent inspection and maintenance of network assets to
ensure all devices work properly and provide a highly reliable service. This is specif-
ically important with respect to those assets that are required to be switched off for
maintenance. This is because due to asset specificity and the lack of redundancy
their availability directly affects security of supply. Investment in remote control
and power distribution automation systems are part of the solution to the network
reliability (Liu et al. 2006). These systems send warning signals to replace the
non-functional and faulty equipment and hence, can minimise the disruption to the
consumers.
External factors can also necessitate network investment because they affect
the operation of gird. For example, extreme weather conditions or proximity of
distribution lines to trees increase the likelihood of power disruption (e.g., falling tree
in the storm). In these instances, investment is necessary to protect the overhead
lines against the risk posed by extreme events. The network companies are also
required to invest in order to improve safety of grid. This, for example, includes
horizontal and vertical clearance of overhead lines in accordance with national and
international electricity standards and also protection of the equipment from theft
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and vandalism. This is because the increase in price of metals, in recent years, has
made the distribution substations attractive targets for metalwork larceny.
Another important driver of investment, in electricity distribution companies,
is network energy losses. Around 5% of electrical energy is lost in the distribution
system due to conductors’ natural resistance and/or technical problems (Shaw et al.,
2010). Apart from the issue of energy inefficiency, these energy losses account for
around 95% of operational CO2 emission of distribution network companies (Shaw et
al., 2010). Thus, network energy losses need to be reduced to the minimum feasible
level.
The investment drivers in distribution network companies are not confined to
technical problems. Non-technical factors can also potentially lead to capital invest-
ment. For example, network companies may need to invest in costly underground
cables in order to avoid disturbing natural beauty areas or to reduce public oppo-
sition with respect to infrastructure development at local communities’ proximity
(Steinbach, 2013). Additionally, environmental legislation compliances such as re-
ducing noise or oil leakage in substation can drive investments. Furthermore, dis-
tribution companies undertake investment in R&D activities and also facilities that
support delivery of operational projects (e.g., buildings, computers, etc.).
2.1.1 Investment incentives under regulation
In order to enable distribution network companies to maintain their network, com-
ply with regulation and standards and provide an acceptable quality of supply, the
regulatory framework needs to incentivise ”investment sufficiency”. A ”reasonable”
rate of return on capital is a major incentive for network companies to undertake
investment. The allowed rate of return, for efficient financing, is based upon the cap-
ital stock employed in production process and is at least equal to the estimated costs
of capital of the notional company (Ofgem, 2013). The financing process is usually
a combination of debt and equity and thence, a weighted average cost of capital
(WACC) is calculated given different capitals have different costs of acquiring. De-
pending on the regulatory framework, the low risk and protected monopoly nature
of the sector can cause the rate of return to be lower than unregulated companies
2.1. Investment in electricity distribution networks 24
(Kinnunen, 2006).
However, the return on capital may not be sufficient to incentivise investment.
This is because, for example, in remote rural areas the investment cost is usually
higher and this can squeeze the companies’ profits. Thus, in many countries, the
regulatory frameworks are backed by legislations which oblige network companies
to provide a fair and non-discriminatory grid access for both load and generations.
These legislations also, oblige transmission system operator (TSO) to ensure that
demand is met at all times. Under these legislations distribution network compa-
nies are legally responsible to maintain the connection of the current consumers and
generation sources as well as those of new entrants who require grid access. These
direct regulations play an important role in persuading network companies to under-
take certain type of investment which may not be sufficiently incentivised through
indirect incentive regulation.
Along with the incentives provided by return on capital and direct regulations,
regulators often adopt additional instruments to ensure security of electricity supply.
The need for additional instruments is highlighted when taking into consideration
that the main aim of the incentive regulation is to promote cost efficiency. The incen-
tive for cost reduction raises concerns about achieving cost efficiency at the expense
of service quality. Thus, additional ad hoc instruments are designed to incentivise
firms to improve their service quality by undertaking necessary investments. These
incentives are normally provided through different approaches such as: (i) marginal
reward and penalties, (ii) absolute fines, and (iii) quality incorporated regulatory
models (Giannakis et al., 2005).
The marginal reward and penalties is based on the idea that the firm is rewarded
or penalised for each unit of marginal improvement or decline in quality of service.
Thus, firms undertake investments to the point where marginal benefit of quality
improvement equals to the marginal cost of quality, at which point optimality will
be achieved. In absolute fines approach regulator sets a target for service quality.
A company that falls short of the target level will be penalised based on a prede-
termined amount per unit of service quality. Therefore, the firm has incentive to
undertake investment in order to deliver the minimum required quality of service.
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Finally, the quality incorporated regulatory models treat service quality as an in-
tegral part of regulation. For example, some countries evaluate the cost of energy
not supplied at ”consumer willingness to pay for reliable services” and add this to
other cost categories when the companies’ efficiencies are estimated. The companies’
revenues, then, are set based upon their efficiency level. The quality incorporated
regulatory model promotes competition among the firms for delivering the bundle
of quantity and quality of service. This is because the firms will be rewarded or
penalised when they outperform or underperform their peer respectively.
In a similar manner, regulators incentivise distribution companies to reduce net-
work energy losses. The approaches for reducing network energy losses are similar to
the case of service quality except that energy losses are often evaluated at a different
price (e.g., system price) compared with energy not served.
2.2 Empirical analysis: The case of Norway
In this section the investment determinants of distribution networks are analysed,
empirically, using the case of distribution network companies in Norway. First, a
brief review of power sector reform and regulatory model in Norway is provided.
Then, the empirical models and data are discussed.
2.2.1 Power sector reform and network regulation in Nor-
way
Norway was among the first countries, after Chile and the UK, which embarked on
power sector reform by unbundling the different elements of the electricity indus-
try across the value chain. The generation and retail supply which are potentially
competitive were separated from the transmission and distribution that are natu-
ral monopolies. Therefore, the distribution and transmission networks are subject
to economic regulation. The Norwegian Water Resource and Energy Directorate
(NVE)(Norges vassdrags- og energidirektorat) were appointed as the sector regula-
tor since Norwegian Energy Act came into effect in 1991. Unlike the other countries
where the regulatory reform was often accompanied by transfer of ownership, the
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Norwegian power industry mainly remained under the state or local municipalities’
control after the reform. Also, companies that are involved in both monopolistic
(distribution or regional transmission) and competitive businesses (generation or
retail supply) are required to keep them separated legally and/or financially1.
At the early years of the reform, there were approximately 230 distribution net-
works and 70 generation units in Norway. The high number of utilities reflects the
dispersed nature of the hydroelectric resources as the main source of power genera-
tion as well as the historical development of the sector in the country. In December
2010, around 167 companies were engaged in grid operation (NVE, 2010). The
marked reduction in the number of distribution companies is the result of mergers
and acquisitions among the network companies in pursuit of scale efficiency and
other gains.
After the reform, initially, the distribution companies were operating under a rate
of return regulatory regime. However, due to the lack of incentives for cost efficiency,
since 1997, the regulatory regime was changed to incentive regulation. From 2007,
NVE has implemented a new regulatory model which uses the Data Envelopment
Analysis (DEA) as efficiency and cost benchmarking method (for details of DEA
method see Charnes et al., 1978; O.Fried et al., 2008). The networks companies are
regulated with a revenue cap regime that covers their costs annually based on their
distance from the efficient frontier (best practice) in the sector.
Therefore, the Norwegian incentive regulation model treats investment in an ex-
post manner. In this way the regulator sums all the costs incurred to the company
including operating, capital and other controllable expenditures to construct one
variable that reflects total cost. The total cost is, then, benchmarked against peer
to obtain the efficient cost level. The revenue is set based on a weighted average of
actual and benchmarked costs.
1In 2010, about 67 companies were involved in generation, grid operation, and supply to the end
users. Vertically integrated companies with more than 100,000 customers are obliged to separate
their monopolistic operation from competitive activities (legal unbundling) (NVE, 2010). Also,
the Energy Act requires the integrated companies to keep separate accounts for their monopoly
and competitive businesses (NVE, 2010).
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2.2.2 Investments under Norwegian regulatory regime
The investment incentives, under Norwegian regulatory regimes, are provided through
a combination of economic and direct regulation (NordREG, 2011). Along with
profit motivation, the network companies need to undertake substantial investments
in order to meet their obligations as stated in the Energy Act. For example, Section
3-4 of the amended Energy Act states that distribution companies are obliged to
connect new generation sources and consumers that are not covered by the supply
requirement. In addition, a profit incentive is provided through a minimum guar-
anteed return on capital. The regulation states that all companies should achieve a
reasonable (minimum 2%) return on capital, given effective management, utilization,
and development of the networks2.
The Norwegian regulator uses a quality incorporated regulatory model. The cost
of energy not served (CENS) and network energy losses are included in the bench-
marking model in order to provide incentives for service quality improvement and
reducing energy losses. Moreover, regulator also deducts the CENS from the firms’
revenue at the final stage of revenue setting. This is to strengthen the incentives
for service quality improvement and prevent underinvestment. At the same time,
under the Norwegian regulatory regime, investments are restrained indirectly such
that overcapitalisation can lead to deviation from efficient frontier and consequently
partial disallowance of investment costs (Poudineh and Jamasb 2013a).
Figure 2.1 shows total investments, new investments, and reinvestments by the
Norwegian distribution companies between 2004 and 20103. As shown in the figure,
total investments are strictly increasing since 2006. The investment data indicates
that the source of the increase is the reinvestments and not the new investments.
Although new investments remained almost constant, they have had a higher share
in total investments than reinvestments. For instance, 68% of the investments ob-
servations, during the period of study, have a share of new investments to total
2A network that falls below this minimum level will receive a correction in its revenue to achieve
a minimum 2% return on capital. The normal rate of return for Norwegian distribution networks
is currently 5.62%.
3New investments and reinvestments can happen simultaneously in reinforcement projects.
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Figure 2.1: Investments in Norwegian distribution companies
investments higher than 50%. This can be an indication of strong investment incen-
tives which have motivated some networks to undertake new investments, possibly
beyond their minimum reinvestment needs. Such a change can be attributed to the
view that social costs of underinvestment are higher than social benefits of overin-
vestment (Helm and Thompson, 1991).
2.2.3 Methodology
The classical investment models mainly revolve around the concept of Tobin’s q
which is defined as the ratio of the firm value in the stock market over the replace-
ment value of installed stock of capital (Cuthbertson and Gasparro, 1995). The
firm’s Tobin q can be measured by regression and, in a pure theoretical form, should
be a sufficient statistic for explaining the investment behaviour of firms (Cuthbert-
son and Gasparro, 1995). However, subsequent empirical models of adjustment cost
showed that also other factors such as capacity utilisation, profit, cash flow and gov-
ernment investment policies have an independent effect on investment apart from
their effect on q.
Moreover, Tobin’s q models are developed in the context of competitive markets
where the firms respond to the market signals whereas the regulated industries re-
spond to the regulatory frameworks incentives. Additionally, in regulated industries
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such as electricity sector demand is inelastic, return on capital is guaranteed given
the satisfactory performance of firm, and the industry is generally immune from the
boom and bust of business cycle, due to protective role of regulation. Therefore,
in a regulated environment, the factors that influence investment decision of the
firms are not easily predictable especially if the firms are subject to a combination
of incentives. Thus, due to the uncertainty around the response of the regulated
firms to different incentive instruments we use a Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA)
technique.
BMA is a powerful tool to examine the extent to which inclusion of a given factor
improves the explanatory power of estimated models. The literature on the appli-
cation of the Bayesian approach to investment analysis of electric utilities is limited
but not new. Egert (2009) uses BMA to explore the effect of macro-factors such as
joint introduction of independent regulator and incentive regulation on sector level
investments. Peck (1974) employs a Bayesian method in order to investigate the
association between return to scale characteristic and lumpy investments. He com-
pares this with the result of a distributed lag model that complies with the smooth
investment behaviour. In the present study we use BMA to examine possible factors
that constitute firm level determinants of investments under incentive regulation.
BMA estimates the parameters of interest conditional on each model in the model
space and then computes the unconditional estimates based on weighted average of
these conditional estimates. The model averaging estimator takes into account the
uncertainties around model selection and estimation whereas conventional estima-
tors are based upon preliminary diagnostic tests. Hence, BMA provides a more
robust method of inference on regression parameters. This is particularly relevant
in the context of regulated networks where the regulator needs to take into account
the shortcomings and revenue implications of using a specific model for a relatively
heterogeneous set of networks. Hence, a practical approach by regulators to model
selection can be to use the average of competing models (Jamasb et al., 2004).
The model space for a BMA estimator can be represented as in (2.2.1) (see De
Luca and Magnus, 2011; Magnus et al., 2010).
y = β0 +Xβ + u (2.2.1)
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where y is n × 1 vector of dependent variable observations, X is n × k matrix
of explanatory variables, β is k × 1 vector of slope parameters, and, u ∼ N(0, σ2)
is an n× 1 vector of error term that its elements are identically and independently
distributed. As there are k regressors the number of possible models to be considered
is I = 2k. Therefore, the ith model in the model space (model Mi) is achieved by
inclusion of a subset of k (0 ≤ ki ≤ k) regressors and can be written as:
y = β0 +Xiβi + i i = 1, ...I (2.2.2)
where Xi is an n×ki matrix of observations for the included subset of regressors,
βi is the associated sub-vector of parameters and i is the new error term after k−ki
regressors are excluded. The weights used for averaging of possible models can be
obtained using the Bayes’ theorem. The posterior model probabilities are obtained
by weighting the likelihood of each model by its prior probability as in (2.2.3).
P (Mi|y,X) = P (Mi)P (y|Mi, X)I∑
j=1
P (Mj)P (y|Mj, X)
(2.2.3)
where P (Mi) is the prior probability of model Mi and P (y|Mi, X) is the marginal
likelihood of y given model Mi. The estimator combines the prior belief on the
known elements of model with the extra information coming from the data. The
key elements include the sample likelihood function, the prior distribution on the
regression parameters of model Mi and the prior distribution on the model space.
The posterior model probability (PMP) and thus the model weighted posterior
distribution for any parameter such as β can be presented as in (2.2.4).
P (β|y,X) =
I∑
i=1
P (β|Mi, y,X)P (Mi|y,X) (2.2.4)
Under the condition of no prior knowledge, a common choice of prior, P (Mi) can
be to assign the uniform probability to each model.
Following ”Zellener’s g prior” instruction, it is assumed that there is a normal
error structure for each model Mi. A ”non-informative” improper prior is chosen on
the common intercept and error variance by assuming they are evenly distributed
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over their domain (P (β0) ∝ 1, P (σ) ∝ σ−1) (Zeugner, 2011). Moreover, since we
do not know about the coefficients a priori, a common assumption is normal distri-
bution with mean zero and a specified variance. Thus, according to Zellner’s g the
distribution of coefficients can be presented as in (2.2.5).
βi|g ∼ N(0, σ2(1
g
X ′iXi)
−1) (2.2.5)
The hyper parameter g shows the extent to which one is certain that the coef-
ficients are zero. The posterior mean for β is a weighted average of the posterior
means in each model as follows:
E(β|y,X) =
I∑
i=1
E(β|Mi, y)P (Mi|y,X) (2.2.6)
The posterior distribution of coefficient also reflects the prior uncertainty and
given g it follows a t-distribution with the expected value of E(βi|y,X, g,Mi) =
g
1+g
βˆi. In a similar manner the posterior variance is also influenced by g as follows:
Cov(βi|y,X, g,Mi) = (y − y¯)
′(y − y¯)
N − 3
g
1 + g
(1− g
1 + g
R2i )(X
′
iXi)
−1 (2.2.7)
where y¯ is the mean of the dependent variable, N is the number of observations
and R2i is the conventional R-squared for each model i. Considering this framework,
we can write the marginal likelihood P (y|Mi, X, g) with proportionality constant
that is the same for all models, as in (2.2.8).
P (y|Mi, X, g) ∝
∫ ∞
0
(1 + g)
N−1−ki
2 [1 + g(1−R2i )]−
N−1
2 P (g|Mi) dg (2.2.8)
where ki is the size penalty factor adjusting for model size and P (g|Mi) is prob-
ability of prior g which could depend on Mi. Popular value for the choice of g is
to allocate g = N for all models and thus assign the same information to the prior
as it is contained in one observation (Ley and Steel, 2012). The detailed technical
discussion of BMA estimator can be found in Hoeting et al.(1999).
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Choice of model size prior
Following Zeugner (2011) and Amini and Parmeter (2011) we use three different
priors for model size distribution in order to reduce the possibility of result bias
from choosing a particular prior. These include, uniform prior, fixed prior and
random prior. The uniform prior is to assign a common probability of 2−k to all
models, considering 2k combinations of different models (”k” is the total number of
explanatory variables). As this distribution has a mean of k/2 hence; we expect the
mass of distribution concentrates around a model of size ki = k/2, simply because
the combination of
(
k
k/2
)
is higher than other possible combinations.
The fixed prior places a common probability of inclusion, α , on each regressor.
Therefore, the distribution of prior probability of model size ki can be written as
the multiplication of inclusion and exclusion probabilities as shown in (2.2.9).
P (Mi) = α
ki(1− α)k−ki (2.2.9)
The expected value of prior model size distribution in (2.2.9) is ”kα”. This
means specifying the expected value of prior model size distribution, by researcher,
automatically determines the value of α. For example, choosing an expected model
size of k/2 will convert it to the previous case of uniform prior because the inclusion
probability of each regressor (α) will be equal to 1/2. Thus, specifying a prior
model size lower than the mean of the regressors numbers (k/2) pushes the prior
distribution towards a smaller model size and vice versa.
Finally, we adopt a ”random prior” in order to incorporate uncertainty and
make the results as robust as possible to the prior selection. The random prior
also has a binomial distribution such as (2.2.9). However, α is chosen randomly
rather being fixed as in the case of fixed prior. If a Beta prior is chosen for α with
hyperparameters c > 0 and d > 0 i.e., α ∼ Be(c, d) then the expected value of
prior model size is q¯ = c
c+d
k (Steel, 2011). The implied prior model size distribution
would be a Binomial-Beta distribution. This prior, thus, depends on two parameters,
c and d and Ley and Steel (2009) suggested to facilitate the prior elicitation by
specifying c = 1. As noted in Steel (2011), this still allows for a wide range of prior
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behaviour and make it appealing to elicit prior in terms of the mean of prior model
size distribution (q¯). Any choice 0 < q¯ < k will determine d = (k− q¯)/k. Therefore,
in order to set this, researcher only needs to specify the mean of model size prior
which is exactly the same information one requires in the case of fixed prior. The
resulting prior is less tight and reduces the unintended outcomes because of prior
choice by decreasing the importance of the prior in estimation procedure4 (Zeugner,
2011).
2.2.4 Data
The dataset used in this analysis is an unbalanced panel of 129 distribution com-
panies observed from 2004 to 2010. All financial variables are presented in real
terms and adjusted based on 2010 prices. There are ten independent regressors that
constitute 13 factors by including three lag variables. The rationale behind these
factors as potential investment drivers has been based on the economic theory, Nor-
wegian regulatory model, technical characteristics of grid and previous studies of
distribution networks. Overall, the factors that might affect investment behaviour
of distribution companies in Norway can be categorised into four groups. Table 2.1
provides definition of these variable, method of calculation and their source. Table
2.2 presents the summary of descriptive statistics of them.
The first group of variables comprises ”demand driven factors” which are related
to demand for electricity. These are number of customers which in Norway includes
conventional customers and leisure homes5, number of stations (transformers)6, and
energy density. An increase in demand for energy may cause the network companies
to raise the number of distribution feeders or to upgrade the capacity of transformers
4In our analysis for both cases of fixed and random prior we chose the mean of model size prior
equal to 6. The number of regressors in our case is 13 and consequently the mean of model size
is 6.5. We choose 6 to have a prior model size lower than mean of regressors and consequently
different from the case of uniform prior.
5The leisure homes are separated from conventional residential and commercial consumers as
they have a different load profile which peaks over the weekends and is zero in other days.
6Network station or substation is the point that high voltage transmission grid connects to the
distribution network.
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which in both cases leads to capital investment. Energy density as the measure of
energy delivered per unit of network length (Km) can be an investment driver as
well. This is because an increase in energy density necessitates more advanced power
electronic equipment to support power flows. Moreover, considering the geographic
dispersion of load centres in Norway, energy density is a more important factor than
the length of networks or energy distributed. There are some sparse areas towards
the north with wider distribution networks (i.e., higher network length but lower
energy density) whereas energy density is much higher in southern populated areas.
Also, sometimes a single energy intensive commercial or industrial consumer can
result in high energy density in the grid.
The second group termed ”aspect factors” to refer to the characteristics of dis-
tribution networks such as the share of overhead lines and the total capacity of
distributed generations connected to the grid. The share of overhead lines with
respect to total length of network is calculated, for each distribution network, as
these can potentially be exposed to environmental conditions and hence might need
protective investments. Previous studies have shown that, for example, weather
can affect the network physical condition (Yu et al., 2009). Distributed generations
are also potential investment driver as the grid may require initial reinforcement to
integrate these resources (Mendez et al., 2006).
The third group comprised of “quality driven factors” including the cost of en-
ergy not supplied (CENS) and cost of network energy losses (CNEL). CENS
reflects the socio-economic cost of energy not served to the consumers as a result of
interruption. It is calculated based on the minutes of interruption multiplied with
consumer willingness to pay for reliable service7 . CNEL shows the cost of energy
lost in the grid because of the conductor resistance or other technical problems. It
is computed by multiplication of physical network energy loss and annual average
system price for electricity. CENS and CNEL related incentives are embedded in
Norwegian regulation in order to encourage the network companies to maintain a
high quality of supply. It is expected that threat of financial loss as a result of poor
7Consumer willingness to pay is computed using costumer surveys and technical information.
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Table 2.1: Definition of variables
Variable Definition Method of calculation Source
Investment The capital expenditure of
companies
Report by companies NVE
Energy density Energy distributed per
unit length of network
Energy distributed is di-
vided by network length
NVE
Number of sta-
tions
It is the number of distri-
bution network substations
Report by companies NVE
Number of cus-
tomers
It refers to the number of
end-users connected to the
grid
Report by companies NVE
Number of lesiure
homes
It refers to the number of
holiday homes connected
to the grid
Report by companies NVE
Cost of energy not
supplied
It is the socio-economic
cost of outages
Energy interrupted times
willingness to pay for reli-
able services
NVE
Cost of network
energy loss
It is the cost of energy
wasted in the grid
Energy lost times electric-
ity system price
NVE
Distributed gen-
eration
Total capacity of dis-
tributed generation con-
nected to the grid
Report by companies NVE
Share of overhead
lines
It is the share of overhead
lines with respect to total
length of network
Length of over headlines is
divided by the total net-
work length
NVE
Useful life of as-
sets
It is the remaining life of
assets
Calculated based on
straight line depreciation
formula
NVE
Operational
expenditure
It refers to the operational
cost of companies
Report by companies NVE
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Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics of variables
Group Variable Name Min Max Mean
Dependent Investment to capital stock ratio IR 0 1.047 0.074
Energy density (MWh/Km) DENS 137 2234 552
Group 1: Number of stations (#) NS 21 14405 965
Demand factors Number of customers(#) NC 243 535443 19274
Number of leisure homes (#) RE 2 27307 2214
Group 2: Distributed generation (MW) DG 0 96.45 10
Aspect factors Share of overhead lines (%) OH 0.13 0.97 0.67
Group 3: Cost of energy not supplied* CENS 10 58527 2844
Quality factors Cost of network energy loss* CNEL 205 394127 14524
Group 4: Useful life of assets (year) UL 7.17 31.627 14.90
Other factors Operational expenditure* OPEX 878 854646 43917
*All monetary variables are in 000’ NOK.
quality of service will encourage firms to undertake investment.
The forth category is related to “other factors” such as useful life of asset8 and op-
erational expenditures. The network companies are expected to replace depreciated
assets hence, asset age can have an impact on investment. Operational expendi-
ture may influence investment because the Norwegian distribution network compa-
nies operate under the ex-post review of investment using total cost benchmarking.
Thus, we consider the possibility of a trade-off between capital expenditures and
operational costs (Poudineh and Jamasb, 2013a).
The dependent variable is investment to capital stock ratio (investment rate) in
order to define investment spikes and also be consistent with classical investment
models in empirical literature (see e.g., Bloom et al., 2007; Morgado and Pindado,
2003). Furthermore, we include the lag of investment rate, CNEL and CENS
as three additional factors. The lag of investment is included to controls for the
8Useful life measures the remaining life of asset and is computed using straight line depreciation
formula.
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cyclical behaviour of investment. The large investment projects may last multiple
years and hence, when firm-level data are used, spells of high investment rates are
followed by spells of zero investment. The lags of CNEL and CENS are included
to account for ”preventive investments” in pursuit of improving quality of supply
proactively. The main quality factor variables capture ”corrective investments”
where distribution companies respond to the current period events to reduce energy
losses and interruptions (Jamasb et al., 2012).
2.3 Results and discussions
Long-term planning and asset management are among the main priorities of distribu-
tion network companies. Investments in network companies are costly, long-lasting
and irreversible. Hence, better information for the decision process is of essential
importance to the both companies and regulators. This, in turn, relies on under-
standing and identifying the factors that drive long term investment of distribution
grids.
The estimation to identify investment drivers of Norwegian distribution com-
panies is carried out in a Bayesian framework. Table 2.3 presents the results of
investment models estimated based on different priors (described in Section 2.2.3).
The dependent variable is the investment rate (the ratio of investment to the stock
of capital). For each prior and estimation three statistics are reported i.e. poste-
rior inclusion probability (PIP), posterior mean of coefficient (Mean) for all models
even those where the variable is not included (i.e., its coefficient is zero) and finally
posterior standard deviation (SD). PIP shows the importance of the variable in ex-
plaining the investment behaviour of companies. It is also the sum of all Posterior
Model Probabilities (PMP) wherein that particular variable is included.
As shown in Table 2.3, in the case of uniform prior, there are only three factors
that have a PIP of higher than 50%. These are the lag of investment rate, cost of
energy not supplied and asset useful life. Lag of investment rate has a PIP of 99%
which is the highest among all other factors. This can be interpreted as a ranking
measure of the extent to which the data favours inclusion of capital expenditures in
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the previous period as a determinant of investment behaviour.
The cost of energy not supplied (CENS) has a PIP of 62%, and asset useful life
shows a PIP of 94%. There is no other significant factor that can be considered as
investment driver under uniform prior. For example, there is no evidence of impact
from ”aspect factors” as neither overhead line nor distributed generation show any
significance. The same applies to demand factors.
Table 2.3: Investment model estimation based on different priors
Mprior=uniform Mprior=fixed Mprior=random
Variable PIP Mean SD PIP Mean SD PIP Mean SD
Constant 1.00 0.0107 NA 1.00 0.0108 NA 1.00 0.013 NA
IRit−1 0.99 0.1289 0.027 0.99 0.1293 0.027 0.99 0.1314 0.027
Log(DENS)it 0.26 0.0017 0.003 0.25 0.0016 0.003 0.18 0.0013 0.002
Log(OH)it 0.05 0.0000 0.001 0.04 0.0000 0.001 0.02 0.0000 0.000
Log(NS)it 0.10 -0.0004 0.002 0.08 -0.0003 0.002 0.05 -0.0001 0.001
Log(NC)it 0.20 0.0010 0.002 0.19 0.0010 0.002 0.16 0.0007 0.002
Log(RE)it 0.24 -0.0008 0.001 0.22 -0.0007 0.001 0.12 -0.0004 0.001
Log(DG)it 0.05 0.0000 0.000 0.04 0.0000 0.000 0.02 0.0000 0.000
Log(CENS)it 0.62 0.0028 0.002 0.61 0.0026 0.002 0.55 0.0022 0.002
Log(CENS)it−1 0.07 -0.0001 0.000 0.06 0.0000 0.000 0.03 0.0000 0.000
Log(CNEL)it 0.08 0.0000 0.001 0.08 0.0001 0.001 0.06 0.0001 0.001
Log(CNEL)it−1 0.12 0.0004 0.001 0.12 0.0004 0.001 0.10 0.0004 0.001
(UL)it 0.94 0.0016 0.000 0.93 0.0016 0.000 0.85 0.0015 0.000
Log(OPEX)it 0.11 -0.0006 0.002 0.09 -0.0005 0.002 0.05 -0.0002 0.001
Moving away from uniform prior to the fixed prior based on binomial distribution
of prior, Table 2.3 shows that there are no significant changes in the results. The
PIPs of the main factors are almost identical to the case of uniform prior. Thus,
the same three factors still have significant posterior inclusion probabilities under
the fixed prior. In a similar manner, the identified factors under random prior
match the cases of uniform and fixed priors. However, the PIPs of CENS and UL
variables are slightly lower, under random prior, compared with the other two priors.
Nonetheless, their PIPs are still significant. Therefore, it can be concluded that the
identified investment drivers are robust to the choice of prior. This highlights the
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importance of these factors in explaining the investment behaviour of Norwegian
distribution companies.
The results in Table 2.3 are, to some extent, in line with the manner that in-
vestment incentives are implemented under the Norwegian regulatory regime. For
example, the high PIP for CENS is not an unexpected result given that the cost
of energy not supplied is an important instrument used by the Norwegian regulator
to incentivise quality of supply improvement. In effect, the regulator penalises the
firms for poor service quality. On the other hand, the results in Table 2.3 show that
other quality factors such as cost of network energy loss (CNEL) and the lag of
CENS and CNEL variables are not significant.
The posterior model size distribution and cumulative model probabilities, under
uniform prior, are illustrated in Figure 2.2. As seen from the figure and discussed
previously, the mean of prior is 6.59. However, the posterior distribution of model
size has a mean of 3.88 (between three and four)10. This means that although we
believed, a priori, that around 6 factors would be the final investment determinants,
the data favours a number between three and four. In Bayesian parlance we have
updated our prior belief about investment drivers through new information coming
from the data. Overall, under uniform prior, three of the four factors are considered
to be more certain. This is because many of the models estimated, under the uniform
prior, have identified a weak response from investment with respect to forth factor
with highest PIP-i.e., energy density (DENS). This can be seen from the unshaded
area in cumulative model probabilities depicted for the best 500 models in Figure
2.2. A fully shaded area implies a PIP of 100% for the variable.
A similar result can be seen in Figure 2.3 for the case of fixed prior. The mean
of the posterior model size distribution, under the fixed prior, is 3.76 whereas the
mean of prior model size distribution is 6. The results of the estimations under
uniform and fixed priors suggest that, on average, the response of investment to the
9Recall that the mean of model size prior is 6.5 for uniform and 6 for the cases of fixed and
random priors.
10The mean of posterior model size distribution is the weighted average of model sizes where
posterior model probabilities acting as weights.
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Figure 2.2: Model size distributions and cumulative model probabilities for a uniform
prior
aforementioned three factors (i.e., lag of investment rate, cost of energy not supplied
and useful life of the asset) are more certain. This is also reflected in the cumulative
model probabilities in Figure 2.3 which shows less shaded areas for energy density
(DENS) compared with other three factors.
The results indicate that the cost of current period interruptions can explain
part of the variations in investments of distribution companies. This suggests that
investment by the network companies mainly responded to interruptions and out-
ages in the current period. In other words, interruption costs resulted in ”corrective
investment”. There is no evidence of ”preventive investment” aiming at improving
service quality proactively as lag of CENS and CNEL do not appear as invest-
ment drivers. The corrective nature of investment, in response to outages, can be
explained by the fact that reducing the current period interruptions has a high pri-
ority from a regulatory perspective and thus needs to be dealt with in the shortest
time.
It is likely that the most robust results stem from the random prior estimation.
As seen previously from Table 2.3, under the random prior, the results follow the
same pattern as the other two priors. Figure 2.4 illustrates the posterior distribution
of model size and cumulative model probabilities for the random prior. As shown,
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Figure 2.3: Model size distributions and cumulative model probabilities for a fixed
prior
the prior distribution places more emphasis on small model sizes. However, the
average of posterior model size distribution is 3.27 and thus close to the previous
cases. The shaded areas in the cumulative model probabilities indicate that the
random prior also identifies the same investment drivers. This strongly confirms
that the results are not biased with the choice of prior.
Table 2.4 presents the summary of top 3 models based on different priors. It is
evident from the table that in all cases the top model only includes lag of investment
rate, CENS and UL with posterior model probabilities (PMPs) of 15, 17 and 24%
under uniform, fixed and random priors respectively. Considering high number of
possible models (2k) these constitute rather high probabilities.
The second and third best models, under uniform prior, pick up the same three
factors (lag of investment rate, CENS and UL) along with RE and DENS as
additional investment drivers respectively. This is also the case for the second best
model under fixed prior. However, the third best model under fixed prior identifies
lag of investment rate, useful life of assets and number of customers as determinants
of investment. This again repeated for the case of second best model under random
prior. The third best model, under random prior, only picks up lag of investment
rate and CENS as the main factors.
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Figure 2.4: Model size distributions and cumulative model probabilities for a random
prior
Overall, the second and third top models under all priors are associated with
lower PMPs and hence, less probable. Therefore, the main drivers of investment
in the distribution companies are investment rate in previous period, CENS and
UL. Among these, lag of investment rate is ranked highest and cost of energy not
supplied has the lowest rank in terms of posterior inclusion probabilities.
The coefficients of identified investment drivers are positive but vary in magni-
tude as seen from Table 2.3. The largest coefficient is related to investment rate
which is around 0.13. The useful life of asset has a coefficient of approximately
0.002 and coefficient of CENS is around 0.001. This ranking of coefficients coin-
cides with the importance of associated regressors in terms of variations they create
in dependent variable. The fact that lag of investment rate explains a large portion
of variation in investment behaviour of distribution companies is consistent with
theory. The operating environments of distribution companies are dynamic so, de-
mand, economic condition, technology, regulation etc. may change. The companies
do not respond to these changes instantaneously rather the changes are likely to
be spread over time and equilibrium position, if ever achieved, will be approached
gradually. The slowness of response may be the result of time delays in informa-
tion transmission and reception upon which the decision is based. It can also be
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Table 2.4: Top three models based on different priors
Variable
Mprior=Uniform Mprior=Fixed Mprior=Random
Top1 Top 2 Top 3 Top1 Top 2 Top 3 Top1 Top 2 Top 3
IRit−1 ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗
Log(DENS)it ⊗
Log(OH)it
Log(NS)it
Log(NC)it ⊗ ⊗
Log(RE)it ⊗ ⊗
Log(DG)it
Log(CENS)it ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗
Log(CENS)it−1
Log(CNEL)it
Log(CNEL)it−1
(UL)it ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗
Log(OPEX)it
PMP 0.155 0.105 0.060 0.176 0.102 0.063 0.244 0.087 0.068
attributed to adjustment costs which deter firms from rapid changes. In Chapter 4
we will show the effect of adjustment cost and slowness of investment response on
dynamics of cost efficiency.
The positive coefficient for CENS implies that the increase in interruption costs
results in higher investment to reduce outages (due to adverse effects on the revenue
of companies). Similarly, the positive coefficient for useful life of asset (UL) implies
that firms with younger assets invest more compared with those that have older
assets. This may be because firms with younger assets are in process of expansion
or investment in older assets is more costly.
Contrary to CENS, the results show that the companies do not respond to
energy loss reduction incentives embedded in the regulatory model. The lack of
response of investment to CNEL, may signal that further reduction of network
energy losses do not justify the required investments because the incentive for energy
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loss improvement has not been strong enough. This can also be attributed to the
different treatment of cost of network energy loss (CNEL) and cost of energy not
served (CENS) under Norwegian regulatory model. Both CNEL and CENS are
part of controllable costs that are included in the benchmarking model. However,
CENS is also subtracted directly from the firms’ allowed revenue at the final stage of
revenue setting thus leading to a stronger incentive for service quality. Additionally,
the regulator evaluates network energy losses at system price whereas energy not
served is valued at ”consumer willingness to pay for reliable services”. As the costs
of outages are higher to the residential, commercial and industrial users than the
system price, network companies have more incentives to avoid interruption costs
which affect their revenue base to a greater extent.
To sum up, we have investigated the effect of 13 factors which are categorised
under four groups, on investment behaviour of distribution networks. Figure 2.5
summarises the impact of all factors across the all models. The results indicate
that only a few factors drive most of the investments of the distribution companies.
There are two sets of variables in the figure 2.5: those that are located in the far
upper left with highest PIP and those that are in lower right and associated with
lowest PIP. None of the investment determinants has a PIP of below 55%.
There is only one investment driver from service quality factors: the cost of
energy not supplied. Among other factors asset useful life is identified as an im-
portant investment driver. There is no evidence of effect from operational costs
on investment although there is a possibility of trade-off between operational and
capital expenditures as the Norwegian regulatory model is based on the total cost
benchmarking.
The investment is also not responsive to the number of recreational homes and
number of customers. Moreover, as shown in Figure 2.5, distributed generation
does not appear as an investments driver which, at first, seems counterintuitive.
However, one explanation is that the Norwegian networks have already adapted
to integrate the distributed generation resources. For example, the share of the
dispersed hydroelectric plants accounted for around 95.1% of the total net generation
in 2009 (NVE, 2011).
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Figure 2.5: Comparison across models for the most important factors
The Norwegian Energy Act obliges distribution network companies to connect
new consumers and generations as far as it does not compromise grid security. This
is a form of direct regulation to ensure investment sufficiency with the objective
of network access provision for all customers. If the request for connection comes
from a production unit, and if there is not enough capacity in the grid, the firms
are obliged to carry out necessary reinforcement. Under the condition that joint
investment in grid and production unit is economically inefficient, the grid company
can ask for exemption from obligation to provide grid access.
In addition, although Norway is located in the cold region with severe weather
conditions over the large parts of year however; there is no evidence of overhead line
driven investment. This is while overhead distribution lines are usually vulnerable
to the effect of weather condition. One reason for this could be that environmental
factors are already incorporated in the design and operation of networks and this
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reduces the need for subsequent reinforcement against severe weather conditions.
2.4 Conclusions
Achieving sufficient and efficient investments in the capital intensive electricity net-
works is a major challenge for electricity sector regulators. Over the coming years
the need for significant levels of investment is envisaged, in distribution networks, as
a result of sustainability policies aiming at a decarbonised electricity sector. Thus,
understanding the response of companies to regulatory incentives enables the sec-
tor regulators to promote adequate and appropriate investments more effectively
through incentive regulation.
This study investigated the determinants of investments in the Norwegian elec-
tricity distribution companies using a Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) approach.
BMA is a coherent method of inference on regression coefficients that takes into ac-
count the uncertainties around model selection and estimation. This is particularly
relevant in the context of investment in regulated industries where the companies
are subject to various incentive mechanisms and hence; there is uncertainty in model
selection. The estimations were based on three priors in order to avoid bias in the
findings as a result of selecting a particular prior.
The results indicate that, of the 13 potential factors explored, three factors
constitute the main determinants of investments in electricity distribution networks.
Due to the dynamic nature of investment decisions, a large part of variations in
investment of firms can be explained by investment in previous period. The lag
of investment to capital ratio is identified as the strongest factor which repeatedly
shows a high posterior inclusion probability regardless of the choice of prior.
The cost of energy not supplied and useful life of asset are the other main drivers
of investments. We find little evidence that the length of overhead lines drive in-
vestments though we expect network reinforcements to improve protection against
severe weather conditions. Moreover, we find no investment effect from distributed
generation sources connected to low voltage distribution grid. Furthermore, there is
no evidence that the number of customers influences the investment by firms. Un-
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der the Norwegian regulatory framework, network reinforcement is the obligation of
licence holders in order to ensure a fair and non-discriminatory network access for
all types of users.
The study of investment response of firms to the four groups of factors in this
chapter provides a picture of investment behaviour of distribution companies under
Norwegian regulatory model. The results indicate that the Norwegian distribution
companies have responded, to some degree, to the investment incentives provided
by regulatory framework. Nonetheless, some of the incentives do not appear to have
been effective. The quality of supply incentives embedded in the benchmarking
model have motivated the firms to undertake investment to reduce service interrup-
tions. However, the results show that these investments are more of a ”corrective”
nature and not of a ”preventive” type. Moreover, the lack of investment response
to energy loss reduction incentives show that the strength and type of incentives
are important in promoting investment sufficiency and to reduce certain operational
deficiencies. The results of this study suggest that network companies respond to
investment incentives when the cost of inaction outweighs the investment costs.
The responsiveness of network companies to investment incentives gives an indi-
cation of ”sufficiency” of investment. However, another major issue of regulation is
to incentivise ”efficiency” in capital expenditures. The challenge is how regulators
can ensure that there is no systemic under- or over-investment. The next chapter
provides an in depth study of the relationship between investment and efficiency
under incentive regulation.
Chapter 3
Investment and efficiency under
incentive regulation
Following the liberalisation of the electricity industry since the early 1990s, many
sector regulators have recognised the potential for cost efficiency improvement in the
networks through incentive regulation aided by cost benchmarking and productivity
analysis. Although benchmarking has achieved efficiency improvements (mainly in
operating costs), new challenges have emerged as how to address the issue of network
investments. The challenge is to provide the right incentives for the delivery of cost
effective services while ensuring there is no systematic underinvestment or overin-
vestment. Hence, regulators need to balance the cost and risk of underinvestment
against the cost of overinvestment in maintaining and modernising the networks.
Incentive regulation accentuates static cost efficiency while investment is a dy-
namic and long term activity. On the other hand, benchmarking is a relative concept
in the sense that a firm’s efficiency depends not only on its own performance but
also on the performance of other companies. The paradoxical effect of incentive
regulation concerning investment and the peculiar specifications of total cost bench-
marking complicate the relationship between investment and cost efficiency. This
chapter analyses the relationship between cost efficiency and investments under in-
centive regulation with ex-post regulatory treatment of capital expenditures using
the case of electricity distribution networks in Norway.
The contribution of this research is two-folded. Firstly, we introduce the concept
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of ”no impact efficiency” as a revenue-neutral efficiency effect of investment under
incentive regulation which makes the firm ”investment efficient” and immune from
cost disallowance in benchmarking process. Secondly, we estimate the ”observed”
efficiency effect of investment in order to compare this with no impact efficiency and
discuss the implication of cost benchmarking for network investments in Norway.
Despite the important role of regulatory treatment of capital expenditure, using
total costs benchmarking, for investments behaviour and efficiency improvement in
the networks, the topic has not been formally studied in the empirical literature.
The next Section discusses different approaches to regulatory treatment of in-
vestment and their effect on optimum capital expenditure. It also reviews the most
important literature in this respect. Section 3.2 describes the methodology used
to conceptualise the efficiency implications of investment under incentive regulation
and also presents the stochastic frontier analysis procedure. Section 3.3 describes the
data used in empirical analysis. The empirical results are presented and discussed
in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 is the conclusions.
3.1 Regulatory treatment of investment
The regulatory treatment of investment is among the debatable issues in regulatory
economics. Other controllable expenditures such as operating costs tend to be less
critical as there is a consensus that these need to be minimised for a given level of
output and service quality. However, due to the dynamic and long term nature of
investments, minimisation of capital expenditures may not be possible or desirable.
This is because it may lead to underinvestment which can endanger long term reli-
ability of networks with significant socio-economic costs. Within this context, the
challenge of regulation is to strike a balance between incentive for investment, and
prevention of under- and over-investment.
The regulators of natural monopolies have adopted different models in order to
address the issue of investment under regulation. Broadly, the regulatory treatment
of investments can be viewed in terms of two main approaches: ex-ante and ex-post
review of capital costs (Petrov et al., 2010).
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3.1.1 Ex-ante review of capital costs
Under the ex-ante model of investment treatment, regulated companies submit their
business plans for expected capital expenditures prior to the commencement of the
next regulatory period. The regulator scrutinises the submitted plan to verify pru-
dence of investments. As there is asymmetric information between the regulator and
the firm, the former relies on engineering reports, auditing, and cost-benefit analysis
for the need case and efficiency of investments (Petrov et al., 2010). Thus, the regu-
lator needs to form an opinion, a priori, on the prudent level and type of investments
required in the following regulatory period (Petrov et al., 2010). At the end of the
regulatory period, the regulator evaluates deviations of actual investments from the
investment plans and may disallow, partially or totally, the excess investments.
Likewise, in the case of downward deviation from projected investments, the
regulator might reward the firm. This is the case in the UK under the RIIO-ED1
model where distribution networks receive financial incentive if they deliver the
same output with less investment (Ofgem, 2012). Under this condition, regulator
can lower the allowed revenue in the next regulatory period in order to better align
the network’s actual cost with their revenue and share the benefits of cost reduction
with consumers.
The ex-ante method of investment treatment aims to secure adequate investment
and quality of supply. This method has been adopted under rate of return regulation
and also incentive regulations that are based on projected cost and not on historical
costs. However, the effect on investments depends on the regulatory model as, for
example, rate of return regulation increases observable investments, whereas price
cap regime promotes cost reducing investments (Armstrong and Sappington, 2005).
The ex-ante model influences the investment behaviour of network companies in
certain ways. Under the condition of guaranteed return, the utilities bear little risk
for their investments. This makes it easier to compete with non-regulated firms,
in the capital market, in order to finance investments. Additionally, under this
regulatory model of investment treatment, the companies have incentive to inflate
the capital cost by reporting high volume of work or by capitalising their operational
expenditure especially when there is no incentive attached to downward deviation
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from the agreed level of capital expenditures in the business plan (Petrov et al.,
2010).
The ex-ante model of investment treatment, under rate of return regulation, has
been the subject of empirical and non-empirical research for many years. Averch and
Johnson (1962) were the first who showed that under this model more capital will
be employed compared to a non-regulated firm, given any level of output, especially
when the regulator commits to a higher rate of return (than the cost of capital) in
advance. This is because the regulator sets the revenue to cover the operating cost
plus a return on capital stock. Therefore, the firms know that lower investments
lead to lower regulatory asset base (RAB) and consequently lower revenues.
Since the formal presentation of Averch-Johnson effect, several methods have
been proposed to overcome this issue. Gilbert and Newberry (1988) show that an
approach based on ”used and useful” rate-of-return regulation, applied strategically
in an infinitely repeated game, can remedy the effect. The other suggested approach
to alleviate the Averch-Johnson bias is that the regulator should offer a nonlinear
rate-of-return in which return is decreasing in capital (Kle-vorick, 1966; Baumol and
Klevorick, 1970). However, a non-linear rate of return might be an optimal solution
to observe the capital costs of firms; it does not reduce the firms’ incentive to inflate
investment (Besanko, 1985).
Therefore, an operating environment which is regulated with ex-ante model of
investment treatment can provide incentive for overinvestment. A shift in the regu-
latory regime which allows for the use of cost disallowance instruments will decrease
the propensity to invest (Gal-Or and Spiro, 1992). Cost disallowance is an effective
instrument to motivate firms move towards an equilibrium path when the regulator
identifies undue investments. Lyon and Mayo (2005) demonstrate that the em-
pirical consequence of large scale cost disallowance is a reduction in propensity to
invest for the firms that have experienced such disallowances. Along the same line,
Teisberg (1993) argues that under stringent cost disallowance, firms incline more
towards smaller projects in order to reduce the chance of being penalised in regula-
tory process. Moreover, unlike larger projects that are prone to change in economic
conditions; the short lead time of implementation does not change the ”usefulness”
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of project from initial expectation.
The regulator commitment is another critical issue, under the ex-ante model,
which has mainly been discussed in the context of rate of return regulation. The
process of revenue setting under the rate of return regulation involves two stages.
In the first stage firm chooses the level of capital and in the second stage regulator
sets the regulated price based on the firm’s capital stock (Besanko and Spulber,
1992). Due to irreversibility of investment, the issue of regulator commitment plays
an important role in the investment decision of firm. Besanko and Spulber (1992)
shows that lack of a credible commitment, by regulator, can create disincentive for
investment.
3.1.2 Ex-post review of capital costs
An alternative regulatory option to treat investments is the ex-post review of capital
expenditures. In this method, the regulator does not need to form an opinion, a pri-
ori, on the type and scale of investments required in the next regulatory period such
that there is no need to project these (Petrov et al., 2010). The regulator uses the
sum of all the costs incurred to the company (operational and capital expenditures,
and other controllable costs) to construct a single variable that reflects the total
costs. The total expenditure is then benchmarked against peer companies in each
regulatory review period using frontier based benchmarking methods such as COLS,
DEA, or SFA 1 (Petrov et al., 2010). Thus, the regulator does not interfere with
the detail of investment plans of companies. The firms are free to decide whether
or not to undertake a particular investment or what level of capital expenditure is
needed. It is expected that companies will restrain their investments to the efficient
levels, in order to avoid high costs in the benchmarking process. This is because
high cost can reduce the relative efficiency score and consequently regulated revenue
of company.
Under the ex-post method the regulatory period is normally shorter, compared
1Corrected Ordinary Least Square (COLS), Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), and Stochastic
Frontier Analysis (SFA).
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with ex-ante approach, in order to dissuade investment inefficiency. Also, similar to
the ex-ante model, the ex-post regulatory treatment of investment creates incentives
for certain types of strategic behaviour. For example, benchmarking total cost
creates incentives for the firms to trade-off between capital expenditures (Capex)
and operating expenditures (Opex) to avoid revenue loss when there is fear of cost
disallowance. The effect of ex-post model on investment behaviour of regulated
firms is not limited to trade-off between Capex and Opex. In this chapter (Sections
3.2 and 3.3) we analyse, in details, the impact of ex-post model on the investment
behaviour through an empirical study of Norwegian distribution companies.
3.1.3 Optimum investment and regulation
The low-powered regulatory regimes such as pure ”rate of return regulation” are
often associated with poor incentive for efficiency. Incentive-based regimes such as
price or revenue caps aim to overcome the efficiency problem by decoupling prices
from utilities’ own costs. However, they give rise to new challenges regarding the
level of investments. The issue of cost efficiency at the expense of investments or
service quality has been discussed in the literature (see e.g., Giannakis et al., 2005;
Rovizzi and Thompson, 1995; Markou and Waddams Price, 1999). Therefore, regu-
lators usually adopt quality incentives such as setting a performance target based on
some estimated index of reliability (e.g., SAIDI and SAIFI 2 ) or including the cost
of energy not supplied and cost of network energy losses in the total benchmarked
cost. This is to reduce the chance of underinvestment which endangers network re-
liability. However, under incentive regimes, when rewards and penalties are weak or
uncertain, the incentives for cost reductions outweigh the inducement to maintain
quality of service and investment (Burn, and Riechmann, 2004).
The empirical evidence concerning investment behaviour of firms under incen-
tive regime is not conclusive. While some initially argued that incentive regulation
2System Average Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI). It is the equivalent of the ratio of total
number of consumers interrupted to the total number of consumer served. The System Average
Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) is the ratio of the sum of all customer interruption duration
to the total number of customers served.
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will lead to underinvestment, subsequent empirical works demonstrated that the
outcome of the incentive regulation concerning the investment behaviour can be in
either direction. Waddams Price et al. (2002), state that a high-powered incentive
regulation might lead to overinvestment. Roques and Savva (2009) argue that a
relatively high price cap can encourage investment in cost reduction as in an unreg-
ulated company. Nagel and Rammerstorfer (2008), on the other hand, show that a
strict incentive regulation regime is more likely to create disincentive for investment.
However, it is generally agreed that in incentive regulation regimes, due to the sep-
aration of firms’ own costs from prices, the motivation for cost reducing investment
is higher than under the rate of return regulation models (Ai and Sappington, 2002;
Greenstein et al., 1995; Cambini and Rondi, 2010).
From the regulatory viewpoint, it is important that decisions influencing the
investment level of the firms are based upon economic efficiency. For example, the
cost of reducing service interruptions through investments should be lower than the
socio-economic costs of service interruption. In effect, the regulator seeks an effi-
cient level of investment in the grid although realising this goal through regulation
is a challenging task. On the one hand, theory does not provide clear indications of
the conditions under which ”efficient” levels of investment are achieved and which
factors lead to over or underinvestment (von Hirschhausen, 2008). Meanwhile, the
empirical evidence from cases of overinvestment or underinvestment is rare. There-
fore, the outcome of incentive regulation regarding investments is ambiguous, and
that regulators, in practice, tend to adopt a combination of different regulatory in-
centive mechanisms in order to achieve their objectives. Furthermore, implementing
incentive regulation is complicated and an evaluation of the associated efficiency is
more difficult than it is often implied (Joskow, 2008b).
Additionally, an important shortcoming of the current studies is that while they
discuss the impact of main regulatory models on investment, they do not explore
the nature of this relationship. In other words, the literature does not show, for
example, how investment of network companies will be reflected in their efficiency
level if capital expenditures are treated in an ex-post manner. Also, the empiri-
cal literature has not systematically categorised regulatory treatment of investment.
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Therefore, the results of those empirical works that seem to investigate the invest-
ment behaviour under incentive models may not be directly comparable as they not
necessarily study the same form of incentive regime.
All in all, the area of efficiency effect of investment under incentive regulation
has been largely ignored in the empirical literature. One of the main reasons might
be that quantifying the efficiency effect of investment can be a challenging task
especially if the investments are treated in an ex-ante manner. In the case of ex-post,
investigating this relationship requires an analytical framework and an appropriate
empirical model that allows us to purge the effect of investment on efficiency. This
chapter bridges this gap by providing the details for a theoretical framework and an
empirical model that enable us to perform this task.
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3.2 Methodology
In this section, we first present a model of the incentive regulation of electricity dis-
tribution networks in Norway and then analyse the relationship between investments
by the utilities and the change in their relative efficiency under incentive scheme.
We then describe the econometric approach and the models estimated in order to
explore the efficiency effects of investments.
3.2.1 Modelling incentive regulation
The allowed revenues of regulated networks are determined by incentive regulation
and cost efficiency benchmarking. Within this framework, investments are encum-
bered indirectly such that overinvestment can result in partial disallowance of in-
vestment costs. The Norwegian regulator computes the allowed revenue (REt) of
the networks using Equation (3.2.1), which, in essence, is a generic incentive regu-
lation formula representing the trade-off between cost reduction incentive and rent
transfer to the consumers, given the presence of asymmetric information between
the firm and the regulator (Newbery, 2002b; Joskow, 2005b).
REt = Ct + λ(C
∗
t − Ct) (3.2.1)
Where Ct is the actual (own) costs of a network company (Ct > 0), C
∗
t is
the norm cost obtained by using the frontier-based benchmarking method Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA), and λ is the power of incentive in terms of the weight
given to benchmarked costs vs. actual costs in setting the allowed revenue. The
power of incentive is important for motivating the firms to move as close as possible
to their norm (benchmarked) cost as they lose revenue when deviating from the
efficient frontier. The share of actual costs and norm costs in determining the
revenue caps is currently 40% and 60% respectively (i.e. λ = 0.6) (NVE, 2008).
Placing more weight on norm costs increases the incentive power of regulation and
promotes indirect competition among the utilities to improve their cost efficiency
relative to best practice.
Actual costs include operating and maintenance costs, capital costs, depreciation
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costs and cost of negative externalities such as network energy loss and service
interruptions. In addition, the regulator deducts the cost of energy not supplied
(CENS) from the firms’ revenue cap3 and adjusts the allowed revenue for tax and
other non-controllable expenses. The regulator uses data with a two year lag which
is updated with an inflation index. The allowed revenue is then adjusted at the end
of the year when final actual data becomes available4.
We divide both sides of (3.2.1) with Ct and rearrange such that it yields:
REt = Ct[1 + λ(et − 1)] (3.2.2)
where et = C
∗
t /Ct is the efficiency of firm in period t (Ct > 0). When a firm invests
the amount In, this will impact its revenue by changing its relative efficiency in
cost benchmarking. The variables for before and after undertaking investments are
denoted by subscripts 1 and 2 respectively. The change in a firm’s revenue due to
an investment can be computed from equation (3.2.3).
∆RE = RE2 −RE1 = C2 − C1 + λ[C2(e2 − 1)− C1(e1 − 1)] (3.2.3)
The change in actual cost of the firms after undertaking investments is equal
to the amount of investments (∆C = C2 − C1 = In). We substitute for C2 in the
bracket and rearrange (3.2.3) as presented in (3.2.4) to show the change in revenue
as a result of investments.
3In order to incentivise network companies to improve service quality (NVE, 2011).
4While the current and previous year investments (years t and t-1) are not included in the
regulatory asset base (RAB) due to a time-lag, the companies can start to calculate a return
on investment into their allowed revenue (i.e. tariff base) from the commissioning year. It is
also important to note that investments enter the regulatory asset base and then capital cost is
computed based on calculated rate of return and depreciations. So, the Norwegian regulator uses
capital costs in the cost base for benchmarking model and not capital expenditures.
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∆RE = ∆C+
Revenue effect of
investments due to
benchmarking
λ[C1(e2 − e1) + In(e2 − 1)] (3.2.4)
Equation (3.2.4) presents the main framework for the network companies’ in-
centive to undertake investments. In the absence of cost benchmarking (i.e., when
λ = 0) the firm would automatically earn a return on its investments because the
change in the firm’s revenue is the same as the change in its cost (∆RE = ∆C),
and the company can pass all its investment costs to its customers. However, as
investments are included in cost benchmarking, the firms’ revenue also depends on
their relative cost efficiency before investments (e1) and after investments (e2). This
is reflected in the second component of (3.2.4), to which we refer as Q in (3.2.5),
and shows the (gross) revenue effect of investments due to benchmarking.
Q = [C1(e2 − e1) + In(e2 − 1)] (3.2.5)
As seen from (3.2.5), the revenue effect of investments consists of two parts.
Clearly, we always have (e2 − 1) ≤ 0. However, the outcome of the component
(e2− e1) of (3.2.5) is not certain as it is not clear whether, following an investment,
the cost efficiency increases, decreases, or remains constant5.
Depending on the initial and after investment measured cost efficiency, Q can
take different values. If Q < 0, the firm gains less from investing compared to the
case of no cost benchmarking (ceteris paribus). However, when Q = 0 investment
costs are fully recovered as there is no benchmarking. If Q > 0, investment creates
synergy by excessive increase in efficiency although this may not happen under
normal condition6 so in most situations one expects Q ≤ 0.
5(e2 − e1 > 0, e2 − e1 < 0 or e2 − e1 = 0)
6The reason is that if the share of investments to other costs (before investments) increases, the
efficiency required to satisfy the inequality rises considerably. However, under certain circumstance
we can have Q > 0 which we refer to it in Section 3.4
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∆RE = ∆C + λQ (3.2.6)
Thus, as shown in (3.2.6), the change in revenue after investments is not neces-
sarily equal to the change in cost and it crucially depends on the value that Q takes.
Although the revenue also depends on the power of incentive (λ), it is a predeter-
mined parameter which is beyond the control of the firm. Thus, a desirable outcome
can be achieved when Q = 0 and benchmarking has no adverse impact on the firms’
revenue. - i.e. when the efficiency after investments increases (due to productivity
of capital) to an amount that results in Q = 0 (note that also when the firm is on
the efficient frontier and remains there after investments, we have e2 = e1 = 1, and
consequently Q becomes zero). This efficiency can be obtained by solving (3.2.5)
with respect to e2 as in (3.2.7).
eno impact = e2 =
C1e1 + In
C1 + In
(3.2.7)
Equation (3.2.7) shows how the Norwegian incentive regulation links investments
to efficiency improvement. In order for a firm to earn a profit on its investments as
if there was no cost benchmarking (ceteris paribus), its efficiency should be, at least,
C1e1+In
C1+In
after the investment. An efficiency level below this will result in lower rev-
enue relative to the no benchmarking case. We use the term ”no impact efficiency”
to refer to the revenue-neutral efficiency effect of investment under cost benchmark-
ing as presented in (3.2.7). In other words, a firm is considered ”investment efficient”
when it meets the ”no impact efficiency” criteria under regulation7.
The Norwegian incentive regulation links investment and efficiency to ensure that
firms do not undertake undue investments. This means that the regulator does not
need to interfere in the firms’ investment decisions, but indirectly incentivises them
to be investment efficient. A limit analysis of (3.2.7) shows that as C1 increases,
the efficiency e2 will approach e1. The opposite of this implies that when the ratio
7For simplicity, we assume that the frontier firms are genuinely efficient. In practice, this may
not be the case.
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Figure 3.1: Possible efficiency effects of investment under Norwegian incentive reg-
ulation
of investment to other costs8 increases, the firm needs to achieve a higher efficiency
level (which in limits is equal to unity) in order to avoid revenue loss. This means
that the expected interval of the no impact efficiency change is e1 ≤ eno impact ≤ 1,
which depending upon the investment to cost ratio would be closer to lower or upper
boundary.
Figure 3.1 shows the possible outcomes of efficiency effect of investment under
Norwegian regulation as an ex-post regulatory model for treatment of investments.
When a firm (with an initial cost and efficiency level) undertakes an investment, it
achieves a new level of efficiency (A). On the other hand, regulation links the initial
cost, efficiency, and investment to no impact efficiency and rewards or penalises the
firm based on the efficiency effect of their investments (B). In practice, this reflects
the incentive mechanism pertaining to investments.
3.2.2 Modelling a stochastic efficient frontier
This section presents the efficiency measurement techniques and empirical model
estimated in this study. We estimate the efficiency of firms before and after in-
vestments and use the efficiencies to calculate the no impact efficiency for current
investment levels of the networks.
The efficiency and productivity analysis has been based on parametric (Stochas-
8The ratio of “investment to other costs before investments”, the average of this ratio for the
Norwegian networks is currently 34%. The maximum is 168% and the minimum is 0.1%.
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tic Frontier Analysis (SFA)) and non-parametric (Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA))
approaches or combination of these two. The advantage of non-parametric methods
is that we do not need to assume a functional form and make assumption a priori
about the nature of production technology except about convexity (Hjalmarsson
et al., 1996). However, a major disadvantage of non-parametric methods is that
they are deterministic and one cannot distinguish between noise and inefficiency.
Parametric methods allow for separating noise from inefficiency but they need a
functional form and thus there are always risks of misspecification and estimation
issues. However, a main attraction of parametric methods is that they allow for sta-
tistical hypothesis testing and constructing confidence intervals (Hjalmarsson et al.,
1996). In recent years significant efforts have been made to combine the advantages
of both approaches which the most important estimator of this type is known as
Stochastic Non-Parametric Envelopment of Data (StoNED) (A detailed comparison
of SFA, DEA and StoNED can be found in Kuosmanen et al., 2013).
In the present analysis we use a fully parametric method because we are inter-
ested to measure the effect of investment on efficiency and this requires simultaneous
estimation of two functions. Furthermore, for our analysis it is important to separate
noise from inefficiency something which requires a parametric setting.
We use an input distance function which allows us to estimate the efficiency
of the firms when input price data is not available (Fa¨re and Lovell, 1978; Coelli
and Perelman 1996). Other advantages of distance functions are that they do not
depend on explicit behavioural assumptions such as cost minimization or profit
maximization and they can accommodate multiple inputs and outputs (Kumbhakar
and Lovell 2000; Coelli et al., 2005).
Input distance functions have been used in empirical studies for efficiency and
productivity analysis of industrial units as in Abrate and Erbetta (2010) and Das
and Kumbhakar (2012) as well as those of electricity networks such as Tovar et al.
(2011), Hess and Cullmann (2007), and Growitsch et al. (2012). The output of elec-
tricity networks is determined exogenously by demand for energy and connections.
Thus companies can only adjust their inputs (i.e. costs) to deliver a given service
efficiently.
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An input distance function can be defined as in (3.2.8):
DI(x, y) = max{ψ : (x
ψ
) ∈ L(y)} (3.2.8)
where L(y) represents the input vectors x that produce the output vector y, and ψ
indicates a proportional reduction in input vector. The function has the following
characteristics: (i) it is linearly homogenous in x, (ii) it is non-decreasing in x and
non-increasing in y, (iii) it is concave in x and quasi-concave in y, and (iv) if x ∈ L(y)
then DI ≥ 1 and DI = 1 if x is on the frontier of input set.
Input-oriented technical efficiency is defined as the inverse of the distance func-
tion and can be obtained from (3.2.9).
TE = 1/DI(x, y), 0 < TE ≤ 1 (3.2.9)
When a firm is operating on the frontier it has a distance function value equal
to unity and consequently has a technical efficiency score of 1. We use a flexible
functional form for input distance function as in (3.2.10):
lnDIit = α0 +
M∑
m=1
αmlnymit +
1
2
M∑
m=1
M∑
n=1
αmnlnymitlnynit +
K∑
k=1
βklnxkit
+
1
2
K∑
k=1
K∑
l=1
βkllnxkitlnxlit +
K∑
k=1
M∑
m=1
δkmlnykitlnymit + θ1t+
1
2
θ11t
2 + νit (3.2.10)
where DIit represents the distance function, ymit is output, xkit is input, variable t
represents the time trend, subscript i = 1...N denotes the number of the firms and
t = 1...T indicates number of periods. Also, m = 1...M and k = 1...K show the
number of outputs and inputs respectively. Parameters α, β, δ, and θ are to be
estimated.
The flexible functional form relaxes the restrictions on demand elasticities and
elasticities of substitution nevertheless; imposing appropriate curvature on translog
models can be challenging (Greene, 2008)9. The time trend is included in order to
capture technical change and also everything else that we cannot measure but varies
9Some studies use the Bayesian approach to impose regularity conditions (Greene, 2008).
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over time and has a common effect on all firms (e.g., price of capitals, change in
the regulatory environment, etc.). This is common in efficiency analysis of network
companies (see e.g., Growitsch et al., 2012).
The condition of homogeneity of degree one in inputs is imposed by the use of
the following constraints:
K∑
k=1
βk = 1,
K∑
k=1
βkl = 0 k = 1, 2, ...K and
K∑
k=1
δkm = 0, m = 1, 2, ...M
(3.2.11)
The symmetry condition is met if: αmn = αnm, m,n = 1, 2...M, and βkl = βlk
k, l = 1, 2...K.
We transform the input distance function into econometric models to be esti-
mated by the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) method and to obtain technical
efficiency of the firms. Imposing the homogeneity of degree one by deflating K − 1
inputs by Kth input (we use other cost (C1) to deflate) will lead to (3.2.12):
lnDIit − lnxKit = f [(lnxkit − lnxKit), lnymit, t] + νit (3.2.12)
where f(.) is the translog functional form. For the purpose of estimation we rear-
range the above equation as:
−lnxKit = f [(lnxkit − lnxKit), lnymit, t] + νit − uit (3.2.13)
where lnDIit = uit represents the non-negative technical inefficiency. The error
components have the following distributions:
νit ∼ iidN(0, σ2ν) uit ∼ iidN+(0, σ2u) (3.2.14)
νit is a normally distributed random error term and uit is a half- normal random
error term that capture inefficiency. As the efficiency is affected by the investments
we model the heteroscedastic inefficiency variance σ2uhet as in (3.2.15).
Logσ2uhet = ρ0+ρ1Log(In)+ρ2Log
2(In)⇒ σ2uhet = exp(ρ0+ρ1Log(In)+ρ2Log2(In))
(3.2.15)
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where ρ0, ρ1 andρ2 are parameters that need to be estimated and “In” is normalised
investment level with respect to sample mean. As shown in (3.2.16) we can sepa-
rate the heteroscedastic variance into its homoscedastic component (σ2uhom) and the
element related to investments.
σ2uhet = exp(ρ0)exp(ρ1Log(In) + ρ2Log
2(In)) =
σ2uhom × exp(ρ1Log(In) + ρ2Log2(In)) (3.2.16)
This allows us to purge the effect of investments on inefficiency as seen from
(3.2.17). In terms of estimation, equations (3.2.13) and (3.2.15) are estimated si-
multaneously based on the only observed data in (3.2.13). Having estimated them,
the homoscedastic inefficiency can be obtained as follows:
uit ∼ N+(0, σ2uhom × exp(ρ1Log(In) + ρ2Log2(In)))
uit ∼ N+(0, σ2uhom)× exp(ρ1Log(In) + ρ2Log2(In))
uˆit = exp(ρˆ1Log(In) + ρˆ2Log
2(In))× uˆbefore (3.2.17)
It is clear that uˆit = E[uit|it] where it = νit − uit, On the other hand, uˆit = uˆafter
thus we can write:
uˆbefore =
uˆafter
exp(ρˆ1Log(In) + ρˆ2Log2(In))
(3.2.18)
where, uˆbefore is before-investment inefficiency and uˆafter is after-investment in-
efficiency (uˆit). The firm specific technical efficiency is then computed by eˆ1 =
exp(−uˆbefore) and eˆ2 = exp(−uˆafter). The ”no impact efficiency” is calculated using
Equation (3.2.7).
3.3 Data
We use a dataset comprising a weakly balanced panel of 129 distribution network
utilities from 2004 to 2010. All monetary data are in real terms and adjusted
to 2010 price level. The data is collected by the Norwegian Water Resource and
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Energy Directorate (NVE) and used in order to set the networks allowed revenues.
The data collection procedure is mainly through an electronic system named eRapp
(NVE, 2007). These include both technical and economic data. The economic
data gives detailed information on the costs and revenues with respect to different
network activities. The technical data, on the other hand, include consumer specific
information such as customer numbers at each category, energy distributed, network
energy losses, and also technical information about the networks such as length, type
and capacity of lines and cables, transformers, switches, number of meters and finally
duration and frequency of interruptions (NVE, 2007).
The network companies are responsible for the accuracy of metering data within
their grid area even for metering and collections that are outsourced to a third party.
The only data that is not based on the firm’s own report is the environmental data
(see Footnote 12). Following the data collection, the economic data are verified by
independent auditors and controlled by the regulator. Moreover, NVE controls the
technical data by visiting the site and also auditing the technical components of
distribution networks and other comparable sources (NVE, 2007).
Our distance function model consists of two inputs and two outputs. The inputs
are capital expenditure (In) and other costs (C1). Following the Norwegian regu-
latory approach, we incorporate quality of service into our benchmarking model by
adding the cost of negative externalities (network energy losses and service interrup-
tions) to the directly incurred elements of operating cost as presented in (3.3.19).
C1 = Operational Expenditure+Cost of Losses+Cost of Energy Not Supplied
(3.3.19)
The cost of energy not supplied is calculated from the number of minutes of
interruptions multiplied by consumer willingness-to-pay for a more reliable service10.
The cost of network energy losses is computed by multiplying the physical losses with
average annual system price of electricity.
10Consumer willingness to pay for quality of service is derived from consumer surveys and tech-
nical analysis.
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The standard outputs, in efficiency measurement of distribution companies, are
the number of customers, energy distributed and network length (or the size of
service area) (Coelli et al. 2012). We use total number of customers (residential
plus recreational homes) and network length as outputs11 . These two variables
are commonly used in efficiency analysis of electricity networks (e.g., Growitsch
et al., 2012; Migue´is et al., 2011; Coelli et al., 2012). In addition to the input and
output variables we use three weather and geographical variables in order to capture
the heterogeneity among firms12 . These factors can impact cost efficiency of the
networks and controlling for their effects can help to account for the heterogeneity
in the operating environment of network companies (Growitsch et al., 2011; Jamasb
et al., 2012)13 . Table 3.1 summarises the descriptive statistics of the data used.
As we use ”other costs” (C1) to impose homogeneity of degree one, the dependent
variable of model is −Log(C1). The parameters used in the model are obtained
by maximum likelihood estimation procedure. The optimisation technique used is
Berndt-Hall-Hall-Hausman (bhhh) algorithm. Furthermore, in order to facilitate
the interpretation of the first order terms, all variables are divided by their sample
mean prior to estimation.
11We examined the case of using distributed energy as an output along with number of customers.
However, due to the presence of sever multicollinearity between these two variables, the estimated
function does not satisfy regularity conditions (i.e. monotonicity and concavity). This is also the
case when we estimated with three standard outputs.
12The three environmental variables are: (1) snow conditions, in millimeters of snow per year
at a given temperature (around 0 degrees C), (2) Wind and distance to coast, as a ratio (average
extreme wind/distance to coast), and (3) forest productivity, a number between 0 and 1 showing
the share of forest with this growth rate along the power lines.
13We examined the influence of asset age (ratio of depreciation to book value) as a control
variable. However, the variable showed inconsistencies in the sign of the age variable itself as well
as for first order terms of other variables. Other measures of age may produce different results but
these were not available. At the same time, the results indicated that inclusion of age does not
change the efficiency scores significantly.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Description Name Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev.
Inputs
Other costs* C1 1205.25 1178987 41260.63 67709.02
Capital expenditures* In 6.82 121042.4 13113.12 17518.02
Outputs
Network length (Km) NL 14 8111 558.27 779.13
Number of customers (#) CU 18 515152 13054 26964
Geographical variables
Snow condition (millimetres) snow 0 1193.61 372.64 196.54
Wind / distance to cost (ratio) wind 0 0.16 0.01 0.02
Forrest productivity (fraction) forest 0 0.54 0.15 0.11
*Monetary variables are in 000’ NOK.
3.4 Results and discussion
The profit motive implies that incentive regulated firms evaluate the costs and ben-
efits of undertaking investments by comparing the possible reductions and increases
in their allowed revenue as a result of efficiency effect of their investments in cost
benchmarking. However, the outcome depends on the net efficiency effect achieved
by the investments.
Table 3.2 presents the results of the input distance function and heteroscedastic
variance model estimations14. As shown in the table, the coefficients of first order
terms for the number of customers, network length and investments are statistically
significant and have the expected signs. These coefficients can be interpreted as dis-
tance function elasticity with respect to outputs and inputs at sample mean. The
first order coefficients for snow, wind and forest are significant and consistent in
terms of sign indicating that these geographic variables are also cost drivers. Addi-
tionally, all interactions of the forest variable with outputs are significant. However,
only one interaction term of wind and snow variables with outputs is statistically
significant. The heteroscedastic inefficiency variance model shows significant coeffi-
14For ease of interpretation, the model coefficients were multiplied by -1.
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cients both for the first order and quadratic terms.
The translog functional forms do not satisfy monotonicity and convexity glob-
ally (regularity conditions) hence, these need to be verified a posteriori (Sauer et
al., 2006). Monotonicity implies two conditions for partial derivatives of input dis-
tance functions: non-decreasing in inputs and non-increasing in outputs (Perelman
and Santin, 2005). Appropriate curvature implies concavity in inputs and quasi-
concavity in outputs which boils down to a negative definite Hessian matrix on
inputs and a negative semi-definite bordered Hessian matrix on outputs (Perelman
and Santin, 2005). The results of a posteriori check on monotonicity and concavity
conditions are presented in Tables A1 and A2 respectively (Appendix).
The results show that monotonicity is satisfied at sample mean for all inputs
and outputs. Moreover, for the inputs investment and other costs and output net-
work length monotonicity is satisfied 100% over all data points. The figure is 99.6%
for the other output number of customers. The Hessian matrix of inputs is nega-
tive definite at sample mean without violation of appropriate curvature over data
points. The bordered Hessian matrix of outputs is, however, indefinite at the point
of approximation and satisfies appropriate curvature only 18.7% of times over data
points15.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the changes in the efficiencies before and after investments.
As shown in the figure, investments have impacted the efficiency of the networks
and within a relatively wide range. It is evident that the impact of investments on
the efficiency variation among the firms is not uniform, in the sense that some of
the firms have gained while some others lost efficiency. This complies with the basic
notion of ex-post regulatory treatment of investments based on benchmarking that
efficiency effects influence investment behaviour of firms as undue investments face
the risk of efficiency loss.
15Appropriate curvature cannot be guaranteed at all data points due to the presence of trade-off
between flexibility and theoretical consistency. It is, however, desirable to have these conditions
at least at the vicinity of the approximation point (e.g., sample mean), or for a range of dataset
in which case interpretation capabilities with respect to the data points far from point of approxi-
mation is restricted. For a detail discussion of the regularity conditions see Sauer et al. (2006).
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Table 3.2: Input distance function model estimation
Dependent variable:−Log(C1)
Variables Coefficient Std. Err
Constant -5.799*** 0.911
Log(CU) 0.428* 0.233
Log(NL) 0.625*** 0.218
Log(In) -0.924*** 0.17
0.5Log2(CU) 0.235*** 0.025
0.5Log2(NL) 0.134*** 0.049
0.5Log2(In) -0.073*** 0.016
Log(CU) ∗ Log(NL) -0.159*** 0.036
Log(CU) ∗ Log(In) -0.007 0.02
Log(NL) ∗ Log(In) 0.026 0.02
t -0.01 0.01
0.5t2 0.011*** 0.003
snow 0.075*** 0.021
wind 0.022*** 0.005
forest 0.064*** 0.013
snow ∗ Log(CU) -0.003 0.029
snow ∗ Log(NL) 0.073** 0.035
wind ∗ Log(CU) -0.019** 0.008
wind ∗ Log(NL) 0.014 0.009
forest ∗ Log(CU) 0.077*** 0.023
forest ∗ Log(NL) -0.067*** 0.024
Log(σ2u)
Log(In) -1.801*** 0.684
Log2(In) -0.261** 0.124
Constant -5.605*** 1.005
Note: ∗ P < 0.1 ; ∗ ∗ P < 0.05 ; ∗ ∗ ∗ P < 0.01
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Figure 3.2: Efficiency change in firms before and after investments
Figure 3.3: The distribution of efficiency change following investments
Figure 3.3 shows the distribution of efficiency variation following investments.
The descriptive statistics of graph data is presented in Table 3.3. As seen from
the graph and the table, the change in efficiency tends towards an asymmetrical
distribution. The Jarque-Bera test of normality is rejected and distribution is right
skewed. The maximum positive variation is 0.49 whereas on the negative side it
is -0.34. Also, the majority of observations lie between -0.15 and 0.08 efficiency
variations following investments (one standard deviation with respect to mean).
Furthermore, as illustrated by the scatter plot in Figure 3.4, efficiency loss after
investments is more prevalent among the companies with lower investment to total
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Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics of e2 − e1
Mean -0.035
Median -0.043
Maximum 0.496
Minimum -0.345
Std. Dev. 0.112
Skewness 1.022
Kurtosis 5.711
Jarque-Bera 408.59
Probability 0.000
cost ratios. On the other hand, companies with average investment levels show more
efficiency gain following their investments compared with companies with very high
share of investment in total cost. This suggests that middle scale investments have
generally been more productive than the larger and especially than the small ones.
One striking point is that the efficiency loss following investment is mainly related
to the smaller companies. As seen from Figure 3.5, many of the utilities with a
network length of less than 1000 km have lost efficiency following their investments.
These companies have also lower investment to total cost ratios. On the contrary,
the efficiency gain from investments increases with the size of firm, in the sense that
highest efficiency gains are achieved by firms with a network length in excess of
1000 km. However, for very large firms, the efficiency gains from investments tend
to decline again.
These observations suggest that smaller companies tend to be less productive
and less able to absorb the full benefits of their capital expenditures. One reason
can be that small companies are not operating at optimum size16 . Moreover, the
fact that lower investment to total cost ratio in these companies did not lead to
an efficiency improvement indicates the complexity of the investment and efficiency
16In the extreme, one network served 18 customers in a year and one with 14 Km of network
length only (see Table 3.1). As seen from Figure 3.5, the majority of the companies have a network
length of less than 1000 Km.
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Figure 3.4: Efficiency change versus investments to total cost ratio
Figure 3.5: Efficiency variation versus network size (length)
relationship under benchmarking as lower investment levels might lead to an increase
in other costs and may not help with efficiency improvement. This also implies that
small scale investments may need better scrutiny prior to implementation in order
to avoid lower allowed revenues as a result of cost benchmarking.
Figure 3.6 summarises the distribution of before investment, after investment
and no impact efficiencies estimated in different years. As seen from the figure, in
all cases, the distributions do not show zero skewness rather the mass of distribution
is concentrated around the more efficient region without a noticeable change over
different years. Additionally, the lower quartile is higher for the case of no impact
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efficiency compared with before investments and after investments efficiency, sug-
gesting that given the current levels of investment efficiency improvement is required
for many firms.
Table 3.4 compares the average of the same efficiencies in each year for all com-
panies. As the table shows, the average efficiency declined following investments and
it falls behind no impact efficiency in all years. This deviation varies between 3.7 to
6.2% in different years. Moreover, there is no stable pattern of change, in average
efficiencies, over different years. However, the average becomes affected with outliers
hence; in order to make a more reliable inference on the performance of sector we
have weighted the efficiencies by the share of their corresponding investment in the
total investment of the sector. This is to ensure that the weight effect of firms on
total investment in the sector is taken into account when looking at the sector level.
This is particularly relevant to the case of the Norwegian distribution companies
which are diverse in terms of network size and customer density.
As shown in Table 3.4, the average efficiency gain following investments increased
to around 10% when weighted. Additionally, there is a decline in weighted no impact
efficiency. Also, the weighted average efficiency following investment exceeds the no
impact efficiency by around 6.4%. This clearly indicates that equal treatment of
firms to infer about their investment behaviour ”at sector level” can result in biased
conclusions. Moreover, the fact that the weighted average no impact efficiency de-
clined below the weighted average after investment efficiency signals that the sector
can still increase the level of investments, through new reallocation of investments,
and without lowering the average efficiency gain of the sector.
Table 3.4: Average ’before investment’, ’after investment’, and ’no impact’ efficiency
Efficiency measured 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Average e1 0.951 0.953 0.948 0.949 0.947 0.946 0.943
Average e2 0.912 0.908 0.898 0.911 0.925 0.922 0.913
Average eno impact 0.962 0.965 0.96 0.962 0.962 0.962 0.959
Weighted average e1 = 0.861 e2 = 0.963 eno impact = 0.899
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Figure 3.6: Distribution of efficiencies estimated
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The reallocation of investments can increase the total investments in the sector
because there are significant performance differences among the companies as de-
picted in Figures 3.3 and 3.4. The very efficient utilities that exceeded the no impact
efficiency may wish to increase their investment in order to gain from their efficiency
level. The investment increase can be continued until efficiency after investment de-
clines to no impact efficiency, in which state, a form of optimality is achieved. On
the other hand, those firms that their efficiency after investments falls short of no
impact efficiency need to reduce their investment level in order to avoid inefficiency
associated revenue loss17 . The total capital expenditure of the companies that fall
short of no impact efficiency accounts for 34% of the sector investment whereas this
figure is about 66% for networks that obtained or exceeded no impact efficiency.
Therefore, the net effect of the new reallocation is an increase in total investments
without reducing the average efficiency of the sector.
As discussed above, the outcome of ex-post regulatory treatment of investments
through total cost benchmarking is that some firms will lose part of their capital
cost while some others recover all their investment and some make above normal
profits. For example, the firms that appear to have outperformed the investment
efficiency requirement i.e. their efficiency after investments exceeded the no impact
efficiency considerably (the instance of Q > 0 discussed in Section 3.2.1) can earn
more compared to the no benchmarking case. Under the circumstance that an ”in-
vestment efficient firm” gains and an ”investment inefficient firm” loses, the ex-post
regulatory treatment of investment is effective in rewarding efficient and penalising
inefficient firms.
However, this might not always be the case as the condition under which bench-
marking produces reliable results does not always hold. This is because efficiency, in
benchmarking terms, is a relative concept and only reveals information about firm
17In this analysis we ignore the concept of dynamic efficiency hence; we do not take into account
the cost effect of investments that takes more than one regulatory period to become realised. This
is because our positive analysis is based on the current form of incentive regulation with ex-post
regulatory treatment of investments as practiced in Norway and some other countries. The concept
of dynamic efficiency is addressed in chapter 4.
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performance in relation to other firms. Thus, the relative efficiency of a firm can
also improve when the peer companies are not performing well. For instance, when
companies are capital productive and their investments are used and useful, they
might move to a higher level of relative efficiency after investments. However, the
same can happen when they underinvest, something which gives them the appear-
ance of cost efficiency. Therefore, unless the frontier firms genuinely represent the
best practice, the results of benchmarking can be misleading.
The benchmarking limitation regarding investment embraces other cases such
as when the firms’ investments behaviour is harmonised in the sense that they are
in the same phases of their investment cycles. This refers to the case that firms
invest in similar periods and in proportion to their total cost levels but beyond
their actual need. As the measure of efficiency is relative the firms tend to remain
in a relatively similar efficiency position before and after investment. Under this
condition, benchmarking can fail to identify the incidence of overinvestment.
The regulator expects that the threat of partial disallowance of capital expendi-
tures built into the regulatory formula leads the firms towards efficient investments.
However; the power of the model to detect overinvestments is limited to the case of
’out of phase’ investments (i.e. when firms are not in the same investment cycle).
Thus, sector-wide ’in phase’ or cyclically harmonised overinvestments by the firms
are not revealed in the process of benchmarking because the approach is based on
between-firms comparisons. This will, in turn, limit the ability of the regulator to
effectively address the issue of overinvestment. Harmonised investment behaviour
can happen when many firms follow a similar investment policy. For instance, when
a regulator guides the investment into a desired direction by, for example, offering a
higher return for investments in innovation and particular types of technologies and
activities (e.g., Smart Grids).
A parallel argument also holds in the case of harmonised underinvestment. This
problem arises when the incentives to invest are not strong enough or the regulation
is restrictive which causes firms to reduce their investments. In the short run,
this can give the appearance of cost efficiency while, overtime, leading to gradual
degradation of the networks and their reliability.
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There are some possible remedies to address the cases of harmonised underinvest-
ment or overinvestment. For instance, the regulator can use the power of incentive
(λ) in order to influence the investment inefficient firms when there is evidence of
overcapitalisation. The higher the power of incentive is the greater possibility of
financial loss as a result of investment inefficiency. Thus, a high λ causes investment
inefficient firms to reduce their investments and consequently improve their effi-
ciency. Also, frontier firms need to follow the same path to maintain their position
on the frontier. At present, λ is set at 60% for Norwegian distribution companies.
A small increase in λ can reduce the net efficiency gains by the firms and create
disincentive for investments. On the contrary, a reduction of the power of incentive
aligns the revenue of the firm more with its actual cost and increases its propensity
to invest. However, the power of incentive is usually set for a long period of time
in order to make the investment behaviour of firms predictable and provide a stable
regulatory environment. Therefore, the ability of the regulator to modify the power
of incentive can be constrained18.
In order to avoid underinvestment and deterioration of quality of supply induced
by cost reduction incentives incorporated in incentive regulation, regulators adopt
either quality performance targets or include the cost of network energy losses and
cost of energy not supplied in benchmarking model as in the case of Norway. This is
to prevent systematic underinvestment which can endanger network reliability over
time. However, the issue is that underinvestment can have an immediate effect on
efficiency improvement of the network whereas its impact on network reliability will
be realised in the longer run.
Another possible problem of ex-post regulatory treatment of investment using
benchmarking is that it can ease the strategic behaviour for trade-off between Capex
and Opex19 in order to avoid revenue loss from investment inefficiency when firms
invest beyond their productive capacity. For instance, as shown in Table 3.2, invest-
18This strategy can have significant side effects such as inducing uncertainty in regulation. There-
fore, it needs to be used with strong evidence of persistent or systematic over or underinvestment
in the sector.
19Capital expenditures and operational expenditures.
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ments and other costs are negatively correlated in such a way that a 1% increase
in investment with respect to the mean of the sector can result in 0.92% reduction
of other costs. This in turn raises the regulatory issue of substitution of capital for
labour introduced by Averch-Johnson (1962).
The regulatory treatment of investments involves a risk sharing dimension be-
tween the utilities and the consumers irrespective of being ex-ante or ex-post. The
ex-post regulatory treatment of investment has the merit of being less interven-
tionist. However, this comes at the cost of transferring investment risks to the
companies. On the contrary, the ex-ante regulatory model is more interventionist
but less risky for the investments of the network companies because risks are mainly
transferred to the users of networks.
Thus, it is less likely that firms operating under a pure ex-ante regulatory regime
(i.e., no ex-post evaluation of used and useful capital) peruse cost reducing invest-
ments as the investment cost is decoupled from their efficiency level. For example, in
the UK, under the current regulatory framework for electricity and gas transmission
networks, which are a form of ex-ante model (though subject to ex-post efficiency
assessment), consumers are exposed to 75% of the companies ’actual cost’ (Ofgem,
2010)20 . Under the ex-post model it is more likely that consumers are exposed to
the efficient cost of firms however, the implementation of this model has proven to
be more complicated that initially perceived.
To sum up, the relationship between investment and efficiency under incentive
regulation with ex-post regulatory treatment of investment is not straightforward.
As efficiency is a relative concept in economics, performance of a firm is not only
related to its own behaviour but also to that of other firms. The conditions under
which overinvestment can reduce cost efficiency might not always hold. Moreover,
it takes time for underinvestment to appear as cost in the form of quality of service
deterioration. The Norwegian regulator attempts to incentivise the companies to
operate and maintain their networks in an efficient manner and provide a high level
of reliability. However, the use of total cost benchmarking does not necessarily
20This figure is perceived to be lower for electricity and gas distribution companies (Ofgem,
2010).
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lead to the socio-economic efficient level of investments. The implication of these
for regulatory framework of network companies is that, there is no ideal measure to
address the issue of investment under regulation given the trade-off between the level
of intervention and risks of capital cost to the utilities or their consumers. Therefore,
the regulator might choose to combine the effective elements of different approaches
to balance between the benefits and shortcomings of taking up a particular method.
Some previous works which have proposed such new approaches, in the context of
transmission grid, include combining the merchant model with benchmark or price
regulation models (see Hogan et al., 2010) or the design of network tariffs such as
two-part tariffs as in Vogelsang (2001).
3.5 Conclusions
Contrary to the early years of electricity sector reforms when regulators were mainly
concerned with cost efficiency, an emerging and pressing issue is how to ensure
sufficient and efficient level of investments in the regulated networks. Over the years,
efficiency of the natural monopoly power networks has been improving as a result
of incentive regulation. However, the need for significant investments in the coming
years combined with the incentives to reduce costs gives rise to new challenges
regarding the efficiency and sufficiency of investments in the networks. In this
study we analysed the relation between cost efficiency and investments in electricity
distribution networks under ex-post regulatory treatment of capital expenditures
using the case of Norway. We introduced the concept of ”no impact efficiency” as
a revenue-neutral efficiency effect of investments under cost benchmarking which, if
achieved, makes the firm ”investment efficient” and immune from cost disallowance
in the benchmarking process. Also, we estimated the observed efficiency effect of
investments in order to compare this with the no impact efficiency and discussed
the implication of cost benchmarking for the investment behaviour of distribution
companies in Norway.
The results show that the weighted average efficiency gain of the networks from
investments is 10% reflecting the fact that more investment often resulted in higher
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efficiency. The results suggest that networks that fall short of the no impact effi-
ciency need to reduce their capital expenditure in order to improve their efficiency
following investment. On the other hand, firms that outperform the no impact
efficiency may wish to increase their investment levels in order to gain from the
efficiency they achieved. Overall, the new reallocation of investments increases the
total investment of the sector as a whole but without lowering the average efficiency
gain of the sector.
At the same time, there are significant variations in efficiency gain following
investments at the level of individual companies. Firms with average investment
to total cost ratio have gained more efficiency through their investments relative
to those with higher or lower than average. Moreover, the efficiency loss following
investments is mainly related to the smaller networks. An implication of this for
regulatory framework can be that cost reducing incentives have adversely affected
the smaller firms leading to lower level of investments and higher operating costs
and consequently efficiency loss in these firms. Given that average investment levels
have been more productive indicates that the incentives should prevent the network
utilities from going below or beyond certain levels of capital expenditures.
The relationship between investment and efficiency under incentive regulation
is not straight forward. The effectiveness of ex-post regulatory treatment of in-
vestments relies on the reliability of benchmarking results which are potentially
vulnerable to certain trends and behaviours such as harmonised over- and under-
investments. Despite these issues, under the ex-post regulatory treatment of invest-
ments, consumers are more likely to be exposed to efficient level of costs compared
with the ex-ante model. At the same time, the networks bear a higher investment
risk under the ex-post model. Thus, the regulatory treatment of investment always
involves an element of risk sharing trade-off between the firms and their consumers.
This chapter analysed the relationship between investment and short run effi-
ciency under incentive regulation. However, a serious shortcoming of regulatory
models (both ex- ante and ex-post) is lack of an incentive mechanism for dynamic
efficiency. Dynamic efficiency is concerned with the optimal rate of innovation and
investment to improve production processes which help to reduce the long run av-
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erage cost curves. Dynamic efficient behaviour, on the other hand, might cause
the regulated firms to temporarily deviate from the static efficient frontier. This,
however, is problematic especially under ex-post regulatory treatment of investment
because it exposes the firms to financial loss and hence, creates disincentive for long
term investment and innovation. The next chapter deals with the issue of dynamic
efficiency under incentive regulation.
Chapter 4
Dynamic efficiency and incentive
regulation
The pursuit of efficiency improvement is the main motivation for reform and incentive-
based regulation of infrastructure and network industries such as electricity, gas,
water, and telecommunications. The expectation is that incentive regulation mech-
anisms would provide more powerful incentives for regulated firms to deliver the
objectives of regulators (Joskow, 2005b). Due to asymmetry of information between
regulators and regulated firms, the former often rely on sector level information
(benchmarking) in order to determine the firms’ efficient levels of cost. This is be-
cause the business plan of a regulated company can be strategically distorted in
pursuit of profit. Furthermore, the incentive regulatory regimes tend to remunerate
firms based on their performance and not their actual cost. Thus, incentive reg-
ulation models almost invariably involve efficiency and productivity analysis using
benchmarking techniques (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2001).
In theory, regulators would be expected to pursue multiple aspects of efficiency
when regulating natural monopoly industries (Coelli et al., 2003). An important
aspect is the concept of dynamic efficiency. Dynamic efficiency can be described as a
state where the short run and long run objectives of firms are balanced. It also tends
to promote longer term investment in technology and research and development,
which are the key factors for the success of a business. The resulting innovation often
helps an economic decision making unit to smoothly address its future challenges.
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This is particularly the case in a capital intensive sector such as electricity networks.
This is because the industry is regulated and the operating environment of network
companies is highly dynamic as a result of increasing penetration of distributed
energy resources, smart grid deployment, electric vehicles’ uptake and demand side
management.
Thus, regulation should incentivise distribution networks to undertake innova-
tion, make sufficient investment, promote their technical level and improve their
management practices. In other words, regulators need to promote dynamic effi-
ciency in regulated firms. However, until recently the dynamic aspect of efficiency
analysis was absent from the efficiency and productivity literature and, in particular,
in the context of the regulated industries (Serra et al., 2011).
This chapter introduces the concept of dynamic efficiency under incentive regu-
lation with ex-post regulatory treatment of investments using the case of electricity
distribution networks in Norway. We show that incentive regulatory models based on
benchmarking total cost are problematic for investment and optimal inter-temporal
accumulation of capital of regulated firms. This is because they induce an autore-
gressive process in the level of cost efficiency and expose firms to financial losses
following investment and capital stock adjustment. The study demonstrates that,
in a given period, cost inefficiency of regulated utilities is a combination of period-
specific effects (shocks) and a carry-over component from previous periods. The
latter component is due to the sluggish adjustment of outputs in the presence of in-
vestment and the associated adjustment costs. Additionally, we estimate these two
components of inefficiency along with the rate of inefficiency transmission across pe-
riods (adjustment towards the long run equilibrium). Finally, we show that there is
a positive relationship between the investment level and period specific inefficiency
shocks and also the rate of inefficiency transmission across periods.
The next section provides a theoretical framework for the effect of adjustment
cost and incentive regulation of electricity distribution networks on the dynamics of
inefficiency. Section 4.2 discusses the empirical model adopted to estimate the two
components of inefficiency (i.e., period specific shock and carry-over) and the rate
of inefficiency transmission. The empirical results are presented and discussed in
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Section 4.3. Section 4.4 provides the conclusions.
4.1 Theoretical framework
In this section we develop a simple framework to describe the process of capital stock
adjustment of a firm and its effect on the evolution of inefficiency under incentive
regulation with ex-post regulatory treatment of investment such as (4.1.1).
REt = Ct + λ(C
∗
t − Ct) (4.1.1)
In the above model, t indexes time periods, REt is regulated revenue, Ct rep-
resents the actual costs of the firm,C∗t is the efficient cost obtained from efficiency
analysis of regulated firms (i.e., C∗t = etCt where et is the cost efficiency of the firm)
and λ is the power of incentive1 . Actual cost includes capital expenditures and
other costs (operation and maintenance, etc.).
The relation in (4.1.1) presents a generic form of incentive regulation model with
ex-post regulatory treatment of investments. It is an incentive regulatory model
because the revenue of the firm is partially (or totally) decoupled from its actual
(own) cost depending on the magnitude of the power of incentive 2. This amounts
to a non-zero value for λ within its feasible boundary (0 ≤ λ ≤ 1).
The regulatory model presented in (4.1.1) has also two important specifications.
First, it constructs the allowed revenue of firm based on a weighted average of
firm specific information (actual cost obtained from business plan) and sector level
information (efficient cost obtained from benchmarking). Second, revenue crucially
depends on the firm’s cost efficiency. This implies that any factor which affects the
1The aim of this regulatory model is to incentivise efficiency improvement in regulated utilities.
In theory, a higher than optimum level of cost (C∗t ) means revenue loss to the firm. Thus, the
regulated firms have incentive to move as closely as possible to the production frontier (Poudineh
and Jamasb, 2013a, Newbery, 2002b).
2Depending on the value of λ, the model in (4.1.1) represents an spectrum of incentive regu-
lations ranges from a high powered incentive regulation (i.e., λ = 1) where the firm’s cost is fully
decoupled from the revenue to a low powered incentive regulation (i.e., λ=0 ) where the firm’s
revenue is the same as the actual cost ( i.e., rate of return regulation).
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cost efficiency of a firm will also affect its revenue. Additionally, as the revenue of
a firm is linked to the cost efficiency, it promotes an indirect competition among
regulated firms to reduce their cost for given levels of outputs or maximise the
outputs for a given level of cost (Mu¨ller et al. 2010).
Under the ex-post regulatory model of investment treatment the regulator does
not interfere directly with the investment level of regulated firms. The regulator,
however, evaluates the companies’ performance, ex-post, using benchmarking tech-
niques and sets their allowed revenues based on their deviation from the sector best
practice. In this approach, the investment level of regulated firms will impact their
revenue through its effect on cost efficiency.
Poudineh and Jamasb (2014b) show that, under the incentive regulation model in
(4.1.1), firms need to achieve a certain level of cost efficiency, following investment,
in order to avoid cost disallowance in the benchmarking exercise. This level of
efficiency, which is termed ”no impact efficiency”, depends on the investment level
(In), cost and efficiency of the firm before investment (i.e. C1 and e1 respectively)
and can be presented as in (4.1.2) (see Poudineh and Jamasb 2014b; 2013a).
e∗ =
C1e1 + In
C1 + In
(4.1.2)
Alternatively, it can be shown that there is a certain level of investment (In∗),
for a given level of no impact efficiency (e∗), that can be done without reduction in
profits. This investment level can be obtained by solving (4.1.2) with respect to In
as in (4.1.3).
In∗ =
C1(e
∗ − e1)
1− e∗ e
∗ 6= 1 (4.1.3)
As seen from (4.1.3), as no impact efficiency moves towards unity (though never
equals one), the optimum level of investment for the firm will be higher. In practice,
the regulated firm neither observes nor can choose the level of no impact efficiency
whereas it only adjusts the investment level (and other costs). However, the firm
knows that high level of investment involves the risk of cost disallowance because it
requires a higher level of efficiency achievement following investment. Moreover, as
shown in Poudineh and Jamasb (2014b), in a static setting, the lower than optimum
4.1. Theoretical framework 86
level of investment can increase other costs and hence, reduces efficiency in the
benchmarking process, which consequently will be reflected in the firm’s revenue.
Therefore, the firm conjectures the optimum level of investment, given its current
level of efficiency and other costs. The capital accumulation process follows the
following relation:
K∗t+1 = (1− ϕ)K∗t + In∗t (4.1.4)
where K is the stock of capital of the firm, ϕ is the depreciation rate of capital
and the star superscript indicates optimally. In theory, deviation from the opti-
mum investment level (i.e., under- or over-investment), under the incentive model
in (4.1.1), will be translated into a cost to the firm in the form of efficiency loss.
Thus, regulated firms have an incentive to adjust their level of capital stock employed
in the production process.
However, there are two barriers to the full and fast adjustment of capital stock
towards the optimum level. First, the regulated firm needs to take into consideration
the revenue effect of investments and possible cost disallowance in the benchmarking
practice. This is because the firm carries out investment based upon an ex-ante
prediction of the optimum level of investment. However, the firm’s actual investment
can turn out to be lower or higher than the optimum level following the ex-post
efficiency benchmarking (for a detailed discussion see Poudineh and Jamasb, 2013a).
Second, the adjustment costs as a result of changing capital stock (e.g., cost of
installation, disturbing the production process, personnel training, etc.) manifest
themselves as reduced output or resource cost and lead to sluggish capital stock
adjustment3. Adjustment costs are often modelled as either explicit resource cost or
as output-reducing cost incurred by firms as a result of diversion of resources from
production to investment support activities (Silva and Stefanou, 2007).
Therefore, in any regulatory period, the firm’s objective (with regard to invest-
ment) is to minimise the cost of deviation from the optimum capital stock, as well as,
3In this analysis we do not consider external adjustment costs which are related to market for
capital goods (i.e., monopsony in the market for supply of capital goods).
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the cost of adjustment. In the context of incentive regulated firms, it is reasonable
to assume that adjustment cost appears as a resource cost to the firm rather than
an output-reducing cost. This is because output is determined by demand which
is exogenous and hence, the utilities adjust their input to deliver a given level of
output and service quality.
Following Pereira (2001) we adopt a quadratic loss function to represent the
firm’s decision for investment and capital level adjustment. In our model we interpret
the loss function components in the context of a regulated industry as previously
mentioned. Within this framework, the firm minimises the expected sum of future
adjustment cost and the cost of deviation from the optimal path of capital stock,
which are discounted appropriately, subject to a capital accumulation process as
follows:
Min Et
∞∑
i=0
ηi[(Kt+i −K∗t+i)2 + b(In2t+i)]
s.t. Kt+i+1 −Kt+i = It+i − ϕKt+i (4.1.5)
where 0 < η < 1 is the discount factor and b(In2t+i) is a quadratic function
representing the adjustment cost, with b denoting the importance of adjustment cost
in disequilibrium cost. Et is the expectation operator conditional on the information
set available to the firm at time t. The quadratic nature of the function ensures that
any deviation from the optimum level of capital (under- or over-investment) appears
as a cost to the firm (Freiesleben, 2008).
Expectations play an important role in investment decision of firms under regu-
lation. The economic actions concerned with the future are not strictly determined
by a set of objective data whereas often decided upon in a shadow of doubt and un-
certainty. Under uncertainty the optimisation is based on the expectation of future
relevant variables for rationally by agents. The optimum capital adjustment path
(Euler equation) can be obtained from the decision of firm based on the forward
solution procedure.
Using discrete time calculus of variations, the first order condition for the dy-
namic optimisation problem in (4.1.5) will lead to the Euler equation in (4.1.6),
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which shows the optimal path for capital stock (Pereira, 2001).
EtKt+1 − [(1− ϕ)
2 + b−1 + η−1]
1− ϕ Kt +
1
η
Kt−1 = − b
−1
(1− ϕ)K
∗
t (4.1.6)
Using a simplifying assumption of zero depreciation rate (ϕ = 0)4 and the con-
ditional expectation operator converts (4.1.6) into the following:
(B2 + ζB−1 +
1
η
)EtKt−1 = −b−1EtK∗t (4.1.7)
where ζ = −[1 + b−1 + η−1] < 0 and B represents an operator defined as B−jEtxt =
Etxt+j.
The equation (4.1.7) can be further decomposed into its factors as follows:
(θ1 −B−1)(θ2 −B−1)EtKt−1 = −b−1EtK∗t (4.1.8)
where θ1+θ2 = −ζ and θ1θ2 = 1/η. As the sum and product of roots are positive
we can conclude that the roots θ1 and θ2 are both positive. Furthermore, Pereira
(2001) shows that one of these roots is smaller than unity and the other is larger
than one. Solving (4.1.8) for the unstable root, say θ2, leads to the equation of
motion for capital stock in (4.1.9):
Kt = θ1Kt−1 + θ1ηb−1
∞∑
i=0
(θ1η)
iEtK
∗
t+i (4.1.9)
If we multiply both sides of (4.1.9) with (B−1 − 1) a similar equation of motion
for investment can be obtained as follows:
It = θ1It−1 + θ1ηb−1
∞∑
i=0
(θ1η)
iEtI
∗
t+i (4.1.10)
where It = Kt+1 −Kt and I∗t = K∗t+1 −K∗t .
Therefore, the level of investment (or capital stock), in the current period, is
directly influenced by its value in the previous period and also related to the cur-
rent and expected future levels of optimum investment (capital). In other words,
4This assumption is just for simplicity in working with the equations and has no effect on
the nature of the autoregressive process we will obtain for investment or capital in the following
equations.
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the equation of motion, for investment (capital) of the regulated firm, follows an
autoregressive process.
The presence of an autoregressive process in investment (or capital) evolution
induces a similar relationship in state of the firm’s cost inefficiency as well. In
order to show this we construct the total costs of firm using the relation in (4.1.10).
According to incentive regulation model in (4.1.1), the total cost of firm includes
investment and other costs (operation and maintenance etc.) as in (4.1.11).
Ct = It +Other costst (4.1.11)
If we substitute for It from (4.1.11) into (4.1.10) we will have:
Ct = θ1It−1 +Other costst + θ1ηb−1
∞∑
i=0
(θ1η)
iEtI
∗
t+i (4.1.12)
which can be presented as follows:
Ct = θ
′
1Ct−1 + V0 + θ1ηb
−1
∞∑
i=0
(θ1η)
iEtI
∗
t+i (4.1.13)
where θ′1Ct−1+V0 = θ1It−1+Other costst and 1−θ′1 shows the rate of adjustment
of total cost. The equation in (4.1.13) can be further simplified and presented in
term of an autoregressive process for total cost as follows:
Ct = θ
′
1Ct−1 + C0 (4.1.14)
where C0 = V0 +θ1ηb
−1∑∞
i=0(θ1η)
iEtI
∗
t+i and shows the cost level of firm if there
was no transfer from previous period.
Cost efficiency (CEt) is defined as the ratio of minimum cost (C
∗) over actual
cost of the firm (Ct). Also, for any given level of cost inefficiency (zt), the cost
efficiency (CEt) is defined as CEt = exp(−zt). Therefore, we can write:
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CEt =
C∗
Ct
=
C∗
θ′1Ct−1 + C0
1
CEt
=
θ′1Ct−1 + C0
C∗
= θ′1
Ct−1
C∗
+
C0
C∗
1
CEt
= θ′1
Ct−1
C∗
+
C0
C∗
exp(zt) = θ
′
1exp(zt−1) +
C0
C∗
(4.1.15)
The relation in (4.1.15) clearly shows that inefficiency in the current period is
correlated to the inefficiency in the previous period. Thus, the firm decision with
respect to optimal capital stock adjustment, under regulatory model in (4.1.1), will
lead to an autoregressive process in the level of cost inefficiency 5.
Econometric version
Taking the logarithm of both sides in (4.1.15), and appending a random term
(t) we can present the econometric version of this relation for zt−1 as follows:
zt = α + (1− ψ)zt−1 + t (4.1.16)
where α is a constant which is related to the C0
C∗ in (4.1.15), 1 − ψ shows the
persistence of inefficiency6 and is related to θ′1 (i.e., ψ is the speed of adjustment of
inefficiency). Finally, t is a random shock to the level of inefficiency in the current
period.
The term α + (1 − ψ)zt−1 in (4.1.16) is the expected value of zt given zt−1. In
other words, given the previous level of inefficiency and presence of an autoregressive
process, firm inefficiency is expected to be composed of a constant term (α), and its
inefficiency in the previous period (zt−1) which is partially adjusted (−ψzt−1).
5While we demonstrate that investment behaviour of firms under regulation model in (4.1.1)
will lead to an autoregressive process for inefficiency, we do not claim presence of such a relationship
is solely due to investment.
6The value of ψ can be common or different for every observation. The empirical model in the
next section is setup to enable an observation specific estimation of ψ.
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However, in practice, the observed level of inefficiency can be higher or lower
than the expected value due to period specific shocks (i.e., t). These shocks have a
zero expectation and cause inefficiency to deviate from its expected path. Ahn and
Sickles (2000) attribute these shocks to emergence of new technologies, regulation or
deregulation and changes in behaviour of competitors. Investment also is an impor-
tant factor that introduces period specific shock to the current level of inefficiency
which persists over subsequent periods.
It is evident from (4.1.16) that inefficiency transmission across periods exists
only when ψ 6= 1. A value between zero and unity (0 < ψ < 1) means that the
rate of inefficiency transmission is diminishing as time passes. Under this condition,
a higher ψ (or a lower 1 − ψ) implies a faster adjustment towards the long run
equilibrium and a lower level of inefficiency persistence. On the contrary, a lower
ψ implies prolonged persistence of inefficiency and hence; inability of producers to
optimise their cost quickly. A value of ψ = 0, on the other hand, implies that there
is no tendency for inefficiency to revert back to an equilibrium point.
Although, in the short run, inefficiency depends on its past values, in the long
run it is a function of α and ψ. If 0 < ψ < 1 and t is a white noise process, the
expected long run inefficiency would be α
ψ
7.
Therefore, in any given period, cost inefficiency has two components. One ele-
ment is related to period-specific effects (t) and the other is the inefficiency carried
over from previous periods (α+ (1− ψ)zt−1). This implies that inefficiencies which
are related to sluggish adjustment of capital and the associated adjustment costs
persist over time, without firms having much control over them in the short run.
At the same time, the incentive regulation model in (4.1.1) penalises and rewards
firms based on their observed levels of efficiency which, in effect, includes an uncon-
trollable component due to investment cycles. This is problematic for optimising
investment and capital as it exposes the regulated firm to revenue loss following
7Proof : a recursive substitution for (4.1.16) gives zt = (1 − ψ)nzt−n + α[
∑n
i=0(1 − ψ)i] +
[
∑n
i=0(1 − ψ)it−i] on the other hand E(zt) = (1 − ψ)nE(zt−n) + α[
∑n
i=0(1 − ψ)i] because t is
assumed to be a white noise process and E(t) = 0. Thus, the cumulative effect when n → ∞ is
E(zt) =
α
1−(1−ψ) =
α
ψ .
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investment.
4.2 Empirical model
This section presents a parametric method to estimate the two components of in-
efficiency and the rate of inefficiency transmission, across periods, as described in
Section 4.1. Application of parametric methods to address the dynamic aspect of
inefficiency is relatively new. Ahn and Sickles (2000) were the first to use a dynamic
model to provide a structural explanation for variations in the efficiency levels of a
firm. They assume that technical inefficiency evolves over time in an autoregressive
manner due to the firm’s inability to adjust its efficiency in a timely manner. This
model is reduced to a normal dynamic panel data model if the speed of inefficiency
adjustment is assumed to be the same for all firms. Emvalomatis et al. (2011) use a
similar dynamic efficiency model based on the standard stochastic distance function
model, but allow the efficiency scores of the firms to be correlated through time.
The autocorrelated inefficiency model is developed in a state-space framework and
nonlinear Kalman filtering is used to evaluate the likelihood function and obtain the
efficiency scores.
Tsionas (2006) proposes a stochastic frontier model that allows for inefficiency ef-
fects and dynamic technical inefficiency by adopting Bayesian inference procedures
based on Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) techniques. Emvalomatis (2012)
considers the implications of stochastic frontier models with autocorrelated ineffi-
ciency in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity. The study specifies random-
and correlated random-effects models and proposes a Bayesian estimation approach
to measure dynamic efficiency.
4.2.1 Model development
The empirical model is developed in a cost function framework. The cost function,
C(w, y), gives the minimum possible cost of producing output y given the observed
input prices, w. The cost efficiency of firm i in period t is defined as the ratio of
minimum possible cost relative to the observed cost, w′itxit, as follows:
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CEit =
C(wit, yit)
w′itxit
(4.2.17)
where x is the vector of input quantities used. Thus, cost efficiency is always
between zero and one ( 0 < CEit ≤ 1). Taking the logarithm of both sides in
(4.2.17), appending a noise error term νit ∼ N(0, σ2ν) and rearranging will lead to
relation in (4.2.18).
logTC = logC(wit, yit)− logCEit + νit (4.2.18)
where TC = w′itxit represents total observed cost of the firm, C(wit, yit) is the
cost function and logCEit is an one-sided error term which enters the equation as
the logarithm of cost efficiency. According to economic theory, the cost function is
required to be concave and linearly homogenous in input prices and non-decreasing
in input prices and outputs (Chambers, 1988).
Equation (4.2.18) assumes that all firms have access to the same technology and
operate under similar conditions. As this assumption may not be realistic, we add
a firm specific term ωi to (4.2.18) in order to account for unobserved heterogeneity
among the firms, assuming ωi ∼ N(0, σ2ω) (Emvalomatis, 2012). Thus, the cost
frontier in (4.2.18) can be written in terms of an estimable linear function of Qit as
the logarithm of matrix of independent variables and a vector of coefficients β as
follows:
cit = Q
′
itβ − log(CEit) + ωi + νit (4.2.19)
where cit is the logarithm of total cost
8.
Following Emvalomatis et al. (2011), we assume an autoregressive process for
the cost efficiency by making non-linear transformation of inefficiency as in (4.2.20)-
(4.2.22)9.
8Although the model is developed in the context of cost function however, a distance function
approach can also be used.
9This transformation is for estimation purposes and allows us to have observation specific
inefficiency transmission. Thus, equation (4.2.21) is comparable to equation (4.1.16) in Section 4.1
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sit = log(
CEit
1− CEit ) (4.2.20)
sit = δ + ρsit−1 + uit uit ∼ N(0, σ2u) (4.2.21)
si1 = µ1 + ui1 ui1 ∼ N(0, σ2u1) (4.2.22)
where sit is the logarithm of the ratio of efficiency to inefficiency and ρ is an
elasticity that measures the percentage change in the ratio of efficiency to inefficiency
that is transferred from one period to the next. Equation (4.2.22) initialises the
stochastic process and assumes stationarity. Stationarity also implies that, in the
long run, the expected value of sit, unconditional on sit−1, is the same for all firms
and the possible observed differences are due to shocks or the difference in the stage
of the path towards long run equilibrium. Under this condition (stationarity), the
two additional parameters can be obtained by (4.2.23) and (4.2.24).
µ1 =
δ
1− ρ (4.2.23)
σ2u1 =
σ2u
1− ρ2 (4.2.24)
If the process is not stationary the expected value of the firms’ efficiency, over
time, tends towards unity or zero. Similarly, the expected value of sit can incline
towards positive or negative infinity. As suggested in Tsionas (2006), it is unlikely
that the data are generated by a process with a unit root, especially when efficiency
approaches zero. This is because we normally expect inefficient firms to fall out of
a competitive market or, in the case of regulated firms, suffer from financial losses
as their revenue is directly linked with their efficiency level. Thus, the number of
in the following way (subscript i is removed for simplicity): dztdzt−1 = 1− ψ = dztdst × dstdst−1 ×
dst−1
dzt−1
=
exp(st)
(1+exp(st))2
×ρ× 1zt−1(1−zt−1) . For the above relationship we have used zt = 1−CEt which approaches
zt = −log(CEt) for low values of inefficiency. This is because based on the Taylor series of e−zt
we have: e−zt =
∑∞
n=0
(−zt)n
n! = 1 − zt + (zt)
2
2! − (zt)
3
3! + ... and hence, Lim e
−zt = 1 − zt because
all the higher order terms will approach towards zero quickly as zt → 0.
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very inefficient firms will be small. Given stationarity, the long run cost efficiency
can be obtained by (4.2.25)10.
Long run CE = 1/[1 + exp(− δ
1− ρ)] (4.2.25)
In terms of estimation our empirical analysis involves estimation of two models
simultaneously. In other words, we estimate the parameters of the hidden state
model (4.2.21)11 and of the measurement equation (4.2.19) simultaneously using
only the observed data in (4.2.19). In order to estimate the vector of all parameters,
θ = [β, σν , δ, ρ, σu, σw]
′ we set up the likelihood function by letting si denote the
T × 1 vector of the latent state variable for the firm i as in (4.2.26).
p(c, {wi}, {si}|θ,Q) = p(c|{wi}, {si},β, σν ,Q)× p({si}|δ, ρ, σu)× p({ωi}|σω)
=
1
(2piσ2ν)
NT/2
exp{−
∑N
i=1
∑T−1
t=0 (cit − ωi −Q′itβ + logCEit)2
2σ2u
}
× 1
(2piσ2u1)
N/2
exp{−
∑N
i=1(si1 − δ1)2
2σ2u1
}
× 1
(2piσ2u)
N(T−1)/2 exp{−
∑N
i=1
∑T−1
t=1 (sit − δ − ρsi,t−1)2
2σ2u
}
× 1
(2piσ2ω)
N/2
exp{−
∑N
i=1 ωi
2
2σ2ω
} (4.2.26)
where c and Q represent the vector and matrix of dependent and independent
variables respectively and δ1 and σ
2
u1 are the mean and variance of si1 in equation
(4.2.22). The last term in likelihood function captures the heterogeneity effects.
This likelihood function enables a simultaneous estimation of equations (4.2.19) and
(4.2.21).
10Proof :we know sit has the following process sit = δ+ ρsit−1 + uit. Thus, the log run value of
sit is
δ
1−ρ (The proof of this is exactly similar to the footnote 7). On other hand,we know that sit
is defined as sit = log(
CEit
1−CEit ) . Thus we can obtain the long run efficiency by log(
CEit
1−CEit ) =
δ
1−ρ ,
hence, CEit1−CEit = exp(
δ
1−ρ ) and therefore, Long run CE = 1/[1 + exp(− δ1−ρ )].
11Equation (4.2.21) is called hidden (latent) state because we do not observe the data in this
equation.
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The estimation is carried out in a Bayesian framework. For β and δ, normal priors
are selected. For the variance parameters the inverted Gamma has been chosen
because it is conjugate. Moreover, for ρ a Beta prior has been used to restrict it in
unit interval. In order to estimate the posterior moments of the model’s parameters
a posterior simulation based on Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) is employed.
4.2.2 Data and model specification
The dataset used for the application is a balanced panel of 128 Norwegian electricity
distribution networks observed from 2004 to 2010. All financial data are in real terms
which are adjusted based on 2010 prices. The Norwegian distribution companies are
working under incentive regulation with ex-post regulatory treatment of investment
based on the formula given in (4.1.1). The power of incentive (λ) in the Norwegian
regulatory model is currently 60% in order to motivate companies to move as close
as possible to the efficient frontier.
Following the Norwegian energy regulator, our total (social) cost includes capi-
tal costs, operating costs as well as cost of network energy losses and cost of energy
not supplied. Cost of network energy loss is computed by multiplying physical net-
work energy loss with annual average system price. Cost of energy not supplied is
computed by multiplying the energy not served (interrupted) with consumer ”will-
ingness to pay for reliable service”. The Norwegian regulatory framework adds the
aforementioned two costs to other controllable costs categories in order to incentivise
service quality (Poudineh and Jamasb, 2013b).
Other variables include in the model are the number of customers and energy
distributed. These are considered as standard outputs of networks in productiv-
ity and efficiency analysis of distribution companies (e.g., Growitsch et al., 2012;
Migue´is et al., 2011). The number of customers reflects the total number of con-
nected consumers to the grid including holiday homes12. The summary statistics of
model’s variables are presented in Table 4.1.
12The Norwegian regulator has separated holiday cottages from other customers as they have a
different load profile compared with conventional consumers.
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The equation in (4.2.19) requires a functional form for the cost function. The
translog functional form has appropriate characteristics because it does not impose
restrictions on the nature of technology a priori. Due to unavailability of input
price data we construct our cost frontier without input prices assuming every firm
faces the same input prices. This approach is theoretically consistent and has been
used in several efficiency studies of electricity distribution networks (e.g., Filippini
and Wetzel, 2013; Nillesen and Pollitt, 2011). Therefore our cost frontier model
becomes:
log(TCit) = β0 + β1log(DE) + β2log(CUS) +
1
2
β3log
2(DE) +
1
2
β4log
2(CUS)
+ β5log(DE)log(CUS) + ωi + ζ1t+
1
2
ζ2t
2 + νit − logCEit (4.2.27)
where t is a time trend which captures technical progress and also everything else
that we cannot measure but varies over time and has a common effect on all firms
(e.g., input prices).
Given the possibility of the presence of correlation between the firm effects (ω)
and cost efficiency, two models are estimated based on the method proposed by
Emvalomatis (2012). In the first model we assume that the firm specific effect is
uncorrelated with the independent variables (simple random effects). For the second
model we take into account the possibility of correlation between the firm specific
effects with the independent variables using the technique in Mundlak (1978). For
ease of interpretation of the first order terms, all data are divided by their sample
mean prior to estimation.
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Description Variable Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev.
Total cost (000’ NOK) TC 1474.6 1509458 80960.7 167738.9
Distributed energy (MWh) DE 6915 1.68E+07 561877 1575379
Number of customers (#) CU 18 544925 21115 55979.07
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4.3 Results and discussions
4.3.1 Empirical results
Table 4.2 presents the results, of the models estimated, based on the posterior
mean of the parameters and their standard deviation. Results of an analysis of
the monotonicity condition are presented in Table 4.3. As seen there, monotonicity
is satisfied at the sample mean for both models. Also, monotonicity is satisfied over
a wide range of data values with respect to each output. The first order parameters,
in both models, can be interpreted as the elasticities of total cost with respect to
distributed energy and number of customers, evaluated at the sample mean.
The estimated parameter ρ is around 72% for the simple random effect model
and 71% for the correlated random effects model, which are quite similar and fairly
high. The value of ρ directly influences the rate of inefficiency transmission (1− ψ)
(discussed in Section 4.1) across periods. We have used their relationship, as the
way shown in Footnote 9, to obtain the rate of inefficiency transmission for each
observation. Unlike ρ which is common to all firms in the sector, the inefficiency
transmission rate (1− ψ) is observation specific and has a mean of 69%.
However, the distribution of the inefficiency transmission rate (1 − ψ), as pre-
sented in Figure 4.1, shows significant variation among individual firms. A small
value implies short duration of problematic inefficiency persistence and hence, speedy
adjustment. A large value of 1− ψ indicates that inefficiency transmission between
periods affects the performance of firms significantly over a period of years. The
magnitude of inefficiency transmission rates is influenced by the scale of investment.
In any given regulatory period, investment appears as a shock to the current
level of the firms’ inefficiency whose duration of inefficiency persistence depends on
gestation period of the investment projects undertaken. Thus, firms remain under
financial constraints due to inefficiency induced by investments. This effect exists
until the firm reaches the long run equilibrium. The estimates of long run efficiency
of the distribution networks under simple and correlated random effects are close
and, as seen from Table 4.2, approximately 81% and 85% respectively.
At the same time, Figure 4.1 shows that the rate of inefficiency transmission is
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Table 4.2: The posterior mean of parameters and their standard deviation
Simple random effect Correlated random effect
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
β0 -0.154 0.055 -0.324 31.16
β1 0.073 0.082 0.016 0.140
β2 0.801 0.084 0.276 0.278
β3 0.035 0.068 -0.041 0.093
β4 0.172 0.019 0.053 0.054
β5 -0.098 0.035 0.002 0.070
ζ1 -0.010 0.008 -0.003 0.008
ζ2 0.009 0.002 0.010 0.002
δ 0.416 0.108 0.507 0.121
ρ 0.721 0.055 0.710 0.055
σν 0.082 0.006 0.086 0.005
σu 0.479 0.069 0.532 0.078
σω 0.177 0.015 0.182 0.014
Long run Efficiency 0.812 0.8495
Table 4.3: Monotonicity condition
Model Variable
Monotonicity at % violated over
sample mean data points
Simple random effect
DE satisfied 27%
CUS satisfied 0.00%
Correlated random effect
DE satisfied 12.50%
CUS satisfied 0.00%
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Figure 4.1: Distribution of inefficiency transmission rate (1− ψ)
less than one for the majority of observations. This means inefficiency shocks fade-
off over time. However, few firms show an inefficiency transmission rate higher than
one which is not persistent over the studies period and hence, can be attributed to
the observations being far from the point of approximation (mean). This is because
a value of inefficiency transmission rate higher than one suggests that the firm
becomes progressively more inefficient over time, something which is very unlikely
under the reward and penalty scheme of incentive regulation (because revenue is
directly linked with efficiency as shown in relation 4.1.1).
Figure 4.2 presents the mean of decomposed inefficiencies for the whole sector
in different years. Inefficiency decompositions include two terms: inefficiency carry-
over from previous periods and period-specific inefficiency shocks which jointly con-
struct the observed inefficiency of the period. It is worth noting that period-specific
effects are different from uncontrollable noise that affect inefficiency, as our model
controls for noise and unobserved heterogeneity 13.
As seen in Figure 4.2, the mean of period specific term can be positive, negative
13The noise and unobserved heterogeneity are reflected in the idiosyncratic error term (νit) and
the firm specific term (ωi), respectively, in equation 4.2.27.
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and zero in different years. For example, in 2008, the mean of observed inefficiency
increased by about 4.7% with respect to its expected value as a result of the period-
specific term. Similarly, the mean of observed inefficiency remained unchanged in
2005 and declined very slightly in 2006 and 2010. Cyclical investment is the most
important factor in introducing period-specific positive shocks which persist over
time. On the contrary, underinvestment, cost reducing measures, and innovative
managerial practice can impact the period-specific term negatively.
Figure 4.2: Inefficiency decomposition in different years
At the same time, there are significant variations in the components of decom-
posed inefficiency at the level of individual companies. Figure 4.3, shows the distri-
bution of inefficiency decomposition for each year. As it is evident from the figure,
the share of components of inefficiency in constructing the observed inefficiency
varies across years. In some years firms are affected considerably by period-specific
shocks which are eventually reflected in their observed inefficiency. For instance, in
2004, a major share of observed inefficiency of the firms was related to the period-
specific effects. The positive shocks again manifested themselves as increased share
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of inefficiency carry-over in subsequent years. Although under the condition of sta-
tionarity these shocks fade-off over an infinite time horizon, in practice their residual
effects remain in the observed inefficiency of the firms.
Figure 4.3: Distribution of inefficiency decomposition in different years
The intertemporal nature of the autoregressive process for inefficiency implies
that one-time shocks can affect the value of evolving inefficiency far into future. In
other words, the value of the current level of inefficiency is affected by past shocks
because of investment or other reasons.
The impact of period specific effects (shocks) on the evolution of inefficiency
can be computed by taking the derivative of the left hand side term in equation
(4.1.16). The marginal effect can be obtained using
∂zt+j
∂t
= ρj, wherej denotes the
length of time that separates a disturbance to input (it) and the observed value
of the outputs (Hamilton, 1994). The sum of consequences for all future values
(cumulative effect) of inefficiency, zit, as a result of a transitory disturbance to it,
can then be computed from
∑∞
j=0
∂zt+j
∂t
= 1
1−ρ (Hamilton, 1994).
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In order to illustrate this effect, consider the year 2004 which has a mean of
period-specific shock of 0.016 and average inefficiency transmission rate of 0.72. The
expected change in efficiency in subsequent years as a result of this average shock
would be ∆zt+j = 0.016(0.72)
j. This means that in 2005 the shock will become
0.0115 and in 2010 would be 0.002. Also, the cumulative effect would be 3.57 which
is much higher than the initial perturbations. Therefore, when the initial shock is
larger, the effect on firm’s efficiency will also be higher. These indicate that historical
shocks play a major role in the current and future level of firms’ inefficiency. This
also marks the importance of investment as a factor which gives rise to period specific
effects.
The investment level can affect the process of inefficiency evolution in two ways.
First, it is one of the factors which give rise to period specific inefficiency shocks.
Second, under the condition that the initial shock is due to investments, the scale
and type of investment will impact the elasticity of inefficiency persistence. These
two effects can be seen from Figure 4.4 that shows the scatterplots for the rate of
inefficiency transmission and period-specific inefficiency shock versus investment to
total cost ratio. As seen from the graphs, in both cases, the higher share of invest-
ment in total costs of firms is generally associated with higher rate of inefficiency
transmission and also higher period-specific inefficiency shocks.
However, it should be noted that investment does not explain all the variations
in the inefficiency transmission rate or period-specific inefficiency shock. This is
because investment is not the only factor that can result in period specific inefficiency
shocks or inefficiency transmission across periods. Period-specific shocks can also
happen because of emergence of a new technology or sudden changes in the firms’
operating environment, such as introduction of a new regulatory regime. In a similar
manner, inefficiency persistence can be the result of sub-optimal technology level
employed by the firm. However, the extent to which these effects are the result of
cyclical investments, they are problematic for incentive regulation models that use
total cost benchmarking.
The firm can opt for smaller projects which take less time to produce results.
However, once inefficiency transmission begins, the process of adjustment is not
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Figure 4.4: Inefficiency transmission rate (1 − ψ) and period-specific inefficiency
shock (it) versus investment to total cost ratio
completely under the control of the firm because it depends to the nature of invest-
ment. This is against the very basic assumption of incentive regulation model in
(4.1.1) which assumes that the evolution of inefficiency is entirely controllable and,
based upon that, links the revenue of firm with its observed efficiency. The pres-
ence of a positive relationship between investment and period-specific inefficiency
shocks and also the rate of inefficiency transmission limits the firms’ ability to im-
prove their productivity in a timely manner because of the inefficiency induced by
investment. This result is also consistent with previous arguments that under the
incentive regime the immediate efficiency gains are achieved from operating costs
and not from capital costs (Mu¨ller et al., 2010).
4.3.2 Regulatory challenges and the way forward
The implication of persistent inefficiency is crucial for incentives regulation based
on (4.1.1), which is currently being practised in Norway and many other countries.
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Under this model of incentives regulation, efficiency loss is equivalent to revenue
loss for the firms. The theory behind the short run efficiency assumes that firms are
profit maximisers and the regulatory regime implies that cost minimising is valid
under all conditions. However, due to the presence of dynamic aspects in the firms’
decision concerning investments and innovation, static efficiency is an inadequate
measure of investment behaviour and performance of utilities14. Therefore, ex-post
regulatory treatment of investments through benchmarking total cost distorts the
long run objectives of the firms and might expose them to financial loss. Although,
this approach has been adopted to deter overcapitalisation considering asymmetric
information between the firm and the regulator, it will not necessarily lead to an
efficient level of investment.
The inefficiency persistence also has implications for innovation. Innovation is
the outcome of firms’ efforts to produce new or improved products and services, in-
troduce more efficient and productive design processes and implement organisational
or managerial changes. Innovation generation and adoption by the firms depends,
among other factors, on the market structure and the cost of resources. The in-
novative behaviour entails complementary investment to the more traditional R&D
concept such as investment in innovation-related training and design, investment in
machinery, equipment and software. However, these types of investments can in-
duce a prolonged inefficiency and expose the distribution companies to substantial
financial losses under the penalty and reward schemes of the incentives regime.
This study identifies the problems with ex-post regulatory treatment of invest-
ment. However, the regulatory solution is not straightforward. This is because
regulating the capital cost of companies is the matter of trade-off between using in-
formation from the firm itself (i.e. project the cost) and from its peers (i.e. through
benchmark). The fact is that there is asymmetric information between the regulator
and the regulated company. Thus, a regulated firm may use the information advan-
14This is because in a dynamic context the firms’ inefficiency can take a different meaning as in
the short run (the measure of deviation from the optimum frontier). Emvalomatis (2009) describes
the inefficiency, in dynamic setting, as the deviation of the ”observed path” with respect to ”optimal
capital stock adjustment”.
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tage to exploit the regulatory process in order to increase its profit or achieve other
managerial objectives (Joskow, 2008b). Benchmarking of regulated firms can help
the regulator reduce, to some degree, the issue of imperfect information. However,
as mentioned previously, it gives rise to new challenges including those related to
quasi-fixed inputs.
An approach used by some sector regulators to address the issue of quasi fixed
inputs is to exclude capital expenditures from the benchmarking models. That
is to rely on firms’ own information regarding capital expenditure (Capex) and
benchmark only operating cost (Opex)15 . However, this approach received several
criticisms. Burn and Riechmann (2004) argue that Capex and Opex should be
treated equally because benchmarking only one cost category such as Opex and
different treatment of Capex creates incentives for companies to transfer costs from
the “yardstick” category to ”firm specific” category. The firm is aware that lower
investment leads to lower regulatory asset base and consequently lower return, and
may, therefore, engage in strategic behaviour in pursuit of gold plating capital costs.
Furthermore, as argued in Besanko and Spulber (1992), firms might choose a
higher than optimal level of capital in order to persuade the regulator to allow higher
operating costs and price on their product. Furthermore, Averch and Johnson (1962)
showed that under this model, more capital will be employed by the regulated firm
compared to a non-regulated firm, given any level of output. Additionally, from a
practical point of view when the number of regulated companies is large (as in the
case of Norway which are around 130 companies), scrutinising the investment plan
of each individual firm might not be feasible considering the length of regulatory
period.
Another approach that can be considered but needs further investigation is to
use directional contraction of inputs where both operating and capital costs are part
of the benchmarking practice. In this case the, the inputs are contracted only in the
direction of operational expenditures assuming convexity between operational and
capital expenditure as two inputs. This is in contrast with the current form of radial
15This approach is being practised in the UK in which the companies submit their business plan
to the regulator before the next regulatory period to be examined and approved if justified.
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contraction of both inputs being used in the benchmarking exercise. However, the
convexity constraint between operating and capital expenditures might not always
hold in which case this approach can be problematic. Another possibility is to de-
velop statistical approaches that allow for controlling inefficiency persistence due to
investment such that firms are only penalised for the controllable part of their ineffi-
ciency evolution. At the same times, regulators need to ensure that approaches used
to ease the process of investment and innovation will not lead to overcapitalisation.
The area of dynamic efficiency under incentive regulation requires further re-
search to address the issues of investment and innovation and also strike a balance
between firms’ own information, sector information, investment incentives and the
possibility of over- and under-investment. Regulators also need to understand the
long term consequences of the regulatory framework for investment and innovation
and make informed decisions regarding the way incentives are implemented.
4.4 Conclusions
The use of efficiency and productivity techniques such as total cost benchmarking,
is becoming now common practice in incentive regulation to induce cost efficiency
and prevent firms from overcapitalisation. However, benchmarking only captures
short run efficiency of network companies while they operate in a dynamic environ-
ment where technology, regulatory standards, demand and economic conditions are
changing. In response to this, the utilities reorganise their production process to
become more efficient in the short run.
However, the factors that affect the short term efficiency of the firms (i.e. network
inputs and outputs) may not be adjusted instantaneously when firms invest in new
and costly technologies and practices, which take time to produce result. Under this
condition, in the short run, investment induces inefficiency which persists for some
time until the inputs and outputs are fully adjusted. On the other hand, under
incentive regulation, the firms’ revenues crucially depend on the level of efficiency
achieved in the benchmarking process.
The current form of incentive regulation with ex-post regulatory treatment of
4.4. Conclusions 108
investment, employed by many European regulators, does not take this effect into
account and, hence, there is a risk of financial loss for regulated companies when
undertaking investment. Therefore, the simultaneous incentives for investment and
static cost efficiency can send inconsistent signals to regulated firms. This potentially
limits the companies’ incentives for investment and innovation.
This chapter analysed the concept of dynamic efficiency under incentives regula-
tion with ex-post regulatory treatment of investment. We have shown that, in any
given period, a firm’s inefficiency consists of two components: the period-specific
shocks and the carry-over from previous periods. The period specific inefficiency
shocks can be created by investment or other factors that affect inefficiency and the
carry-over effect is due to the inability of firms to adjust their inputs in a timely man-
ner. Additionally, we estimated a dynamic stochastic frontier model in a Bayesian
framework for a balanced panel of 128 Norwegian electricity distribution companies
from 2004 to 2010.
The results show that, at the sector level, around 72% of the efficiency to inef-
ficiency ratio is transferred from one period to another. At the level of individual
companies, however, the variation is significant. There are firms with very low or
very high elasticity of inefficiency transmission. The high magnitude of elasticity
causes the effect of the shocks to die out over a longer period. The distribution of
inefficiency decomposition shows that the share of carry-over effects, in the observed
level of firms’ inefficiency, is considerable.
The results demonstrate that investment to total cost ratio is positively associ-
ated with period-specific inefficiency shocks and also the inefficiency transmission
rate across periods. Therefore, those firms with higher investment share have expe-
rienced higher inefficiency persistence. This is problematic for benchmarking based
revenue setting of network companies as both the cumulative effect as well as the
duration of inefficiency persistence will increase by the magnitude of initial pertur-
bation caused by investment. Finally, the results indicate that the long run cost
efficiency of the sector is approximately 81% and 85% based on the simple and
correlated random effects models respectively.
An important dimension of dynamic efficient behaviour, for a company, is to
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adapt to its dynamic operating environment. This is particularly relevant to the
distribution network companies as power sector, currently, is experiencing rapid
changes with increasing penetration of distributed energy resources. The issue is
that network companies cannot continue relying only on their current business model
while the traditional paradigm of generation-transmission-distribution is changing.
This is because, due to proximity of generation and demand, penetration of dis-
tributed energy resources reduces the volume of energy transmitted in the network
and consequently shrinks the revenue base of distribution companies over time.
Therefore, the network companies need to accommodate themselves in the new envi-
ronment and utilise distributed energy resources for efficient planning and operation
of their network.
A promising and yet underdeveloped area is to utilise the synergy between inte-
gration of distributed resources and reducing the need for network capacity invest-
ment as a result of demand growth. This, however, requires innovation at regulatory
level as well as business model of distribution companies. The next chapter explores
this issue and introduces an innovative market-oriented approach, which enables
integration of distributed resources as alternatives to demand driven network in-
vestment.
Chapter 5
Improving efficiency of electricity
networks utilisation
A conventional power system is characterised by large scale generation sources that
inject large amounts of power into the transmission grid, which in turn is transported
to passive distribution networks, and then delivered to the end-users. A key feature
of the low-carbon future power systems is that they will perform in an operating
environment and paradigm in which distributed generation (DG), demand response,
and storage facilities are important components of the system (Soares et al., 2012).
These resources are connected to low (and medium) voltage networks thus making
the distribution grid a crucial element of sustainable electricity sectors of the future.
These changes are driven by climate and sustainability policies along with afford-
ability and reliability of electricity supply. Thus, the future power systems will be
based on coexistence of conventional and distributed generation sources, and tap
into demand response and storage as network resources for efficient planning and
operation.
The electricity distribution network operators (DNOs) are responsible for, expan-
sion, reinforcement and maintaining the safety and reliability of the network to sup-
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port power flows and ensure quality of supply. Integration of distributed resources1
introduces new challenges and opportunities that require innovative technical, eco-
nomic and regulatory solutions to overcome the barriers and utilise possibilities.
This includes enabling distributed resources to compete with alternatives in provid-
ing network and non-network services to the DNOs. In the context of non-network
solutions, there is an opportunity for replacing or deferring grid reinforcement by
meeting demand locally through deployment of DGs, storage and reducing peak de-
mand through demand response and energy efficiency2 . In effect, due to potential
benefits of distributed resources for the grid, especially at distribution level, they are
natural alternatives to conventional network capacity enhancement (Sheikhi Fini et
al., 2013).
From an economic viewpoint, a challenge is how to value these alternative energy
resources. At present, there are no established methods to value the complex set of
technical and financial opportunities (and challenges) arises from the integration of
these resources. This stems from the lack of a market mechanism that supports this
process. Moreover, adopting distributed resources to defer demand driven grid rein-
forcement requires extending the traditional business model of distribution utilities
in a consistent manner with the unbundled sector. Thus, along with technical con-
cerns, there is a need for innovative economic and regulatory solutions. For example,
issues such as ownership model of resource facility, differentiating between costs of
capacity and energy, dispatchable and non-dispatchable generation, possibility of
trade in other markets, managing storage and demand response are important and
need to be addressed. Moreover, the presence of uncertainties such as the sustain-
ability of costs and possibility of demand reduction over time constitute some risk
elements.
This study proposes a three stage market-based approach termed as ”contract
1Throughout this chapter we use the term ”distributed resources” to refer to distributed gen-
eration, storage facilities, demand response and energy efficiency that interact with distribution
network.
2Energy efficiency, as a permanent reduction in energy demand, is emerging as a resource in
capacity markets along with behavioural (temporary) demand response.
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for deferral scheme” (CDS) in order to employ an economically efficient portfolio
of distributed generation, storage, demand response and energy efficiency to supply
network capacity and to defer demand driven investments.
The next section discusses the need for innovative network solutions and explores
the previous studies on the effect of distributed resources on network investment de-
ferral. An extended business model of distribution companies including the contract
for deferral scheme has been introduced in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 discusses the de-
tails of CDS market model in three steps: pre-auction stage, auction stage and
post-auction stage. Finally, the study concludes with Section 5.4.
5.1 Demand driven network investment
A feature of the traditional approach to upgrading the network is that as demand
grows gradually, network reinforcement is carried out in large increments requiring
lumpy investments. As a result, a portion of grid capacity remains idle for long
periods in anticipation that demand will eventually increase (Hoff et al., 1996).
Therefore, in a network reinforcement cycle, the total capital employed, to deliver
a given amount of output, can be higher than the theoretical optimum needed at
any given time. At the same time, due to adverse effect of asset utilisation rise on
energy loss; the network utilities face a trade-off between the rate of asset utilisa-
tions and reducing network energy losses (Ofgem, 2003). Figure 5.1 presents the
demand growth path and a corresponding network capacity enhancement schedule.
Ci denotes the initial capacity and Cr represents the added capacity as a result of
reinforcement.
Inefficient utilisation of assets, in traditional demand driven network investments,
is exacerbated when the mid- or long term development of demand are uncertain.
As demand grows, the output of network, for a given level of capacity, also increases.
However, demand for electricity can also decline, in which case the idle capacity and
consequently the operating cost of network, per unit of output, raises (Jamasb and
Marantes, 2011). The case of an upward deviation of demand from projections is
less critical for asset utilisation, as it is normally possible to carry out investment
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such that the shortages in network capacity can be avoided.
An alternative to the traditional network enforcement is to meet part of the
demand for energy services locally through DGs, storage and managing demand
through demand response and energy efficiency measures. This is to use distributed
resources whether on the supply side (DGs and storage) or on the demand side
(demand response and energy efficiency) to avert the need for lumpy investment in
costly redundant transformers (Hemdan and Kurrat, 2011). These resources can be
procured to meet the extra demand projection plus a reserve margin for contingen-
cies. The advantages of distributed resources are not limited to the deferment of
network reinforcement but also include, peak shaving, spinning reserve, voltage and
frequency regulation, and dealing with variability of supply side (Zafirakis et al.,
2013).
From a regulatory perspective, integration of distributed resources as an al-
ternative to conventional network reinforcement is in concert with the innovation
incentives embedded in the regulatory frameworks of distribution companies. For
example, in the UK, under the RIIO-ED1 regulatory model, innovative solutions
are incentivised by rewarding the downward deviation from the expected capital
expenditure in business plan of DNOs (Ofgem, 2012). These financial incentives
play a pivotal role in directing the network companies towards implementing smart
solutions.
There is an extensive body of literatures that evaluates the effect of distributed
resources on investment deferral of grid capacity, in particular with respect to in-
tegration of distributed generation. These studies explore different perspectives of
this issue such as cost-benefit analysis, size, siting and type effect of generator as
well as implication for the regulatory model of network companies.
Pudaruth and Li (2007) investigate the costs and benefits of DG for investment
deferral of distribution companies in terms of thermal capacity limits of lines and
assets. Mendez et al. (2006) assess the medium and long term impact of DGs on
investment deferral of radial distribution networks. The study demonstrates that
after initial investment for connection of DGs, their net effect is to defer capacity
enhancement driven by natural demand growth. They also show that the intensity
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Figure 5.1: Demand growth and network capacity enhancement
[Source:Adapted from Hoff et al. (1996)]
of the effect depends on the type of distributed generation (e.g., wind power versus
combined heat and power (CHP)).
The effect of siting on investment deferral of distributed resources has been dis-
cussed in several studies. Gil and Joos (2006) find that the benefits are maximised, if
DGs are sited at the end of long feeder and near load pockets because of their effect
on energy losses and congestion reduction. Zhang et al. (2010) show that effective
site reallocation will increase the benefits of capacity deferral for the same amount
of DGs connected. Moreover, Wang et al. (2009) demonstrate that significant ben-
efits, in terms of investment deferral, can be harnessed if the DG contribution to
system security is taken into account. They also show that the deferment varies
significantly with location and size of the generator.
Although DGs are promising and reliable resources for investment deferral; this
effect is not limited to these resources. In effect, storage facilities, demand response
and energy efficiency are also potential resources that, along with DGs, can lead to
grid investment deferral. Schroeder (2011) argue that demand side management and
storage also constitute important tools in operation of distribution networks that
could benefit system operation by avoiding capacity shortages. The study shows
that, in the case of storage, for example, grid reinforcement can be avoided at some
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voltage level without harming system security because network capacity utilisation
rate will remain well below the threshold. Also, the study noted that the effect of
demand side management is stronger when more flexible demand, such as electric
vehicles, is available.
These studies show there exists an opportunity for taking the advantage of the
synergy between investment in distributed resources and the obligation of network
companies with respect to network reinforcement. However, the effect of these re-
sources on grid depends on many factors such as location, technological specification
and timing of investments (Vogel, 2009). An effective regulatory framework, thus, is
required to align these benefits between resource developer and network companies.
In the absence of such mechanism, penetration of these resources can, sometimes,
lead to adverse effect on the network. For example, DGs uptake can expose the grid
to induced energy losses when installed capacity exceeds the demand (Harrison et
al., 2007).
Distribution utilities can influence the siting of distributed energy resources such
as DGs through connection and use-of-system charges (which could be based on their
capacity and the sole-use network asset used) and reward when DG installation is
in line with optimal operation of the network (Jamasb et al., 2005). The rewards
can be grounded on generator exported power at system peak, proximity to the
frequently congested zones and the network asset utilised. The implication of DNOs
preferences for size and location of DGs and the effect of regulatory model on optimal
connection of DG within existing networks have been examined by Piccolo and Siano
(2009).
5.2 An extended business model
Integration of distributed resources to defer demand driven network investment re-
quires both technical and economic changes to the current operational paradigm of
distribution networks. From a technical perspective, network management needs
to evolve from passive to active by using real time control and management of
distributed resources and network equipment based on real time measurement of
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Figure 5.2: The transition from DNO to DSO model
[Source:Author]
primary system parameters such as voltage and current (Zhang et al., 2009). From
an economic perspective, the business model of distribution companies is required to
evolve and expand beyond the current only connection and use-of-system charges.
The new economic and technical models will shift the operation of distribution
companies from network operators (DNO) to distribution system operators (DSO).
Figure 5.2 illustrates this paradigm shift.
Currently, the revenue sources of distribution utilities have comprised of the reg-
ulated connection charges and use-of-system charges. Based on the type of consumer
and regulatory framework model, new connection fees consist of shallow and deep
cost charges (Jamasb et al., 2005). In an environment with high penetration of
distributed resources the DSOs should be allowed to expand their revenue sources
beyond provision of connections and energy transport charges only. This is because,
over time, the presence of distributed energy resources close to the site of demand
reduces the volume of energy transmitted in the grid and consequently, shrinks the
revenue base of network companies (van Werven and Scheepers, 2005).
The extended business model of DSO includes interaction with different con-
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sumer categories, transmission system operator (TSO), distributed energy operators
and retail suppliers. DSO can offer certain services to these players that construct
extra sources of revenue and receive certain services from them that will consti-
tute part of its costs. These services will include local balancing in the distribution
network, premium reliability for some commercial or industrial customers and also
offering system data to the DGs operators and retail energy suppliers as DSO is the
only party that have such information (van Werven and Scheepers, 2005). These will
bring new stream of revenue for the DSOs which are not currently possible under
the DNO business model.
DSO will contribute to national load balancing and will be compensated for that
by the TSO. This will be done through dispatchable DGs (and, where possible,
storage and demand response resources) that are under the control of distribution
system operators. Moreover, many commercial and industrial users need premium
reliability as their production process is sensitive to the electricity input (Poudineh
and Jamasb, 2013c). DSOs will be reimbursed by those industries for providing
highly reliable connections. Furthermore, with the use of information and commu-
nication technologies, valuable system data will be available that can be shared with
DG operators and retail suppliers for efficient planning and operation in return for
a payoff.
At the same time, the costs to DSO will include operation and maintenance, grid
reinforcement (which can be either in a traditional approach or by procurement of
distributed resources), acquisition of ancillary services from DGs and TSO, use of
system charges and finally cost of energy losses. Figure 5.3, illustrates the existing
and new services, flow of revenue, costs, and interaction of key players in an extended
business model of DSO.
An important part of the extended business model is the possibility to integrate
distributed resources as alternatives to grid capacity enhancement. This however,
requires an economic model that is consistent with the regulatory framework of
an unbundled sector. Moreover, the model must allow the DSOs to procure these
resources cost efficiently and ensure compliance by resource providers. The rest
of the chapter introduces a new approach that enables the DSOs to utilise this
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Figure 5.3: The extended business model for DSO
[Source: Author, information partially from van Werven and Scheepers (2005).]
possibility.
5.2.1 Contract for deferral scheme (CDS)
A challenging task is to design an economic model that delivers network service
(network capacity) cost effectively using alternative resources (DGs, storage, de-
mand response and energy efficiency). Provided the regulatory issue concerning the
ownership of distributed resources by the network companies, under an unbundled
power sector paradigm, our proposed model is based on a ”contract for deferral
scheme” (CDS). Under the CDS scheme, the DSOs can enter into contract with
distributed generations, storage facilities operators, demand response and energy
efficiency providers, which offer available capacity when needed. The market partic-
ipants that enter a contract will be obliged to have available the required capacity
at the time of network constraints (or upon being called). In return, the DSO offers
them a capacity payment. The CDS contract acts as a proxy for vertical integration
and, at the same time, it is procured on a competitive basis.
CDS is considerably different from both administrative and market based meth-
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ods that have been introduced previously. CDS differs from the administrative
approach proposed in Hof et al. (1996) which calculates a break-even price at which
a distribution company is indifferent between undertaking conventional reinforce-
ment and alternative approach. This is because their approach does not achieve
economic efficiency as it ignores market mechanisms and opportunity cost of scare
resources to the society and hence, it is not welfare maximising. Furthermore, their
administrative approach has only been discussed in the context of DG whereas CDS
is a market-based approach for integration of a portfolio of distributed resources
which are treated equally.
CDS also differs from the market based approach proposed in Trebolle et al.
(2010) termed as reliability options for distributed generation (RODG). Firstly, the
CDS model takes into account the investment deferral effects from all types of dis-
tributed resources irrespective of being on the supply side (DG and storage) or
demand side (demand response and energy efficiency) whereas the RODG model
focuses on distributed generation only. Secondly, the auction structure proposed for
RODG is based on a version of sealed bid auction which might not be suitable for
acquisition of renewable resources (e.g., Gottstein and Schwartz, 2010). In contrast,
the CDS contract is based on a model of descending clock auction (presented in
the next section) used in some countries for capacity procurement and in particular
for renewable resources acquisition (e.g., NYSERDA, 2004). Thirdly, the RODG
model does not specify how this model fits into the wider business model of distri-
bution utilities whereas CDS emerges out of an extended business model within the
unbundled power sector paradigm.
The advantages of the CDS approach can potentially go beyond investment de-
ferral by providing value added benefits to the power system. For example, follow-
ing the market deregulation and liberalisation, the reserve capacities of large scale
power generation is declining in many countries (Gordijn and Akkermans, 2007).
This creates new business opportunities for small scale distributed resources that
could supply some system reserve. Additionally, CDS motivates investment in stor-
age technologies which currently their uptake is sensitive to a range of uncertainties
such as future resource mix, technology development, market structures and the
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uncertainty of returns (Grunewald et al., 2011). Moreover, CDS give a boost to the
integration of demand response and energy efficiency, which are currently perceived
to be underutilised resources because the electricity markets and reliability require-
ments have been designed for, and evolved under, a generator supply paradigm
(Capper et al., 2012).
In summary, CDS is a mechanism for procuring, on a non-discriminatory basis, a
portfolio of capacity resources through a competitive forward auction process. The
auctions can reveal the value of the product (capacity) and maximize the revenue
obtained, if a sufficient number of non-colluding bidders participate (Newbery, 2003).
The selected resource portfolio will act as a substitute for conventional demand
driven network reinforcements.
5.3 CDS procurement procedure
Procurement of CDS contracts, by DSO, needs to be based on a well-designed and
implemented auction. Overall, the process of CDS contracts acquisition can be
described in terms of three stages: pre-auction stage, auction stage and post-auction
stage. In the pre-auction stage (stage one), eligibility of potential suppliers needs to
be verified with respect to certain requirements. Stage two, is the implementation
of auction and process of price discovery. Stage three (post-auction), corresponds to
the signing and implementation of CDS contract. Figure 5.4 schematically illustrates
the process of CDS contract procurement.
5.3.1 Pre-auction stage
In this stage the DSO forecasts demand growth over the subsequent years and
projects the required network capacity. That is to identify the constrained zones and
the locations which can potentially experience distribution bottleneck, for delivery
to the consumers. DSO often investigates the load duration curve of distribution
facilities to find out possible over-load condition and also assesses the grid reliability
to ensure that a component failure will not cause a long term interruption (Trebolle
et al., 2010).
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Figure 5.4: The procedure of CDS contract procurement
[Source: Author, information partially from IRENA (2013).]
The major task at this stage, however, is to identify and evaluate resource sup-
pliers. This means the DSO needs to initially decide which resources are eligible
to submit offer. For example, the DSO needs to determine whether to allow only
existing capacities or that both existing and new capacity providers can participate
in the auction and also specifying type of resources.
The resources that are eligible to participate in the auction can be different based
on the feasibility, regulation and institutional framework as well as technical con-
dition of power system. In the UK, the upcoming capacity auction is technology
neutral and includes both the existing and new resources except those that are oper-
ating under contract for difference (CfD), feed-in-tariff or renewable obligation, and
interconnected capacity (DECC, 2013)3. The eligible resources include traditional
3This is to avoid overpayment because these are already under a form of capacity payment.
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generation plants as well as demand response (behavioural demand reduction) and
storage technologies.
Furthermore, energy efficiency (permanent demand reduction through adoption
of more efficient processes and appliances) is being considered for inclusion in this
list. ISO New England and PJM forward capacity markets4 in the US, however,
view energy efficiency as an eligible resource which can participate in the auction
along with the other resources (Gottstein and Schwartz, 2010). Nevertheless, energy
efficiency is treated differently in these markets. PJM allows energy efficiency to
receive capacity payment, up to four years of their measured life, whereas ISO NE
remunerate for its full measured life to encourage long-lived energy efficiency assets
(Gottstein and Schwartz, 2010).
As the CDS contract aims to attract new investment in distributed resources,
eligible bidders should be selected from both existing and new capacity providers, in
a non-discriminatory and technology neutral manner. This will include, distributed
generation, storage facilities, demand response and energy efficiency.
Depending on the nature of resources connected to the distribution network,
the feasible options for CDS auction are: dispatchable distributed generations (e.g.,
CHPs), fairly electricity intensive and electricity dependent consumers (industrial
and commercial consumers) which might be able to provide demand response and/or
energy efficiency, and also storage facilities operators. Moreover, the DSO can set
a minimum eligible volume of capacity to make the participation of small resources
(e.g., residential consumers, small back-up generations, and small storages such as
PHEVs’ battery) possible only through an aggregator.
A DSO might allow intermittent resources such as wind and solar power to
participate. However, these need to be treated differently due to their stochastic
nature of outputs. For example, the DSO may need to exclude the intermittent
resources from availability penalties and/or the poor performing as this is beyond the
control of the resource provider. DSO can establish the value for winter and summer
This is worth mentioning that the UK capacity auction is for non-distributed assets.
4ISO New England (ISO NE) market serves Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hamp-
shire, Rhode Island and Vermont. PJM is Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland Interconnection.
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qualified capacity of intermittent resources such as wind based on the methods that
have been developed for this purpose. One approach that has been studied for
ISO NE forward capacity market is to identify the set of reliable hours that deliver
the most reliable estimator of median generation during the system peak (IRWGM,
2006). PJM capacity market, however, adopts a different method by applying a 13
percent reduction factor on peak capacity of wind intermittent resources (Gottstein
and Schwartz, 2010).
Therefore, CDS can take the advantages of all available resources whether on
supply side or demand side including those with stochastic output. Particularly,
participation of demand side resources (demand response and energy efficiency)
along with supply resources (distributed generation and storage) can significantly
improve efficiency of CDS acquisition. The evidence from ISO NE first capacity
auction demonstrates that participation of demand side resources saved rate pay-
ers $24 million by making the market clearing price lower than it would have been
otherwise (Jenkins et al., 2009)5 . Additionally, demand side resources are carbon
free (when it leads to demand reduction) and thus, in harmony with environmental
policies. Furthermore, they improve system reliability by relieving the load at con-
gested circuits and also reduce market power of supply side resources in determining
market clearing price.
Following the initial identification of potential bidders, the DSO needs to verify
the eligibility of resources providers with respect to conditions such as financial
ability of new capacity providers, environmental compliance, siting and grid access
etc. Below are the most relevant conditions which need to be verified before potential
suppliers enter into the auction stage. The DSO
i) should ask for supply of financial assurance, by potential bidder, in case of a
new resource which needs to be constructed.
ii) should demand potential bidders for submission of relevant environmental
5The ISO NE accounts DG as a demand side resource as well thus, in practice, the total
saving from pure demand resources (demand response and energy efficiency) can be lower than
this amount. Demand side resources (inclusive of DG in the case of ISO NE) made 2554 MW of
39142 MW offered capacity in the first auction (Jenkins et al., 2009).
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compliance documents as specified by the regulator for each type of generation
technology.
iii) should investigate the siting of distributed resource and grid access condition
especially for new resources. For example, position of resource with respect to
frequently congested circuits and cost of grid connection.
iv) should ask for submission of relevant documents, in the case of new resources,
that indicates local communities living at development proximity are content.
v) can ask for proof of technical expertise and managerial capability of resource
provider.
Potential suppliers that are qualified in terms of type and capacity volume and
also meet the aforementioned criterions will be invited to submit their bids. In order
to help the auctioneer to choose the starting price, the DSO might include other
requirements in this stage such as rendering an indicative bid (the approximate
quantity of supply and price).
5.3.2 Auction stage
Several different auction designs can potentially be employed in this stage. These
include: sealed bid, descending clock auction, hybrid, combinatorial and two-sided
designs (Maurer and Barroso, 2011). Sealed bid auction can be in the form of uni-
form pricing, pay-as-bid or generalised Vickrey style in which the winner pays the
social opportunity cost of the item won (Fabra et al., 2002). In the combinatorial
auction, auctioneer sells multiple goods simultaneously where bidders are only al-
lowed to place a bid on bundle of items and not the individual items. A two-sided
auction allows both bid and ask so as to deal with multiple sellers and buyers at the
same time and is proved to be effective in reducing market power when there are
few seller and many elastic demands (Zou, 2009). Descending clock auction, on the
other hand, is a dynamic simultaneous multi-round Dutch auction in which bidders
submit quantity supplied at each price until no excess supply exists (Rego, 2013).
Hybrid auction is the combination of different auction forms.
As the CDS contract acquisition is a form of single buyer model (i.e., DSO as
the sole emptor deals with many potential suppliers), descending clock auction is
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the method of choice because of appropriate market characteristic. These character-
istics, which are noted in NYSERDA (2004), make the descending clock auction a
suitable approach for the CDS contract procurement. Firstly, it is an open auction
with uniform pricing that discovers price with transparency and improves invest-
ment efficiency. Secondly, this auction only identifies the least cost suppliers as
inefficient suppliers will withdraw from the auction when the clock ticks down (i.e.,
price starts to fall). Thirdly, this type of auction determines the winner in a simple
manner and averts the need for complex comparisons of competitors’ bids which, in
turn, reduces the probability of subsequent disputes. Fourthly, under this auction
both price and quantity of capacity committed are known at the end of the auction
which allows the DSO to project more accurately future financial obligation as a
result of CDS contacts acquisition.
Descending clock auction has previously been used successfully in various public
and private procurement contexts6 . In the power market, this approach is used for
procurement of renewable portfolio standard by New York State Energy Research
and Development Authority (NYSERDA, 2004). Moreover, ISO New Englands
Capacity Market uses a descending clock auction in which, energy efficiency, demand
response, and distributed generation compete for capacity contract on an equivalent
basis (Gottstein and Schwartz, 2010).
The DSO will execute a descending clock auction in multiple rounds with the
following procedure. In the first round the auctioneer (DSO in this case) begins with
a ”starting price” (Pstart) which is a fairly high price. The DSO can use information
obtained during pre-auction stage such as indicative bid and breakeven price to
choose the starting price. The resource suppliers, have some time (often between a
quarter to few hours) to bid for the quantity of capacity they are willing to supply
at this price. Then, the DSO adds up all the committed quantities and compares
these with required network capacity to estimate the excess capacity.
In the second round the DSO reduces the price and allows resource providers
6Descending clock auction has been used in US, Spain, Columbia, and the reverse form of it
(ascending clock auction in which auctioneer sells) has been adopted in France, Spain, US and
Canada (Maurer and Barroso, 2011).
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Figure 5.5: The descending clock auction
[Source: Author]
to bid again for capacity they are willing to supply at the new price. The new
quantity will be lower, or the same as before (but not larger), because of the lower
price compared with the previous round. If the excess capacity reaches zero, the
auction terminates and the winners will be the suppliers that placed a bid in the
last successful round. However, if the excess capacity is still not zero, the DSO will
continue the auction over subsequent series until excess capacity is eliminated7 . The
winning suppliers receive the last price cleared by auctioneer. Figure 5.5 illustrates
the procedure of a descending clock auction.
The descending clock auction is an effective process for price discovery compared
with the sealed bid auctions. Moreover, the dynamic nature of the auction allows
the bidders to continuously adjust their bids based on the information revealed
during the auction so that they can reduce the so called ”wining curse”. Although
the descending clock auction appears to be more complicated than the sealed bid
auctions however, the past experience shows that it is not difficult to implement and
also, the practitioners are more in favour of this model (Maurer and Barroso, 2011).
7If in round n the committed capacity falls short of demand then auctioneer announces the
price in round n − 1 as the market clearing price and allocate demand among successful bidders
pro rata.
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However, the main weakness of the descending clock auction is that it increases the
possibility of collusion among the bidders under the condition of weak competition.
The case of insufficient competition is addressed in Section 5.3.2.3.
5.3.2.1 Auction rules
In order to conduct the CDS auctions in an effective and efficient manner, a number
of rules need to be in place. These rules need to be transparent and known to all
participants as they embrace the conditions to run the auction. The main auction
rules, in the context of CDS procurement, are outlined in the following.
i) The rule concerning the information to be released at the end of each round
(e.g., whether or not participants can see the bids submitted by other bidders).
ii) Withdrawal and re-entering in a multi-round auction (e.g., whether the win-
ners must participate in all rounds of auction).
iii) The incremental quantity of price decline in each round (e.g. this can be
specified as a constant or as an interval).
iv) Whether a bid can be modified after it is submitted.
v) The format of bid submission such as bidding on an electronic platform pro-
vided by the auctioneer or in a different form.
vi) The ”bidding window” of the auction (i.e. specifying when the bidding round
starts and ends).
vii) The minimum volume of capacity that supplier can bid in each round. This
is to prevent inefficient bids and to allow aggregators to take part on behalf of many
small scale storages and demand response providers.
viii) Indication of minimum price at which the bidder would be willing to commit
supplying capacity in the round that bidder has withdrew because of low price.
ix) Rules concerning disqualification of bidders and allowing the auctioneer to
remove a bid from the current or future submission.
5.3.2.2 Auction lead time
The time of the auction depends on several factors such as the prediction of demand
growth in distribution network and the presence of new resources in the auction and
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their associated technology. The DSO will determine the lead time that new projects
need to be completed and hence, fulfil their obligation for supplying capacity. How-
ever, if the bidders are existing resources only, the lead time will be shorter (e.g.,
the following year). Therefore, taking into consideration the different lead times for
existing and new projects, the auction needs to be held well in advance of demand
growth to allow sufficient time for the construction of new capacity if required.
A short lead time can become a problem for capacity market design as it deters
new entry even with high prices. A short lead time might also incentivise resource
providers to withhold strategically in order to raise the price. The decision to
run the UK capacity market with a four-year lead time between auctioning time
and delivery period is to mitigate the impact of withholding and make the market
sufficiently contestable by attracting new investment (see DECC, 2012).
In the context of CDS auctions, the lead time should be based on the gestation
period of energy-based distributed resources such as CHP plants or storage facil-
ities which are often shorter compared with conventional power plants (e.g., coal
or nuclear plants). Also, DSO can differentiate between existing and new resources
to prevent a long lead time come at the cost of undervaluing the investment of ex-
isting resources. Moreover, specifying different delivery periods will facilitate the
participation of demand response as they will not be constrained by the lead time
of constructing projects.
5.3.2.3 Inadequate supply and weak competition
In CDS contracts, the issue of inadequate supply can occur if at the starting price,
in the descending clock auction, the total capacity offered (by existing distributed
generation, storage facilities, demand response and energy efficiency) is less than
the network capacity demanded. Insufficient competition, on the other hand, occurs
when the number of bidders is limited (this can be accompanied with inadequate
supply as well, though not necessarily).
The issue of inadequate supply due to insufficient existing resources can be allevi-
ated by changing the auction parameters such as price and lead time. One approach
to modify descending clock auction is to differentiate between existing and new re-
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sources based on the price. For instance, allowing existing resources to have market
clearing price but the new resources to collect the penultimate round price in the
first year of delivery and market clearing price thereafter (i.e., if the market clears
after n rounds; this corresponds to the price in round n − 1 and since the auction
is descending in price we always have Pn−1 > Pn). This approach provides incen-
tive for new resources to participate and thus, attracts more new developers into
competition and can potentially reduce probability of inadequate supply. The dis-
criminatory price descending clock auction can be accompanied with a suitable lead
time to incentivise investors.
The second approach to address the issue of inadequate supply is to include the
amount of inadequate supply in the subsequent reconfiguration auction to correct for
the inadequacy(NYSERDA, 2004). This auction will cover both inadequate supply
and change in the position of potential suppliers due to unpredicted circumstances.
The reconfiguration auction has been explained in Section 5.3.3.4.
As mentioned previously, the descending clock auction is vulnerable to weak
competition. That is the bidders can misuse the available information during the
auction to coordinate their actions and raise the market clearing price. One ap-
proach to address the issue of weak competition is to carry out a hybrid auction
in which the first phase starts with a descending clock auction followed by a sealed
bid auction(Maurer and Barroso, 2011). The advantage of this approach is that it
attracts more of small bidders and hence, strengthens competition. This form of
hybrid auction has been used in Brazil to auction hydro power resources and has
proved to be effective, to some extent, in handling market power and weak compe-
tition(Maurer and Barroso, 2011). However, a weakness of hybrid auction is that it
can increase complexity of auction process and raises transaction cost. Therefore,
it can be difficult to implement a hybrid auction.
Another approach, to address the market power, would be to use a single round
sealed bid auction. Herrera-Dappe (2013) demonstrate that a sequence of two uni-
form price auctions gives lower expected revenue than a single uniform price auction
when the market is not sufficiently competitive.
Despite these possible remedies, under insufficient competition, the DSO might
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seek permission from regulator not to run an auction. In this case the DSO can adopt
alternative approaches to procure capacity which have been suggested to develop-
ing countries in these circumstances. Some of these alternatives are: negotiations
between the DSO and potential suppliers, using an administratively set price such
as feed-in tariff on a first-come-first served basis until the demand is met, or using
a ”beauty contest form of allocation” in the sense that DSO defines the criteria
and conditions for contract with some room for discretion and subjective evaluation
(Maurer and Barroso, 2011).
5.3.2.4 Market monitoring
A competitive process can result in an undesirable outcome, if it is not appropriately
designed, implemented and monitored. There are a number of potential obstacles
such as liquidity, market power, collusion, gaming etc., from which the CDS auc-
tion is not necessarily immune. These highlight the need for oversight. Therefore,
regulator needs to appoint a third party, as the auction monitor, to superintend the
CDS acquisition process.
The task of the auction monitor is to oversee the procurement process and report
any evidence of breach of rule or non-conformity to the regulatory body(Maurer and
Barroso, 2011). This includes all the stages from pre-auction to post-auction phase.
The market monitor identifies the structural deficiency of CDS market design and
the way these deficiencies can be misused by market participants. Moreover, the
market monitor provides regulator with an assessment of market outcome to ensure
they are consistent with a competitive process and policy objectives. Furthermore,
the regulatory body can consult with the auction monitor in case that the conduct
of the auction is disputed by a bidder.
The auction monitor can also help with designing the auction procedure for the
specific contract procurement. However, the tasks of auction design and auction
auditing should ideally be delegated to two independent entities, as in the case
of PJM capacity market, to reduce possibility of conflict of interest and increase
transparency.
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5.3.3 Post-auction stage: Awarding CDS contract
Following the acceptance of offers and clearing price, DSO will enter into CDS
contracts with successful bidders. According to the CDS contract, the capacity
supplier will be paid based on the price in the agreement and the resource operator
is obliged to deliver capacity or to reduce demand when called by the DSO. As CDS
is a contract, many of the relevant issues in the context of contracts theory (i.e.,
principal-agent relationship such as information asymmetry, moral hazard etc.), are
also applicable to CDS. Moreover, in practice writing a complete contract (taking
all contingencies into consideration) for CDS is both unfeasible and costly. However,
the following important issues need to be elucidated in a CDS contract.
5.3.3.1 Length of CDS contract
An important feature of the CDS contracts is the duration of agreement between
DSO and capacity provider. Short agreements have the advantage that they are
more easily tradable in a secondary market and also there is no long term financial
obligation for DSO. However, long term agreement gives more financial security
to capacity providers and avoids boom and bust in capacity market(DECC, 2012).
In practice, a uniform contract length for all resources is not feasible, given the
different cost structures, technology and asset age of capacity resources. Thus, in
order to encourage investments and reduce the risk to investors, the DSO needs to
differentiate between the existing resources and new capacities. It may be preferable
to give more time to new capacities because a longer term agreement will enhance
the certainty of return to investment and reduce the cost of capital.
A possible risk of differentiating between the existing and new capacities based
on contract length is that the projects that are under construction at the time of the
auction will be treated as existing resources. This creates incentive for investors to
withhold new investments until an auction is announced. In order to mitigate this
effect, the definition of existing and new resources should be based on the capability
to deliver at the time of the auction so as to treat only those resources that are
operational as existing resources.
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5.3.3.2 Prioritisation of support
Under the CDS contracts, resource operator, DSO and TSO are the entities that will
have control over the operational status of distributed resource. In order to improve
coordination among these players and avoid conflict of interest, prioritisation of
support needs to be clearly determined. The form of allocating priority can be
based on the type of resource and the initial purpose of developing the resource.
For example, if the resource is a DG which was originally installed to satisfy the
developer’s own demand, a feasible arrangement would be to give the owner of
DG resource priority because it is usually needed as backup power supply. The
DSO would then be the second entity that has priority to call the generation for
local balancing as no other alternative is available, and finally the TSO is the third
entity. Where the resource output is not required locally or nationally, the energy
produced can be sold into the wider electricity market.
5.3.3.3 Non-compliance risks
There are several sources of non-compliance risks such as the failure of successful
bidder to sign the CDS contract, failure to complete the project (for new resources),
risks related to the delays and failure of supplier to deliver the committed capacity,
risk of underbidding and finally regulatory and administrative risks(IRENA, 2013).
As in other contracts, the CDS needs to address these issues at an appropriate stage.
For example, the risk of delay and underbidding can be reduced by applying stringent
compliance rules. Frequent monitoring of project development can reduce the risk of
failure with respect to construction of new resources. Moreover, strict qualification
checks at pre-auction stage reduce regulatory and administrative risks such as those
related to the project siting, grid connection and environmental obligations.
A challenging issue from the perspective of the DSO is the commitment of the
capacity provider to deliver when needed. Uncertainty in this will undermine the
effectiveness of smart solution as alternative to grid capacity enhancement. There-
fore, the DSO needs to ensure that a credible, effective enforcement and compliance
mechanism is in place that guarantees a timely delivery and applies a penalty in the
event of non-compliance. Drawing on the experience from the established capacity
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markets, there is a spectrum of approaches to reduce probability of non-compliance.
The market-based methods rest at one end and the administrative approaches are
located at the other end of the spectrum. The hybrid methods lay somewhere in
between.
One market based approach is to pin the terms of CDS contracts to some ref-
erence electricity market such that when the reference price is above the contract
price, the resource operator is required to pay the difference. This incentivises the
resource owners to deliver at the time of network constraint and peak demand, be-
cause even if they do not operate they still need to pay the difference(DECC, 2012).
The price spikes usually coincide with time of peak demand and network constraints.
However, if they do not coincide this method can be problematic. Moreover, in some
countries such a market might not be available to provide a reference price.
The administrative approach would be that the resource owners receive a capac-
ity payment for their availability period, as specified in CDS contract, and to be
penalised based on an administratively set price if they fail to deliver when they
are called or fail a spot check by DSO. This method is more straightforward and
easier to be implemented(DECC, 2012). However, the total annual penalties should
be capped to avoid unquantifiable risk to the investors. For example, the penalty
could be proportional to the volume of capacity (e.g., a percentage of the annual
payment for that resource during the capacity commitment period). Moreover, the
DSO should offer the option to resource provider to default on its commitment,
when called, and pay the penalty if unexpected faults developed.
The compliance monitoring approach that the DSO can adopt is context bounded.
However, regardless of the approach chosen; it needs to take into consideration sev-
eral aspects, such as the possibility of strategic behaviour and gaming the DSO,
allowing for maintenance planning of energy-based resources, and linking the size
of penalties to total volume of capacity payment etc. Moreover, in many capacity
markets the penalty price is not uniform across different resources. For example,
the PJM and ISO NE capacity markets differentiate between supply side resources
and demand side resources for non-compliance and associated penalties (Gottstein
and Schwartz, 2010). This differentiation can also be helpful in the context of CDS
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contract given different nature of energy based and non-energy based resources.
5.3.3.4 Reconfiguration auction
Due to the possibility of unpredictable circumstances and change in economic fac-
tors, there might be discrepancies between the contractual obligation of bidders and
the actual cost of their contract fulfilment(NYSERDA, 2004). Thus, when there
is evidence of such condition, a reconfiguration auction should be held in an ap-
propriate time, ex-post, in order to allow suppliers to correct for these differences.
For example, the ISO New England’s capacity market runs monthly and yearly
reconfiguration auctions to allow deficient suppliers procure replacement capacity
(Gottstein and Schwartz, 2010). The lack of such a mechanism increases probability
of unavailability of resource in the time of need.
Other situations that require reconfiguration auction include the state of inade-
quate or excess supply of capacity. As mentioned in Section 5.3.2.3., the inadequate
supply dominates when there is insufficient supply from the existing capacities at
the first round of the descending clock auction. The excess supply can prevail when
there is a decrease in load forecast8 following the auction and capacity acquisition.
Under these conditions, the reconfiguration auction can help the DSO to buy or
to sell CDS contracts and match supply with demand more accurately. The recon-
figuration auction, for a specific target, can be held close to the year of delivery.
The price in the reconfiguration option can be higher or lower than the initial CDS
auctions.
5.4 Conclusions
The power sector is evolving with anticipation of increase in penetration of dis-
tributed generation, storage technologies and demand side participation. Distribu-
tion networks which were originally designed as passive and one way transporters of
electrical energy are entering a new era in which operational philosophy will change
8The error in forecast is natural when looking far into the future i.e. the CDS auction has been
held few years in advance of delivery period.
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to the bi-directional power flows and the use of information and communication
technologies. These will bring new opportunities for implementing innovative solu-
tions for traditional issues such as demand driven network reinforcement, through
locally satisfying of demand, using distributed resources.
This chapter proposed a new market-based model termed ”contract for defer-
ral scheme” (CDS) to integrate an economically efficient portfolio of distributed
resources including distributed generations, storage technologies, demand response
and energy efficiency, as an alternative to demand driven network investment. The
concept of CDS is consistent with an unbundled power sector paradigm, and lies
within the wider context of an extended business model of distribution utilities. The
details of the CDS procurement were discussed in three stages: pre-auction, auction
and post-auction. The pre-auction stage explored the conditions for resource eligi-
bility; the auction stage discussed the process of price discovery and market rules
and finally post-auction stage addressed issues such as the length of contracts and
compliance monitoring.
The CDS contracts present several potential advantages. Firstly, they protect
the developers of distributed resources from market risks, decrease the financing
cost and improve commercial bankability of investments. Secondly, they improve
competition, encourage investments and hence; speed up the deployment of DGs,
storage facilities and demand side participation. Thirdly, CDS auctions help with
creating an integrated market for substitution of a resource portfolio as a virtual
network capacity, at distribution level, and simplifying the process of valuing al-
ternative solutions to grid reinforcements. Fourthly, CDS helps, to some extent,
alleviating the gradual reduction of reserve margin which is currently a major issue
in the post-liberalisation power sector.
Chapter 6
Conclusions
Distribution networks are an important part of power systems, which deliver electric-
ity to consumers and, at the same time, they play a principal role in the integration
of renewables, demand side management, security of electricity supply, market com-
petition, inter alia. The increase in demand for electricity as a result of consumption
growth along with environmental policies aiming at a decarbonised electricity sec-
tor strain the power grid more than ever. Additionally, the anticipated shift in the
operational paradigm of the power system, through the use of information technolo-
gies, implies the need for considerable automation and communication, especially at
the distribution level where the concept of smart grid comes to play an important
role. Therefore, development of a modern, flexible and reliable grid is essential and
among the crucial challenges of the power sector in coming years.
The issue of network development requires sizable investments and innovation
by grid companies, which are natural monopolies and, hence, subject to economic
regulation. The motivation behind the regulation of the industry is to improve
economic efficiency and to ensure sufficient investment in a segment which lacks
competition. However, in practice, designing a regulatory system that provides the
right incentives for investment and innovation, without compromising other objec-
tives such as economic efficiency is more difficult than often perceived. Accordingly,
this research was designed to address some of the most relevant regulatory, eco-
nomic and policy challenges pertaining to grid development. More specifically, the
thesis aimed at developing an understanding of investment drivers, the relationship
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between investment and static/dynamic efficiency and innovative alternatives to
traditional network reinforcement, within the context of incentive regulation. The
general theme of the thesis was broken down into four research questions, which
were addressed in Chapters 2,3,4 and 5.
This chapter synthesises the empirical findings as well as the results from other
methodological approaches used in the thesis. The outline of the chapter is as
follows. The next section reflects on the main findings and results with respect
to individual research questions posed at the beginning of the thesis. Section 6.2
presents the implications of research results for policy and practice in regulation
of electricity networks. Finally, the limitations of thesis and the areas of further
research have been discussed in Section 6.3.
6.1 Research findings and reflection
The investment drivers and responsiveness of companies to the regulators’ incen-
tives with regard to investment have been investigated in Chapter 2. The chapter
provides an insight into investment behaviour of network companies under incentive
regulation with ex-post regulatory treatment of investment.
The aim of incentive regulation is to set up a penalty and reward scheme that
directs companies toward an efficient level of investment and operating cost. The
response of regulated firms to investment incentives depends on the net effect of
the costs and benefits resulting from their response. For example, the empirical
findings of Chapter 2 showed no response from Norwegian distribution companies
to incentives for network energy loss reduction, suggesting that these incentives do
not justify investments. Although technical reasons might also explain this (i.e.,
reducing energy loss below a certain threshold is not possible due to the natural
resistance of physical materials), from an economic perspective, the companies re-
spond to an incentive only when the cost of taking measures is lower than ignoring
the incentive.
Another example along the same line is the cost of service interruptions. The in-
centive for reducing outages, under the Norwegian regulatory framework, is stronger
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because the cost of energy not served is part of the benchmarking model and, at
the same time, directly deducted from the companies’ revenue at the final stage
of revenue setting. Therefore, unlike the case of network energy losses, the cost of
inaction is not trivial. The empirical evidence in chapter 2 confirms that Norwegian
distribution companies have strongly responded to outage-reducing incentives.
The results of Chapter 2 also show that the investment rate in the previous period
explains a large part of variations in capital expenditure of firms. The importance of
lagged dependent variable (i.e., investment rate) in explaining investment behaviour
of network companies suggests that the response of firms to information is slow. This
can be because of adjustment costs and/or the nature of the ex-post regulatory model
in which investment spikes can result in cost disallowance (i.e., cause the firms with
high investment rate to look inefficient). Therefore, the network companies try to
avoid instantaneous responses and instead spread their investment plan over multiple
periods. Both of these effects motivates the autoregressive process developed for
inefficiency, in chapter 4.
The incentives to maintain and modernise the grid can be provided through
different instruments which vary in terms of strength, effectiveness and the degree
of intervention. The economic incentives have the advantage of being unintrusive.
Nonetheless, the response of firms is not guaranteed because it depends on the cost
of action versus that of inaction. The economic incentives can be strengthened with
direct instruments in order to secure investments prioritised by the regulator (e.g.,
network access).
A challenge, from a regulatory perspective, is how to adjust the incentives at the
right level so as to deter inefficient behaviour. This is because strengthening the
incentives increases the probability of overcapitalisation. In a parallel argument,
weak incentives raise the chance of underinvestment. On the other hand, frequent
adjustment of incentives can create regulatory uncertainty and, over a longer term,
results in disincentives for investment.
A stable regulatory framework is a prerequisite for predicting the behaviour of
regulated firms. Therefore, adjustment of incentives should be based on the strong
evidence of systematic over or under-investment and after periods of observing the
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firms’ behaviour.
From a regulatory point of view, investment incentives are designed and imple-
mented in order to achieve two specific objectives. The first one is the objective of
“investment sufficiency” which has been discussed in Chapter 2. The second one is
“investment efficiency” which ensures that capital expenditures will not come at the
expense of cost efficiency. This is the topic of Chapter 3 in which the relationship
between investment and efficiency under incentive regulation has been explored.
Understanding the relationship between investment and efficiency is instrumen-
tal in addressing the issue of investment under regulation. The method of regulatory
treatment of investment, under incentive regulation, determines the way investment
and efficiency are related. Under the ex-ante regulatory treatment of investment,
there is no clear quantifiable relationship between investment and efficiency, as cap-
ital costs are excluded from the benchmarking model. Thus, it is often hard to
measure the efficiency effect of investment as the operating and capital costs are
treated differently and the regulatory regime implies that efficiency gains can mainly
be achieved from operating costs.
Unlike the ex-ante approach, under the ex-post regulatory treatment of invest-
ment there is a quantifiable relationship between investment and efficiency. This is
due to the fact that capital cost is part of the benchmarking model and investment
behaviour of network companies will be reflected in their observed efficiency. How-
ever, the characteristic of this relationship is more complex than previously thought.
While it is possible to conclude that a lower level of investment will result in lower
total cost and consequently higher efficiency, the empirical evidence of Chapter 3
showed that this is not necessarily true. The largest efficiency losses after investment
were related to the firms with lower levels of capital expenditures to total cost ratio.
This is partly due to fact that benchmarking is a relative concept and behaviour of
firms is evaluated in relation to their peers and not in isolation. Thus, the behaviour
of competitors also affects the benchmarking results.
This indicates that the relationship between investment and efficiency is far from
linear under incentive regulation with ex-post regulatory treatment of investment.
Thus, it is difficult to infer about the firms’ investment efficiency a priori, based
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only upon their investment levels.
The presence of a relationship between firm investment level and cost efficiency
increases the incentives for cost-reducing investment. This stems from the fact
that inefficiency causes revenue loss but at the same time, firm has an incentive to
invest in order to benefit from the return on capital. The concept of no impact
efficiency introduced in Chapter 3 can be a useful benchmark to infer about the
investment efficiency of individual firms in an ex-post manner. However, it has the
same limitations of efficiency as a relative concept.
The implications of the relationship between investment and efficiency studied in
Chapter 3 illuminated the difficulties of achieving investment efficiency. Along with
regulatory invectives for investments, the actual capital cost needs to be controlled
in order to deter strategic behaviour in pursuit of supernormal profit. This is why
the ex-post regulatory treatment of investment links the capital cost of companies
to their efficiency level. Although this approach can reveal more information about
the firm’s investment behaviour in relation to other companies, the possibility of
harmonised overinvestments reduces the effective range of this approach.
Moreover, investment is a dynamic and long term undertaking, whereas efficiency
obtained from benchmarking is a measure of the short-term behaviour of a firm.
Therefore, the simultaneous incentive for investment and cost efficiency can send
inconsistent signals to the regulated firm. This is the subject of Chapter 4 in which
the dynamic aspect of efficiency in regulated firms, with ex-post regulatory treatment
of investment, has been investigated.
The lack of incentives for dynamic efficiency is a major disadvantage of incentive
regulation. In essence, incentive regulation is designed and applied to incentivise
cost reducing measures. The cost of regulated companies, which mainly comprised
operating and capital expenditures, does not have a uniform structure as these cost
categories serve different purposes with different time scales. On the other hand,
the incentives for cost reduction can only target those costs that have a short term
nature such as operating costs. This is because the incentive regime seeks short
run efficiency gains, which is only possible with respect to adjustable costs and is
problematic with quasi-fixed inputs such as capital costs. This makes the incentive
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regulation a tool for short term objectives which does not take into account the long
term nature of investment and innovation.
Although this is a common feature of incentive regulation models, the extent to
which it impacts the dynamic behaviour of companies varies between the ex-ante
and ex-post regulatory approaches. The empirical evidence from Chapter 4 shows
that, under ex-post model, inefficiency persistence due to sluggish adjustment of
quasi-fixed inputs, in the short run, is a critical issue. The persistent inefficiency
can seriously affect the companies’ short run productivity and consequently their
regulated revenue. The benchmarking methods are unable to distinguish between
the controllable and uncontrollable parts of inefficiency evolution. Therefore, the
incentive to reduce the total expenditures of a firm to the efficient level can come
at the cost of compromising the long term objectives of investment and innovation.
Under the ex-ante regulatory model of investment treatment, the issue of dy-
namic efficient behaviour is less critical compared to the ex-post model. This is
because the length of the price control review period is usually higher and static
efficiency is decoupled from capital expenditure by excluding investment from the
benchmarking model. However, the advantage of this approach is relative as it suf-
fers from several drawbacks discussed in Chapter 4. These shortcomings include the
incentives for strategic behaviour in terms of cost transfer between cost categories
and also gold plating of capital.
The lack of incentive for dynamic efficiency in incentive regulation hampers the
objective of grid development as it affects the process of cost recovery in network
companies. The solution to this problem is not straightforward. A shift to the ex-
ante approach as well as the introduction of complementary incentives for innovation
can, to some extent, reduce this problem. However, the regulator needs to deal with
the side effects of the ex-ante method as well.
The design of incentives such as that of RIIO-ED1 regulatory model in the UK,
which rewards the downward deviation of investment costs from the agreed level of
capital expenditures in the business plan might encourage innovation by regulated
companies. These innovations can reduce inefficient capital expenditures which pre-
vail under the traditional operating paradigm of electricity networks. This is the
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topic of Chapter 5, which explores a practical solution to bring down inefficiency in
network capacity enhancement. This approach takes advantage of distributed en-
ergy resources penetration to reduce the need for network reinforcement and improve
the efficiency of asset utilisation.
The integration of distributed resource, as an alternative to traditional network
reinforcement, not only improves efficiency of network utilisation but also minifies
the problem of public opposition with respect to grid infrastructure expansion. A
shift in the operating paradigm of distribution companies from network operator
to system operator is helpful to enable an effective use of distributed resources.
This implies major changes in the technical and the business operation of these
companies. From a technical viewpoint, distribution network management, which
traditionally has been passive, needs to become active. In this way, the distribution
companies will have more control over the power flows and dispatchable demand
and supply. This allows distributed resources to be used for efficient balancing of
the system at the distribution level. It also avoids network congestions and thereby
averts the need for costly redundant transformers. From an economic perspective,
the business model of distribution companies needs to be extended as suggested in
Chapter 5. The new business model includes market operation for integration of
distributed resources, and utilising the new possibilities arising from active network
management.
The contract for deferral scheme (CDS), introduced in Chapter 5, enables firms
to optimise on asset-based network services and, at the same time, provides a sus-
tainable business model for integration of distributed resources. Under the CDS
contract, the process of price discovery is based upon a competitive forward auction
which is an economically efficient way of revealing the real value of network services.
Additionally, the CDS contract reduces the cost of financing renewable projects and
encourages new investment through providing a sustainable cash stream for the re-
source developer. Furthermore, the financing source of CDS contracts is, in fact,
the avoided costs of network reinforcement. Therefore, CDS is appealing from a
regulatory perspective because it reduces the capital cost of companies. Moreover,
CDS is part of an extended business model for distribution network companies which
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requires going beyond connection and use of system charges. This allows distribu-
tion network companies to take on a new and active role and helps them to fend off
shrinking of their revenue as a result of distributed generations’ uptake close to the
demand site.
6.2 Policy implications
The outcome of this research has some policy implications concerning the regulation
of natural monopoly electricity networks. A key regulatory challenge is the issue
of investment in power network companies. The ability to adapt to the dynamic
environment of the power sector is particularly important as lack of flexibility, in the
current forms of incentive regulation, caused the network companies to lag behind
the frontier. The climate policy objectives initiated a new trend in the power system
operation in the form of renewable integration and decentralised generation. Thus,
the incentive regulation needs to offer sufficient level of flexibility to allow distribu-
tion companies to play a more active role and at the same time evolve synchronously
with the rest of the power sector. In what follows, the implications of the thesis
results for policy and practice are discussed.
6.2.1 The concept of no impact efficiency as a benchmark
In theory, incentive regulation with ex-post regulatory treatment of investment,
can incentivise investment efficiency as, for example, overinvestment will increase
the total cost of regulated companies and lowers their efficiency. However, the
previous studies using this model of incentive regulation do not explain the nature
of the relationship between investment and efficiency. The theoretical framework,
introduced in Chapter 3, bridges this gap. According to that framework, there is a
minimum level of efficiency that a regulated firm, with ex-post regulatory treatment
of investment, needs to achieve in order to pass a benchmarking exercise without
cost disallowance. This productivity level, which is the revenue neutral efficiency
effect of investment, was termed “no impact efficiency”.
The concept of no impact efficiency illuminates the process under which incentive
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regulation seeks investment optimality. This concept can help with addressing the
issue of investment under regulation and thus has several advantages. First, it
improves our understanding of investment behaviour of firms under an incentive
framework. The incentive to invest in cost-reducing capital is the direct consequence
of incentive regulation. This effect, which is embedded in incentive regime, can be
explained through the no impact efficiency concept.
Second, it provides a benchmark for the sector regulators to examine the firms’
investment efficiency and design more effective policies with regard to investment
and associated incentives. This is particularly important given that the assessment of
investment behaviour of firms and identifying the incidence of overinvestment under
total cost benchmarking is difficult. Third, the measure of no impact efficiency can
be used by regulated firms to adjust their investment level accordingly.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that no impact efficiency is also a relative con-
cept and has all the limitations of efficiency measurement. For example, the be-
haviour of peer companies can move the reference point for a particular firm re-
garding the investment. Thus, although no impact efficiency reveals information
about the investment behaviour of firms; it should be applied with same level of
cautiousness as the conventional efficiency measurements.
6.2.2 Harmonised investment behaviour
A common perception in incentive regulation with ex-post regulatory treatment of
investment is that overinvestment behaviour will be identified in the benchmarking
exercise as it reduces the efficiency score of the firms. However, as discussed in
Chapter 3, under the condition of harmonised investment behaviour by regulated
companies, the benchmarking practice fails to detect the incidence of overinvestment.
This is because harmonised investments change the cost of all firms uniformly and
within-group comparison does not reveal much information about their investment
behaviour.
Harmonised investment behaviour can be the result of two circumstances. First,
when the regulated firms are working under a similar investment policy, an unwanted
policy effect might harmonise their investment behaviour over time. The second
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case is related to collusion among the regulated firms. The presence of any of these
conditions is sufficient to create harmonised investment behaviour among the firms
and reduce the power of benchmarking to detect the incidence of overcapitalisation.
The harmonised investment behaviour is a caveat on the effectiveness of incentive
regulation and the extent to which it can address overinvestment through total cost
benchmarking. The regulators who have adopted this approach assume that bench-
marking will provide them with necessary information about investment efficiency
of the firms. However, the success of incentive regulation to address the incidence
of overcapitalisation, to some extent, depends on the investment behaviour of firms.
The notion of harmonised behaviour draws a boundary around the incentive regu-
lation and specifies the edge beyond which the reliability of information from total
cost benchmarking, with respect to investment behaviour of companies, diminishes.
This indicates the necessity of between-group comparisons (as opposed to within-
group) by, for example, using information from similar companies outside the sector
or perhaps, where feasible, international benchmarking.
6.2.3 The concept of inefficiency persistence
An important side effect of incentive regulation with ex-post regulatory treatment
of investment is the issue of adjustment of quasi-fixed inputs such as capital expen-
ditures. This arises from the short-term nature of incentive regulation which seeks
to contract inputs for a given quantity and quality of outputs or maximise outputs
for given levels of inputs. The concept of inefficiency persistence which was intro-
duced and measured in Chapter 4 indicated that incentive regulation disregards the
dynamic aspect of firms’ behaviour.
The common application of incentive regulation, based on output maximisation
or input minimisation, is insufficient to mimic the outcome of a competitive mar-
ket. The empirical results of Chapter 4 provided new insights into the way that
inefficiency should be defined as the basis for assessment of firm investment perfor-
mance. Traditionally, the inefficiency of regulated firms is viewed and estimated as
the measure of deviation from the static optimum frontier. This is in contrast to the
concept of dynamic efficiency which defines inefficiency as a measure of deviation
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from “optimal capital stock adjustment”. This perspective provides more flexibility
for regulated firms and does not detach them from their history and future when
their investment performance is evaluated.
The insufficiency of efficiency measures with the static nature calls for the ex-
tension of incentive regulation. This includes the introduction of incentives for
dynamically efficient behaviour, as opposed to static efficiency, which is problem-
atic with respect to investment and innovation. The firm inefficiency evolution is
currently considered to be completely under the control of the firm whereas the
empirical results in Chapter 4 suggest that this is not necessarily true. The pres-
ence of quasi-fixed inputs reduces the control of firms on inefficiency evolution. The
evolution of inefficiency, under this condition, depends upon the scale and type of
investments. A modified incentive regulation, which takes into account the dynamic
dimension of firm business, promotes flexibility in investment and innovation and
helps the regulation outcome to better mimic a competitive market.
6.2.4 Distribution-managed market model for renewable in-
tegration
Although penetration of renewable energy resources has generally been considered
to be policy oriented, the market approaches should be given priority where feasible.
There is a significant scope for the contribution of distribution companies on the
problem of renewable integration which can be achieved. For this to happen, the
operation and organisation of these companies require reshaping and restructuring.
This is to divert the concentration from physical asset-based network services to
a combination of traditional network operation and alternative solutions such as
procurement of distributed resources that provides network services. There is also a
need for evolution of power distribution companies from network operator to system
operator which implies market operation along with physical operation of the grid.
At the same time, it is crucial to distinguish between regulated and non-regulated
activities of distribution networks and allow them to have an active role in the
process of electricity service supply.
The introduction of a new market, based on the contract for deferral scheme
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(CDS) discussed in Chapter 5, to facilitate integration of renewable resources at
distribution level, is among those possibilities that are yet to be utilised. There are
significant advantages, both technically and economically, in a distribution-managed
market model for distributed resources integration. From a technical point of view,
integration of renewable resources under management of the distribution system
operator allows distribution companies to contribute to national balancing services,
quality of supply improvement, maintaining the voltage profile, among other things.
Form an economic point of view, the CDS approach based on the long term contract
will lower the cost of capital and will improve efficiency of network asset utilisation.
6.3 Limitations of research and the path forward
There are two types of possible limitations in this research. One pertains to those
topics which are not covered here but are still related to the overall theme of the the-
sis (i.e., grid development). The second type is concerned with the methodological
or data-related limitations.
The overall theme of the thesis includes areas which have not been covered
thoroughly as any of them can be the subject of another PhD thesis. Areas such
as social acceptability of grid development, the effectiveness of different investment
models, network security and resiliency enhancement, among other topics require
detailed investigation. Despite this, the research has attempted to address several
key issues on the problem of grid development. These issues embrace a wide range
of sub-topics from economic and market modelling to regulation and policy aspects
of sustainable grid development.
A cross-country analysis will probably enrich the empirical findings with respect
to models and concepts introduced in this thesis. This can be useful for all three
empirical chapters in general, and Chapters 3 and 4 in particular which introduce and
discuss new concepts and theoretical frameworks. Application of the approaches and
concepts introduced in Chapters 3 and 4 to other countries would allow controlling
for some of the differences and would provide a new insight into the problem under
investigation. At the same time, it should be noted that the dataset adopted for
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empirical works in the thesis represents a leading country in power sector reform
and regulation of distribution companies. The Norwegian regulator (NVE) regulates
around 130 distribution companies and constitutes one of the world richest datasets
in this area.
The methodological approaches adopted in the thesis can be compared with
other feasible techniques to examine the robustness of the introduced concepts with
respect to estimation methods. In chapter two, for example, although the adopted
methodological approach was based on a thoughtful economic and statistical reason-
ing, a comparison of estimation results with non-Bayesian approaches can further
underpin the outcomes. The same applies to Chapter 4 which uses a Bayesian
technique for estimation of a dynamic stochastic frontier model. In Chapter 3, how-
ever, a comparison with non-parametric methods would be beneficial as it could
reveal more information about the robustness of the approach taken. The concep-
tual market model developed in Chapter 5 can be further enriched by economic and
mathematical modelling in order to develop and conduct scenario analysis.
The area of grid development is receiving increased attention in energy economics
because of its relevance for a sustainable power sector and the significant scope for
further works. For example, the issue of social acceptance of grid infrastructures is
set to become a major challenge which can increase the cost of projects significantly.
This area requires economic thinking and research to reduce the transaction costs
and provide incentives for affected communities to become involved in the process
of decision making.
Another important aspect of grid development is the issue of network protection
against low probability, high impact events as other critical infrastructures heavily
rely on a reliable power supply. The interdependency among critical infrastructures
makes the total societal cost of electricity supply interruption, higher than expected.
This is particularly due to lack of substitutes for electricity and also instantaneous
failure spread of a triggered event. This area requires investigation to understand
the impact of power supply interruptions on the system of interdependent critical
infrastructures. Such studies can help to explore the ways to use the indirect and
higher order effects of electricity supply interruptions to incentivise investment in
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resiliency enhancement.
Finally, the necessity to develop interconnectors and offshore transmission lines
is becoming a pressing issue. There is currently a growing interest among the Euro-
pean countries to become interconnected and create a single electricity market. This
is to utilise the renewable resources more efficiently, improve security of supply and
boost deployment of low carbon technologies. Achieving these objectives, however,
requires a regulatory model that overcomes obstacles and ensures investors of prof-
itability of economically justified investments. The design of innovative regulatory
models that consolidate the process of decision making with respect to both onshore
and offshore lines can create synergies.
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Appendix A
Regularity conditions
Table A1: Regularity conditions (monotonicity)
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Table A2: Regularity conditions (concavity)
